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ABSTRACT

The duration and type of coalition governments in twelve european countries in the period 1945-1983 are considered. It is argued that the distribution of party size, on a one dimensional policy dimension, conditions the bargaining process between parties and thus the type of coalition that forms and the average duration of government. On this basis the twelve countries are divided into four groups.

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The remaining four countries (Belgium, Denmark, The Netherlands and Ireland) were characterised not only by this move to the right, but by a remarkable recent increase in electoral volatility and coalition instability.

In the Netherlands the Liberals (VVD) gained ten seats, in September 1982, essentially at the expense of a small centre party, and formed a government coalition with the larger centre Christian Democratic Party (CDA). In the previous intra-election period, however, a coalition of the Christian Democratic Party and Labour Party (PvdA) had formed in September 1981, broken up in October, reformed, and then resigned in May 1982. This coalition instability contrasted remarkably with the history of long lived governments between 1972 and 1981.

Similarly in Belgium the Liberals (PVV) increased their seats from 36 to 52 in the November 1981 election. This led to the break up of the previous coalition of Socialist party and Christian Social Party (CVP) and the formation of a CVP-PVV coalition. Again between the election of 1977 and that of 1981, five different coalition governments had been in existence (an average life of ten months each).

Electoral volatility is even more apparent in Denmark. In the election of December 1981 the large Social Democrat Party lost seats to both the Socialists on the left and the Democratic Centre Party on the right, while the smaller Progress Party lost seats to the larger conservatives. The social democrats formed a minority government for nine months and then resigned in favour of a minority four party coalition of Conservatives, Liberals, Democratic Centre Party and Christian Peoples Party. This coalition depends for support on

Introduction: Theories of Coalition Formation and Stability

In the period September 1981 to April 1983, elections have been held in ten of the old established parliamentary democracies of Europe.¹ In at least seven of these countries the election led to the break up of a left or centre-left coalition and the formation of a right or centre-right government. Only in Sweden did a left wing party, the Social Democrat Labour Party, gain enough seats to form a government. In that case the previous centre-right three party government coalition lost twelve seats to the labour party.

In a number of other countries, the electoral move to the right removed a socialist or social democratic party that had been in government for many years. In Austria the Socialist Peoples Party (SPO) had been in office for thirteen years but lost five seats, and its majority in April 1983, to the two parties of the centre-right. In Germany in October 1982, the centre-left coalition (that had lasted thirteen years) of Social Democrats and Free Democrats was destroyed by the defection of the Free Democrats. In the election of March 1983, the two Christian parties on the right gained eighteen seats, although the free democrats lost seats effectively to the new Green Party. In Norway in September 1981 the Conservatives gained thirteen seats from the Christian Party and Labour Party.

the small Radical and Progress Parties. The average lifetime of the five minority social democratic governments that had been in office since 1975 is about eighteen months.

In Ireland there have been elections in June 1981 and February and December 1982. After the first, Fine Gael formed a majority coalition with the labour party. Then Finna Fail formed a minority government, and once again Fine Gael is in office. It is probable however that this government will be no longer lived than the previous one. At the election of April 1983 in Iceland, the two centre left parties, of the previous three party coalition, lost 4 seats between them to the other coalition partner, the Independence Party on the right. A new feminist party gained three seats while the centre Social Democratic Party broke into two factions.

In Italy there have been three elections since 1972, but at least eleven governments, all involving the large Christian Democrat Party. An attempt to maintain a centre left coalition under Spadinni, of the Republican Party, was aborted in December 1982. The same coalition under Fanfani, of the Christian Democrats, recently collapsed, but reformed under Craxi, of the Socialist party, after the June 1983 election.

To fully understand these phenomena requires a model which incorporates i) a theory of voting response to party behaviour, ii) a theory of the transformation of votes into parliamentary seats via the electoral system iii) a theory of the formation and survival of government once parliamentary strength is determined. This paper addresses itself to the third aspect. One of the principal difficulties with building a theory of government coalition behaviour is that various authors have adopted quite different conceptual frameworks within which to model coalition behaviour. For example

one may assume that political parties attempt to maximise power or rewards. Such an assumption might lead one to the theory of games, particularly of games with sidepayments. From such a perspective, it is possible to argue that minimal winning (i.e. just winning) coalitions should form (Riker, 1962). However it is well known that, in such a context, any coalition is unstable (Schofield, 1978). Under some circumstances it is plausible in this context to make use of bargaining theory in an attempt to pick out coalitions which are "quasi-stable" (Schofield, 1982).

