

DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125

ETHNICITY AND ELECTORAL CHOICE: MEXICAN-AMERICAN VOTING
BEHAVIOR IN THE CALIFORNIA 30TH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT

Bruce E. Cain and D. Roderick Kiewiet



SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 492

September 1983

ETHNICITY AND ELECTORAL CHOICE: MEXICAN-AMERICAN VOTING BEHAVIOR IN
THE CALIFORNIA 30TH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT

ABSTRACT

The 1982 election in California offers a unique natural experiment in ethnic and racial block voting. The race in the 30th Congressional District matched a well-financed Anglo Republican, John Rousselot, against an incumbent Hispanic, Marty Martinez, in a predominantly Hispanic seat. On the ballot with Martinez and Rousselot were the successful Republican candidates for Governor and the U. S. Senate, George Deukmejian and Pete Wilson, and the losing Democratic candidates, Tom Bradley (who is Black) and Jerry Brown. These variations in the race and ethnicity of the candidates on the ballot in 1982 can be used to estimate the impact of ethnic and racial consideration in voting decisions. The data for this study were gathered in two surveys of the 30th Congressional District of California. The first was a telephone survey of 455 respondents administered during the third week of October, 1982. The second was a poll of 409 voters as they left the voting booth on election day.

The substantial growth of the Mexican-American population during the last decade has created considerable interest in the Mexican-American voter. Although national election surveys do not sample a sufficient number of Mexican-Americans to permit adequate analysis of their attitudes and political behavior, there have been many excellent regional studies (Garcia, 1973; McCleskey and Merrill, 1973; Freeman, 1974; Levy and Kramer, 1974; Garcia and de la Garza, 1977; Baird, 1977; de la Garza and Brischetto, 1983a,b; de la Garza and Weaver, 1983). Most of these surveys have focused on Texas, New Mexico and Arizona, and many have looked at local council and gubernatorial races where Mexican-Americans made their greatest gains in the seventies. However, nearly half of the Latino population in the southwest currently resides in California, and Mexican-Americans there have made great efforts to win representation in Congress. This study examines one of the Congressional seats targeted by Californian Mexican-Americans in 1982--the 30th CD in LA county.

The race in the 30th matched a well-financed Republican, John Rousselot, against a Mexican-American Democrat, Marty Martinez. Rousselot had lost his seat in the 1981 redistricting. Rather than face a neighboring Republican incumbent in an expensive and potentially

bitter primary, Rousselot chose to contest the 30th. Although the 30th was 65% Democratic in registration (a safe Democratic seat by California standards), Rousselot had reason to believe that he might succeed. To begin with, Martinez had only narrowly won a July special election that was called when Danielson retired to take a position on the bench, and the bitter special election campaign had left a residue of ill feeling among the district's Anglo Democrats. It was reported that some resented the presumption that the 30th should become an Hispanic seat after Danielson's retirement. Martinez was also vulnerable on certain personal issues: he had been a Republican for some years before he joined the Democratic party and, as an Assemblyman, it was alleged that he had received large payments from owners of an unpopular dumpsite. Finally, even though the seat was 50% Mexican-American in population, the electorate was only 30% Mexican-American and Mexican-American voters in that area had not traditionally voted in high numbers.

In the end, Martinez' 54% vote share was significantly below the 65% Democratic registration in the district. Hence, this race provides a good opportunity to answer several questions: 1) were Mexican-American voters more likely to support Martinez than nonMexican? 2) was there Anglo backlash? and 3) in what other ways did ethnicity affect the vote?

In this regard, the 1982 election offers a unique natural experiment in ethnic and racial block voting. On the ballot with Martinez and Rousselot were the successful Republican candidates for

Governor and the U. S. Senate, George Deukmejian and Pete Wilson, and the losing Democratic candidates, Tom Bradley (who is Black) and Jerry Brown. These variations in the race and ethnicity of the candidates on the ballot in 1982 can be used to estimate the impact of ethnic and racial considerations in voting decisions. The data for this study were gathered in two surveys of the 30th Congressional District of California. The first was a telephone survey of 455 respondents administered during the third week of October, 1982. The second was a poll of 409 voters as they left the voting booth on election day.

