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Full Nash Implementation of Neutral Social Functions

Strnad, Jeff (1984) Full Nash Implementation of Neutral Social Functions. Social Science Working Paper, 500. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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This paper characterizes neutral social functions that are fully implementable. A necessary condition for full implementation under either the Nash equilibrium concept or the strong Nash equilibrium concept is that the neutral social function being implemented be monotonic and simple. If a neutral monotonic social function is simple and the set of winning coalitions is nondictatorial then the social function is fully implementable by a set of Nash equilibria. For finite alternative sets a neutral monotonic social function will be fully implementable by a set of strong Nash equilibria if and only if it is simple and dictatorial.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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Additional Information:Revised. Original dated to October 1983. This article is derived from a chapter of my Ph.D. dissertation, Strnad (1982). I have profited greatly from the suggestions and guidance of Donald Brown in this work. Any remaining errors are solely my responsibility. Substantial financial support for this work has been provided by Summer Research Grants for 1981 and 1982 from the University of Southern California Law Center. Published as Strnad, Jeff. "Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions." Journal of Mathematical Economics 16.1 (1987): 17-37.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
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University of Southern CaliforniaUNSPECIFIED
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:500
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170921-132224090
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81689
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:21 Sep 2017 21:25
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:45

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