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Bargaining Theory for Games with Transferable Value

Schofield, Norman (1984) Bargaining Theory for Games with Transferable Value. Social Science Working Paper, 509. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170920-152358814

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Abstract

This paper presents an existence proof of a bargaining equilibrium set B*, in the case of games with transferable value, by making use of the Knaster Kuratowski Mazurkiewicz (KKM) Theorem. As a corollary proof of existence of the usual bargaining set B1 is obtained. Whereas previous proofs of B1 existence have made use of fixed point arguments, use of the KKM theorem provides an insight into possible extensions of the existence proof to the nontransferable value case.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Additional Information:This material is based on work supported by a Nuffield Grant on Political Stability. Thanks are due to Kim Border for making available his unpublished manuscript, and to Graciela Chichilnisky for helpful discussion on her unpublished work.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Nuffield FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:509
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170920-152358814
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170920-152358814
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81643
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:20 Sep 2017 22:34
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:45

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