EVIDENCE OF ETHNIC VOTING

The first task is to assess the degree of ethnic and racial voting by comparing the choices among Anglo and Mexican-American voters across the three races. Table 1 displays the possible combinations of choices and analyzes them by party (i.e., voter's registration) and ethnicity. The data reveal several things. First, Rousselot did succeed in winning Democratic support, including 14% of the Mexican-American Democrats sampled.

[Table 1 about here]

(This figure was arrived at by summing across the figures for Mexican-American Democrats in the appropriate columns, i.e., columns 2, 5, 6, and 8.) Rousselot was also supported by about two thirds of the small number of Mexican-American Republicans interviewed. And, as Table 1 also shows, 7% of the Mexican-American Democrats voted for Rousselot

while simultaneously supporting both Bradley and Brown: in short, the only race they defected on was the one in which a Mexican-American candidate was running.

In general, though, the predominantly Democratic Mexican-American voters in this district gave strong support to all Democratic candidates. Seventy-eight percent voted a straight Democratic ballot, 2% split their vote on the Senate and Governor's races and supported Martinez, and 6% voted for the Republican candidates in all the major races except for Congress. The finding of high Democratic loyalty among Hispanic voters is very much consistent with previous studies (Levy and Kramer, 1974; de la Garza, 1977a). While the numbers are too small to permit firm conclusions, it does appear that a higher fraction of Mexican-American Republicans (36%) than of Anglo Republicans (19%) defected from their party to vote for Martinez.

In sum, Mexican-American voters in this district exhibited a high degree of support for Martinez and for the other Democratic candidates. Still, the 14% defection rate among Mexican-American Democrats in the Congressional race is not trivial. Combined with evidence in our poll that large numbers of Mexican-American voters were undecided until very late in the campaign, this reinforces the point made in previous studies that the support of Mexican-American voters for Mexican-American candidates--even of the same party as themselves--is by no means automatic, and that "bloc voting" is hardly inevitable (de la Garza, 1977a; Baird, 1977).

What about the behavior of Anglo voters in this district?

Previous studies found that credible, salient Latino candidates can cause backlash among Anglo voters (Guzman, 1973; de la Garza, 1974). The question in this case is whether redistricting the seat to favor a Mexican-American candidate and the ethnic emphasis of the Martinez campaign caused block voting against his candidacy on the part of Anglos in his district. To begin with, the fact that 17% of the Anglo Democrats voted a straight Republican ticket is one of many indications that on average they were more disloyal than the Mexican-American Democrats. On the other hand, the number who supported Rousselot but voted for Brown and Bradley--the clearest case of ethnic or candidate-specific backlash--was only 3% higher among Anglo Democrats than among Mexican-American Democrats. Thus it appears that while the overall level of party disloyalty among Anglo Democrats was much higher than among Mexican-American Democrats, the level of ticket-splitting against Martinez specifically was not significantly higher.

It is possible, of course, to test more rigorously the proposition that Mexican-American voters were more likely to support Martinez than other voters. Although the tabular data seem to suggest that this occurred, the bivariate evidence of higher Mexican-American support may have been caused by random statistical error, or by the failure to control for other variables.

The model proposed is therefore a multivariate one that includes the voter's ethnicity, party, employment status and religion. These were specified as dummy variables, which respectively took on the value

of 1 if the voter was Mexican-American, if the voter was registered as a Democrat, if the voter or a family member had been out of work in the past few months, and if the voter was Catholic. The dependent variable is based upon a six cell classification of how the individual voted in the Senatorial, Gubernatorial, and Congressional races in 1982.

Although there are actually eight logically possible ways of voting in the three races, four of the categories are condensed to two because of their infrequency.

