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The Geometry of Voting

Schofield, Norman (1983) The Geometry of Voting. Social Science Working Paper, 485. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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For any non collegial voting game, σ, there exists a stability dimension v*(σ), which can be readily computed. If the policy space has dimension no greater than v*(σ) then no local σ-cycles may exist, and under reasonable conditions, a σ-core must exist. It is shown here, that there exists an open set of profiles, V, in the c1 topology on smooth profiles on a manifold W of dimension at least v*(σ)+1, such that for each profile in v, there exist local σ-cycles and no σ-core.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Additional Information:Thanks are due to Jeff Strnad, at the University of Southern California Law Center, for making available some of his unpublished work. The result presented here as Theorem 1 is much influenced by Strnad's work.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:485
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170921-162353748
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81720
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:22 Sep 2017 17:50
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:46

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