A second possibility is to assume that parties have policy preferences which can be represented in a policy space of one or more dimensions. At least in one dimension, theory predicts that the party at the median position (in terms of party strengths) should belong to each government coalition. Various authors have devised more restrictive hypotheses on coalition formation that have none the less been based on a notion of coalition bargaining over policy (Axelrod 1970, de Swaan 1973, etc.)

It is quite clear that policy or ideological dimension does play a role in coalition formation. However the general position that will be adopted in this paper is that the relatively simple coalition theories that have been considered tend to be unsuited to the wide variety of structures that are apparent in the European parliamentary democracies. More specifically the perspective adopted here is that it is the pattern of strength and position of each party in each parliamentary situation that determines the bargaining possibilities inherent in the situation. However as game theory informs us, it is not possible to infer directly from such a pattern which coalition will come into being.

A second point is that small changes in electoral support, and thus party strength, can result in quite significant changes in the qualitative features of the parliamentary situation, and thus in the behaviour that is exhibited. For this reason no attempt is made to statistically analyse the data on coalition formation and stability. However an attempt is made to cluster the twelve countries under consideration into groups that exhibit some similarities in the qualitative properties of their parliamentary structures. Even such a classification is excessive to some extent, since, as the description of recent events indicates, electoral volatility in a number of these countries has resulted in qualitative change, of the kind mentioned above, in the parliamentary situation.

One of the features of the parliamentary situation that is of significance is the degree to which parliamentary strength is fragmented. As the discussion of the previous section indicated, in a number of the European countries (particularly Belgium, Denmark, Italy and more recently Ireland and the Netherlands) governments have tended to be relatively short lived. This phenomenon is consistent with the conclusions of a literature of the 1950's and 1960's which argued that multiparty systems (with more than two significant parties) tend to be associated with less stable governments (Duverger, 1951). As Blondel (1968) has said

"it does seem that one party government....
is the factor contributing most decisively
to the stability of governments".

Such a conclusion is all very well, but one might well argue, for normative reasons, that multiparty systems and coalition governments

are more receptive to electoral preference than the essentially two party systems in Britain and elsewhere (Schofield, 1981). Moreover, as we have indicated, the parliamentary democracies of Europe exhibit a wide range of types of multiparty systems and government stabilities.

A first step in exploring the Duverger hypothesis however is to relate the degree of parliamentary fractionalism with government duration.

To define fractionalism, let (p_1, \dots, p_n) be the proportions of the seats controlled by the various parties in the parliament. Define

$$H = \sum_{i=1}^n p_i^2$$

to be the Herfindahl index of concentration. This has possible maximum and minimum values of 1 and 0. Conversely $F = 1 - H$ is the index of fractionalism discussed in Rae (1967) and Rae and Taylor (1970). An alternative measure of fragmentation is the reciprocal of the Herfindahl index (H^{-1}) called the effective number of parties (Laasko and Taagepera, 1979). Although other measures of concentration can be devised (see Schofield, 1981) in this paper we shall use only H and H^{-1} .

Taylor and Herman (1971) found the correlation coefficient between fractionalism and duration to be -0.407, while the coefficient between the number of parties and duration was -0.418. In an examination of Blondel's thesis, Herman and Sanders (1977) found a correlation of 0.299 between duration and the majority status of the coalition. Although there is clearly a relationship between fractionalism and duration, the relatively low proportion of variance explained (about 20%) indicates that the relationship is quite subtle.

A general picture of this relationship is perhaps summed up in the observation that the average effective number of parties, in the twelve West European countries examined here, has increased from 3.4, in the period up to 1971, to 3.9 in the ten years since, while average government duration has dropped from 27 months to 23 months. To give examples from individual countries, in Belgium the average effective number has increased from 2.9 to 5.8 and duration dropped from 28 months to 12 (See Table 1).