To estimate this model, we employ a multinomial logit procedure. The base category is referenced by having voted a straight Republican ticket; each alternative is thus considered relative to that base category. The data are displayed in Table 2.

[Table 2 about here]

The results of this estimation reveal several things. First and foremost, Mexican-Americans were statistically more likely to vote a straight Democratic ticket--even controlling for party, religion, and employment status--than nonMexican-Americans. Secondly, when they split their ticket, they were more likely to vote for Martinez. The effect is particularly strong for the Martinez-Wilson-Deukmejian category, the category in which the only Democrat the voter chose was Mexican-American. It would appear, then, that Mexican-Americans did tend to vote more frequently for Martinez even when other factors are controlled for.

FACTORS INFLUENCING THE MEXICAN-AMERICAN VOTE IN THE 30TH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT

Having established that Mexican-Americans did vote more heavily for Martinez, their support can now be analyzed more closely. In particular, it can be broken down into three components: issues, party loyalty, and candidate specific evaluations. To what extent did each of these components play a role in the decisions made by the voters of the 30th district?

The first component is the set of issue attitudes Mexican-American voters possess. While there are many potential issues that Anglo and Mexican-American could be compared on, the focus will be on those that were salient in the congressional race, such as the economy, nuclear weapons, and the various initiatives. This precludes, of course, any overall judgment as to the similarity or dissimilarity of Mexican-American and Anglo Democrats; it is quite likely that there are differences between the two on issues such as bilingualism, guest workers and immigration that we did not collect data on.

To begin with, did Anglo and Mexican-American voters in this district share the same perception of what the most important problems were facing the country in 1982? In the election day exit poll, voters were asked to report what they thought was the most important problem facing the nation. As before, the sample is partitioned by ethnicity and party registration.

[Tables 3-6 about here]

A perusal of the data reveals that all groups believed that unemployment was the most important problem facing the nation. This is not surprising, of course, given that unemployment was running at 10.1 percent in October 1982, and that the media gave the unemployment issue a great deal of coverage. Democrats were more inclined than Republicans to cite unemployment, but the margin is surprisingly small. Intraparty differences were even weaker. Mexican-American Democrats mentioned unemployment more frequently than did Anglo Democrats, and they were also somewhat less likely than Anglo Democrats to mention other sorts of economic problems (e.g., inflation, interest rates) and foreign policy, but these differences were much too small to be statistically significant. So while there were some differences, it would appear that party and ethnic factors were not strongly related to the perception of the most important problems facing the nation.

Although differences in the saliency of issues were not great in November 1982, differences in issue positions were somewhat larger. There were, for instance, three initiatives on the ballot that drew particular attention in November 1982: Proposition 12, which called upon the United States and the Soviet Union to halt the manufacture of nuclear weapons; Proposition 15, which required the registration of handguns; and Proposition 11, which would have required a 5 cent returnable deposit with the purchase of cans and bottles. On two of these initiatives, party differences were much greater than the ethnic differences. Indeed, the nuclear freeze initiative provoked marked differences between Democrats and Republicans (Democrats being more in

favor than Republicans), but no ethnic differences whatsoever. In fact, Mexican-American Democrats and Republicans were more at odds on this issue than any other two groups. Party differences were less significant on the handgun registration issue, but no ethnic cleavage existed at all. Only on the bottle bill were there marked Latino-Anglo differences.

In light of the fact that the economy was acknowledged to be the most important problem in 1982, differences in opinions about economic issues are particularly meaningful. Since there was a fairly uniform pattern to the responses to these questions, it is not necessary to consider the whole battery of economic questions that were asked in both polls. Instead, we will consider a representative one that was designed to elicit a general evaluation of Reagan's economic policies, namely, whether the voter believed that Reagan's economic policies hurt the economy, helped it, or whether it was too early to tell. As one would expect, there were substantial party differences in the responses to this question; Democrats were far more likely to be critical of the President's policies than Republicans. By comparison, the intraparty differences were very small. As the figures in Table 5 indicate, Mexican-American Democrats were slightly more opposed to Reagan's economic programs than Anglo Democrats, which is understandable given that a high percentage of them (43%) had either recently experienced unemployment themselves or had someone in their household who had been unemployed.

