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Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point

McKelvey, Richard D. and Schofield, Norman (1985) Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point. Social Science Working Paper, 552. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170918-145109056

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Abstract

Previous analyses have shown that if a point x is to be a core of a majority rule voting game in Euclidean space, when preferences are smooth, then the utility gradients must satisfy certain restrictive symmetry conditions. In this paper these results are generalized to the case of an arbitrary voting rule, and necessary and sufficient conditions, expressed in terms of "pivotal" coalitions, are obtained.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171113-161716689Related ItemPublished Version
Additional Information:Revised. Original dated to January 1985. The contribution of the first author is supported, in part, by NSF grant SES-84-09654 to the California Institute of Technology, and that of the second author is based on work supported by NSF grant SES-84-18295 to the School of Social Sciences, University of California at Irvine. We are grateful to Charles Plott and Jeff Strnad for a number of helpful observations. Published as McKelvey, Richard D., and Norman Schofield. "Generalized symmetry conditions at a core point." Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society (1987): 923-933.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
NSFSES-8409654
NSFSES-8418295
Subject Keywords:Majority rule, Necessary conditions, Sufficient conditions, Social order, Game theory, Majority voting, Euclidean space, Binary relations, Social choice, Mathematical functions
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:552
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170918-145109056
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170918-145109056
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81542
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:19 Sep 2017 16:44
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:44

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