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Cournot Oligopoly with Information Sharing

Li, Lode (1985) Cournot Oligopoly with Information Sharing. Social Science Working Paper, 561. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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This paper studies the incentives for information sharing among firms in a Cournot oligopoly facing a linear uncertain demand and an affine conditional expectation information structure. No information sharing is found to be the unique equilibrium in two cases in which the signals with equal precision are assumed indivisible and infinitely divisible. However, the nonpooling equilibrium converges to the situation where the pooling strategies are adopted as the amount of information increases. Hence, the efficiency is achieved in the competitive equilibrium as the number of the firm become large.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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Additional Information:Published as Li, Lode. "Cournot oligopoly with information sharing." The RAND Journal of Economics (1985): 521-536.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:561
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170918-132505537
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81530
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:19 Sep 2017 17:18
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:43

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