Finally, there is the issue of abortion. One conjecture that has received some attention in Republican circles recently is that Mexican-Americans persuaded to vote Republican because they are more socially conservative than other Democrats. If this is true, then an issue like abortion should show substantial intraparty differences. Indeed, at first glance, this would appear to be the case. As Table 6 indicates, Anglo Democrats in this district were more likely than Mexican-American Democrats to be pro-choice. However, these policy differences should be considered in light of the fact that 81% of the Mexican-Americans in the sample were Catholic, as opposed to only 42% of the Anglos.

While the data indicate that party differences were more substantial than ethnic differences on issues, the proper statistical test again requires a multivariate procedure. Table 7 presents a series of logit equations predicting the respondent's position on each of the previously discussed issues as a function of various socio-demographic characteristics and party. The dependent

[Table 7 about here]

variables are the individual's positions on the three most salient initiatives on the California ballot in 1982 (approval versus disapproval), whether the individual thinks that Reagan's economic policies have helped (versus whether they had hurt) and whether the individual thinks that abortions should never be permitted (as opposed to being pro-choice). The data come from the election day exit poll.

As is evident in Table 7, with the exception of the handgun initiative there is no strong association between being Mexican-American and holding any of these policy attitudes, and in none of the instances is the association significant by conventional statistical standards. Even the abortion issue, which in the bivariate table showed a relation between ethnicity and attitude, displays no relationship in the presence of a control for religion. In short, there is no difference between Anglo and Mexican-American Catholics on this issue: if the Hispanics are susceptible to the possibility of defection on this issue, so are other Catholic Democrats. By contrast, there are marked partisan differences on almost all of the issues, but especially on the economy. In sum, while there are some small ethnic differences on issues in the tabular data, these differences do not persist in the presence of control variables and are clearly less important than party and sex as explanatory variables.

EVALUATIONS OF THE CANDIDATES

While attitudes on the economy and the initiatives are one plausible explanation of the vote in the 30th, the impact of candidate evaluations is another. Was it the case that Mexican-Americans, controlling for party and other demographic factors, had more favorable impressions of Martinez and less favorable impressions of Rousselot than did other voters? Once again, the proper way to examine this question is to look at a multivariate model. The dependent variable is whether the respondent had a favorable, unfavorable or uncertain

impression of Martinez/Rousselot, and the independent variables are whether the respondent is Mexican-American, is unemployed, is a Catholic, and his/her position on the three initiatives examined earlier. As in the previous analysis, these were all entered as dummy variables. Results of this estimation procedure are reported in Table 8.

[Table 8 about here]

Looking at the Martinez equation first, it is clear that the party and ethnicity variables were the two most important determinants of candidate evaluations in this contest. That is to say, Democrats and Mexican-Americans were more likely to have a favorable impression of Martinez. Conversely, they were much more likely to have an unfavorable impression of Rousselot. The coefficients on both these variables are significant by conventional statistical standards. Indeed, they are the only ones that are significant: all the other variables, including the initiatives, are not. Clearly, even when party biases and the attitudes that are normally associated with being a Democrat in California were held constant, being a Mexican-American did influence one's perceptions of the candidates.

MEXICAN-AMERICANS AND PARTY REGISTRATION

The final component of the voting decision is partisanship. Since this is such a widely studied factor, there is no need to discuss it at great length. Registering with a party is a revealed expression of long-standing party loyalties. Party loyalties affect positions on

issues, as is evident with the initiatives. Party loyalties also affect candidate evaluations, as just seen. In the latter instance, being a Mexican-American had an effect on candidate evaluations independent of party. But if it is also the case that Mexican-Americans are more likely to be registered Democrats, then there is yet another route by which being Mexican-American affects issue attitudes, candidate evaluations and ultimately the vote; namely, the indirect effect through party loyalty.

