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Bargaining Theory and Portfolio Payoffs in European Coalition Governments 1945-1983

Laver, Michael and Schofield, Norman (1983) Bargaining Theory and Portfolio Payoffs in European Coalition Governments 1945-1983. Social Science Working Paper, 490. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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The distribution of cabinet posts in multiparty coalition governments in twelve European countries in the period 1945-1983 is considered. The efficacy of three payoff theories, namely Gamson's proportional payoff, the kernel and the bargaining set, as predictors of portfolio distribution, are compared. It is found that the Gamson predictor is superior in five countries which tend to be characterized by a relatively unfragmented political system, while the bargaining set is more appropriate in the highly fragmented political systems. The kernel can be disregarded as a payoff predictor. The results provide some empirical justification for the restricted (B2) bargaining set as a payoff predictor in simple voting games with transferable value.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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Additional Information:This material is based upon work supported by a Nuffield Foundation Grant on Political Stability. An earlier version was presented at the European Public Choice Meeting, Hanstholm, Denmark, April 1983. Thanks are due to Ian Budge, Bill Riker and Bernie Grofman for their comments and for making available their un published work, and to Sean Bowler for his research assistance. Published as Schofield, Norman, and Michael Laver. "Bargaining theory and portfolio payoffs in European coalition governments 1945–83." British Journal of Political Science 15.2 (1985): 143-164.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Nuffield FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:Political parties, Bargaining theory, Coalition bargaining, Government cabinets, Liberalism, Game theory, Coalition governments, Bargaining power, Multiple regression, Social democratic parties
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:490
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170921-152153125
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81707
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:22 Sep 2017 18:08
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:46

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