Does such a causal connection exist? Table 9 is a test of the relation between being Mexican-American and party registration, once again following the procedure of controlling for other potential effects. The dependent variable is whether the respondent is a registered Democrat, an independent (or minor party voter), or a registered Republican (i.e., the suppressed category). The independent variables are dummies for being Mexican-American, unemployed, Catholic, a union member and female. The choices should be interpreted as the odds of being a Democrat versus a Republican (9.1) and of being an Independent versus a Republican (9.2).

[Table 9 about here]

As is evident from the data, Mexican-Americans were far more likely to be registered Democrats, even when their sex, employment status, union membership and religion were controlled for. The coefficient is large and significant by conventional statistical standards. Union members, the unemployed, and Catholics were also more

likely to be registered Democrats. Gender does not seem to be related in a significant manner to party registration. Mexican-Americans were also more likely to be Independents than Republicans (equation 9.2), as were males in this district. However, no other variable seems to predict the Independent category very well. In sum, it is clear that there is an important connection between ethnicity and party loyalty, adding yet another connection between being Mexican-American and voting for Martinez.

RELATING THE THREE COMPONENTS TO THE MARTINEZ VOTE

Having so far identified three ways in which being Mexican-American could have affected the voter's choice in the race for the 30th CD, it is appropriate to ask at this point which components seemed to have been most important. The variable to be explained is the pre-election indication of how the respondent would have voted if the election had been held at the time of the poll (the week before the election). The pre-election poll is used for two reasons. First, it contains all of the data necessary to test the effects of the three components, whereas the post-election poll does not. Secondly, it allows us to look at the crucial question of why so many voters—especially Democrats and Hispanics—were undecided so late in the campaign. The dependent variable is constructed in a manner such that equation 10.1 is the odds of intending to vote for Martinez versus Rousselot and equation 10.2 is the odds of being undecided versus intending to vote for Rousselot.

[Table 10 about here]

The explanatory variables are by now familiar. Experimentation with the specification led to the final model displayed in Table 10. Earlier attempts included models that had different measures of economic performance as well as the three most salient initiatives. Since economic evaluations were highly related to party, union membership, and employment status, the presence of an economic performance variable added little to the equation, and so was dropped in the final specification. Candidate evaluations were captured by four dummy variables: a favorable impression of Martinez, an unfavorable impression of Martinez, a favorable impression of Rousselot, and an unfavorable impression of Rousselot. A Mexican-American variable is included in order to capture any remaining, unspecified relations between ethnicity and the vote in this race.

The results of the estimations reveal several things. First, there were no residual ethnicity effects, as indicated by the fact that the coefficient on the Mexican-American effect is not significant. This can be interpreted as meaning that the model has comprehensively captured the various causal routes between ethnicity and choice with the other variables. Of the initiatives, only the pro-gun registration shows any strong association with the Martinez vote. By far the most important components of the Martinez vote were party loyalty and candidate evaluations. Of these, the largest effects were having a positive evaluation of Rousselot and party. Those who had developed a favorable impression of Rousselot were much more likely to

vote for him regardless of party. By comparison, having a favorable impression of Martinez had less effect in causing defections from Rousselot. The effectiveness of Rousselot's campaign and the failure of the Martinez campaign at that point to successfully counter Rousselot's attacks are evident in these estimations.

The equation (10.2) predicting the odds of being undecided versus intending to vote for Rousselot is equally revealing. Once again, Democrats appear to have been more likely to be undecided, a fact observed in the cross-tabular data. There were also no residual ethnicity effects in this equation. Thirdly just as in equation (10.1), those who were pro-gun control were also more likely to be undecided than intending to vote for Rousselot. What is particularly striking about this equation is how unequivocally important the negative impressions of Martinez and the positive impressions of Rousselot were to the large undecided vote at the time of the pre-election poll. Again, the impact of campaign and candidate specific effects in this race is underscored. Clearly, the initiatives had far less to do with the fortunes of this race than did the strategies and personalities of the candidates themselves. Also, it seems evident that the "softness" observed earlier in Hispanic support for Martinez was candidate related, suggesting that a significant segment of the Mexican-American voters did not automatically throw their support Martinez either because they felt that they did not know enough about him or did not like what they heard.

CONCLUSION

The Mexican-American vote is a complex phenomenon with many indirect effects through intervening variables such as party, issue attitudes and candidate evaluations. The attractiveness of the Mexican-American candidate is suggested by certain patterns of ballot splitting and the strong effect of the candidate evaluation variable. It would appear that Mexican-American voters were responsive to the attempt to create representation for them in the 30th. That support, however, should not be taken for granted, for Mexican-American voters will condition their vote on their information and evaluation about the quality of the candidate, Mexican-American or not.

Table 1 Pattern of Votes Cast for Congressman, Senator, and Governor by Party Registration and Ethnicity (major party registrants only)

Election	Pattern of Voting									
	Dem	Rep	Dem	Dem	Rep	Rep	Dem	Rep	Rep	
Congress										
Governor	Dem	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Rep	Rep	
U.S. Senate	Dem	Dem	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Rep	Rep	Rep	<u>n</u>
Non-Mex. American Democrat	61%	10%	3%	1%	2%	4%	2%	17%		103
Mex. American Democrat	78%	7%	1%	1%	0%	3%	6%	4%		72
Non-Mex. American Republican	3%	7%	7%	2%	5%	3%	7%	65%		58
Mex. American Republican	27%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	9%	64%		11
Total	50%	7%	3%	1%	2%	4%	4%	28%		244

Table 2 Multinomial Logit Analysis of Voting for Congressman in the 30th Congressional District of California

	Voting Pattern				
	Straight Demo- cratic vs. Straight Republican	Rousselot Brown and Bradley vs. Straight Republican	Martinez Brown or Bradley vs. Straight Republican	Rousselot Wilson or "Duke" vs. Straight Republican	Martinez Wilson and "Duke" vs. Straight Republican
Democrat	3.29* (.41)	1.86* (.55)	2.27* (.75)	1.15* (.57)	.71 (.70)
Mexican American	1.31* (.47)	.37 (.68)	1.11 (.95)	.61 (.91)	1.99* (.81)
Unemployed	1.21* (.43)	1.46* (.55)	-.44 (1.12)	1.23* (.60)	-.78 (1.12)
Catholic	-.26 (.40)	-.11 (.56)	-1.85* (.92)	-2.16* (.87)	-.49 (.81)
Constant	-2.11* (.37)	-2.68* (.49)	-2.84* (.62)	-1.89* (.40)	-2.59* (.52)
<u>n</u>	147	23	11	18	11

Percent Correctly Predicted 66%
Likelihood Ratio Index .41

Table 3 Most Important Problem Facing the Nation (major party registrants only)

	Unemp. Problems	Other Econ. Problems	Foreign Policy	Social Problems	Misc. Problems	<u>n</u>
Non-Mex. American Democrats	47%	24%	5%	8%	16	117
Mex. American Democrats	51%	22%	0%	8%	19	81
Non-Mex. American Republicans	42%	27%	0%	20%	11	59
Mex. American Republicans	40%	27%	0%	13%	20	15

Table 4 Voter Attitudes on Ballot Initiatives (major party registrants only)

	Favors Freeze	Favors Gun Registration	Favors Bottle Deposit	<u>n</u>
Non-Mex. American Democrats	54%	33%	38%	119
Mex. American Democrats	57%	33%	31%	81
Non-Mex. American Republicans	39%	23%	37%	61
Mex. American Republicans	23%	27%	33%	13

Table 5 Evaluation of Reaganomics (major party registrants only)

	Reagan Administration Economic Policies Have:			<u>n</u>
	Helped	Can't Tell Yet	Hurt	
Non-Mex. American Democrats	10%	38%	52%	120
Mex. American Democrats	5%	37%	58%	82
Non-Mex. American Republicans	56%	28%	16%	61
Mex. American Republicans	56%	18%	25%	16

Table 6 Attitudes Concerning Abortion
(major party registrants only)

	Abortion Should Be Allowed:			n
	Under No Circumstances	Under Some Circumstances	As a Matter of Personal Choice	
Non-Mex. American Democrats	8%	24%	68%	115
Mex. American Democrats	13%	40%	46%	82
Non-Mex. American Republicans	12%	38%	50%	61
Mex. American Republicans	7%	27%	66%	15

Table 7 Binomial Logit Analysis of Issue Positions and Support for Ballot Initiatives

	Gun Registration	Bottle Deposits	Nuclear Freeze	Approve Reaganomics	Never Permit Abortions
Union Member	-.22 (.29)	-.28 (.27)	-.24 (.27)	-.21 (.40)	-.05 (.43)
Unemployed	-.18 (.30)	-.01 (.29)	.41 (.29)	-1.06* (.44)	-.17 (.46)
Catholic	-.19 (.30)	.09 (.28)	.08 (.28)	-.12 (.42)	.80* (.45)
Mexican American	-.19 (.33)	.04 (.32)	-.07 (.31)	-.06 (.49)	.01 (.48)
Republican	-2.22* (.59)	-1.28* (.54)	-.99 (.56)	1.85* (.65)	1.32 (1.14)
Democrat	-1.46* (.54)	-1.07* (.49)	-.27 (.52)	-1.22* (.64)	1.21 (1.08)
Female	.59* (.28)	-.01 (.27)	.53* (.27)	-.46 (.39)	.00 (.42)
Constant	.92 (.56)	.51 (.52)	.31 (.55)	-.11 (.65)	-3.15 (1.11)*
% Correctly Predicted	67%	66%	60%	57%	55%

Table 8 Multinomial Logit Analysis of Congressional Candidate Evaluations

	Favorable Impression of Martinez vs. Unfavorable	Uncertain Impression of Martinez vs. Unfavorable	Favorable Impression of Rousselot vs. Unfavorable	Uncertain Impression of Rousselot vs. Unfavorable
Democrat	.85* (.38)	-.00 (.29)	-1.32* (.38)	-.53 (.40)
Mexican American	1.68* (.46)	.65 (.42)	-1.02* (.43)	.13 (.39)
Unemployed	.41 (.40)	.35 (.34)	-.18 (.41)	.58 (.37)
Catholic	.00 (.40)	-.04 (.34)	.17 (.40)	-.50 (.39)
Pro-Freeze	.37 (.36)	.08 (.29)	-.12 (.35)	.08 (.34)
Pro-Gun Reg.	.32 (.36)	.46 (.30)	-.33 (.35)	.18 (.34)
Pro-Bottle Deposit	.49 (.36)	.01 (.29)	-.03 (.35)	-.55 (.34)
Constant	-1.61* (.38)	.39 (.26)	2.14* (.39)	1.40* (.40)
% Correctly Predicted	51%		56%	
Likelihood ratio index	.13		.14	

Table 9 Multinomial Logit Analysis of Party Registration

	Democrat vs. Republican	Independent vs. Republican
Mexican American	1.78* (.42)	1.45* (.67)
Unemployed	.62* (.30)	-.04 (.61)
Union Member	.54* (.29)	.31 (.52)
Female	.08 (.24)	-1.21* (.51)
Catholic	.49 (.29)	-.40 (.60)
Constant	-.20 (.22)	-1.34 (.35)*
% Correctly Predicted	61%	
Likelihood ratio index	.30	

Table 10 Multinomial Logit Analysis of Vote Choice
for Congressman

	Martinez vs. Rousselot	Undecided vs. Rousselot
Democrat	2.05* (.54)	1.09* (.39)
Mexican American	.52 (.60)	.17 (.51)
Unemployed	.67 (.52)	.22 (.43)
Catholic	.06 (.55)	.28 (.44)
Favorable Rousselot Impression	-4.02* (.67)	-3.03* (.41)
Unfavorable Rousselot Impression	1.45 (.83)	.40 (.77)
Favorable Martinez Impression	1.85* (.60)	.23 (.55)
Unfavorable Martinez Impression	-1.64* (.79)	-.78* (.44)
Pro-Freeze	.46 (.48)	.14 (.38)
Pro-Gun Reg.	.80* (.48)	.67 (.38)
Pro-Bottle Deposit	-.05 (.49)	-.44 (.39)
Constant	-1.54* (.60)	.93* (.42)
% Correctly Predicted	73%	
Likelihood Ratio Index	.41	

REFERENCES

- BAIRD, FRANK L., "The Search for a Constituency: Political Validation of Mexican-American Candidates in the Texas Great Plains," in F. Baird, ed., Mexican-Americans: Political Power, Influence or Resource, Lubbock: Texas Tech Press, 1977, pp. 77-93.
- de la GARZA, RUDOLPH O., "Mexican-American Voters: A Responsible Electorate," F. Baird, ed., op. cit., pp. 63-76.
- _____ "Voting Patterns in `Bi-Cultural El Paso': A Contextual Analysis of Mexican-American Voting Behavior," in F. Chris Garcia, ed., La Causa Politica: A Chicano Politics Reader, North Scituate: Duxbury Press, 1977, pp. 250-66.
- _____ and JANET WEAVER, "Mexican Americans and Anglos in San Antonio: A City Divided," Paper Presented at the American Political Science Convention, September 1, 1983.
- DERFNER, ARMAND, "Nondiscrimination in Districting," in Bernard Grofman et al. (eds.) Representation and Redistricting Issues in the 1980's, Lexington: Lexington Books, 1981. pp. 65-76.
- ENGSTROM, RICHARD L., "Racial Vote Dilution: Supreme Court Interpretations of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act," Southern University Law Review, vol. 4, no. 2 (Spring 1978), pp. 139-163
- and John K. Wildgen, "Pruning Thorns From the Thicket: An Empirical Test of the Existence of Racial Gerrymandering,"

- Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 2, no. 4 (November 1977), pp. 465-479.
- FREEMAN, DONALD M., "Party, Vote and the Mexican-American in South Tucson," in F. Chris Garcia, ed., La Causa Politica: A Chicano Politics Reader, Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 1974, pp. 55-66.
- GARCIA, F. CHRIS and RUDOLPH O. DE LA GARZA, The Chicano Political Experience, North Scituate: Duxbury Press, 1977.
- GUZMAN, RALPH, "The Function of Anglo-American Racism in the Political Development of Chicanos," in F. Chris Garcia, ed., Chicano Politics: Readings, New York: MSS Information Corporation, 1973, pp. 21-37.
- LEVY, MARK R. and MICHAEL S. KRAMER, "Patterns of Chicano Voting Behavior," in F. Chris Garcia, ed., La Causa Politica: A Chicano Politics Reader, op. cit., pp. 241-49.
- McCLESKEY, CLIFTON and BRUCE MERRILL, "Mexican American Political Behavior in Texas," Social Science Quarterly, vol. 53 no. 4 (March 1973) pp. 785-98.
- NOTE, "Proportional Representation By Race: The Constitutionality of Benign Racial Redistricting," Michigan Law Review, vol. 74 (1976), pp. 820-841.
- SANTILLAN, RICHARD, "California Reapportionment and the Chicano," Rose Institute Mimeo, undated.