A second research programme in the 1970's involved the analysis of the type of coalitions that occurred in multiparty systems. Perhaps the most celebrated coalition predictor is the minimal winning (MW) principle due to Riker (1962). He argued on the basis of a formal game theory analysis that only coalitions which are winning, but may lose no members and remain winning, will form. However, Herman and Pope (1973) analyzed 207 coalition events and found that only 73 (i.e. 35%) were minimal winning. Of the rest 60 (29%) were surplus (i.e. winning but not minimal winning) while 74 (or 36%) were minority cases (i.e. not even winning).

A number of other coalition predictors were based on the existence of a one dimension policy space in which parties were located. The general idea behind these "diversity" predictors was that the more ideologically diverse a coalition the less stable would it be, or the less likely would it be to come into existence.

Leiserson (1966,1968) defined the diversity of a coalition to be the sum of the number of "spaces" between the parties in the coalition together with the number of "holes" resulting from missing parties within the coalition. His diversity predictors (DW) was that the least diverse

coalitions should form. Axelrod (1970) proposed that minimal connected winning coalitions (MCW) should form. A coalition is MCW if it is both i) winning and ii) connected in the sense that all coalition members are adjacent on the policy scale iii) unable to lose a member and remain both winning and connected. Finally de Swaan (1970,1973) proposed a policy distance theory (PW) based on the concept of bargaining over outcomes between members of potential coalitions.

In a statistical analysis of the MW, DW and MCW predictors, Taylor and Laver (1973) found that the MCW predictor performed best overall, but particularly well in the case of Italy. For Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands the MW predictor was satisfactory. Using a somewhat different statistical method, an analysis by Mokken and de Swaan (1980) indicated that the policy distance predictor did not in fact work very effectively. These statistical analyses, of course, depend rather significantly on the type of statistical comparison used and on the definition of a "coalition" event. In any particular parliamentary situation, the set of possible minimal winning coalitions is larger than the set of, say, minimal connected winning coalitions. Consequently a success by the more parsimonious theory must be more heavily weighed. As regards the definition of a coalition event, it is common to define a government as an

"administration which meets any of the following criteria

- (a) formation after a general election;
- (b) change in Prime Minister
- (c) change in the party composition of the cabinet
- (d) resignation in an interelection period followed by the

reformation of the government with the same Prime Minister and party composition". (Hurwitz,1971).

Here a party is regarded as a member of the government

"when one or more individuals identified with the party participate in the cabinet". (de Swaan, 1970).

This definition means, of course, that a party which provides even formal "support" to the governing coalition is not in the coalition if it has no members in cabinet. In this paper only categories (a) and (c) are regarded as constituting a coalition change, since both category (b) and (d) imply that the same coalition is in power.

Since the MW and MCW are the two most significant coalition predictors, this paper essentially contrasts these two theories by considering the types of government coalitions listed in Table 2.

Single party majority party governments are included in Group 1, since it is of interest to compare the duration of this type of government with that of coalition governments.

Groups 2 to 5 consist of surplus coalitions, or coalitions which are winning but not minimal winning: in Group 5 are the MCW but non MW coalitions; in Group 4 the connected but not MCW coalitions; and Group 3 are the unconnected surplus coalitions.

Minimal winning coalitions are located in Groups 6 and 7, depending on whether or not they are MCW. Clearly Groups 5 and 6 make up the set of MCW coalitions.

Finally Groups 8 and 9 are the minority coalitions, which do not have a formal majority. Those minority coalitions in Group 8 actually have tacit

support from parties outside the coalition sufficient to make up a parliamentary majority. Table 3 of the Appendix presents the frequency of the different coalition types by country in the period up to a convenient election in the early 1970's

Since the period covered by Table 3 corresponds approximately to the period examined by Taylor and Laver, we can use it to interpret their findings. Of the 136 coalition governments in this period, only 40 (or 30%) were minority. If supported coalitions are regarded as winning, then there were only 17 (or 13%). On the other hand there were 51 (or 38%) minimal winning coalitions, 35 (or 26%) surplus coalitions, and 42 (or 31%) MCW coalitions. From the individual country data, it is obvious that essentially only in Italy do coalitions which are MCW but not MW form. In other countries such as Belgium, Iceland and Luxembourg essentially the only coalitions which form are MW.

Table 7 reports the same data for the 1970's. More or less as in the previous period, there are 19 (or 32%) minimal winning coalitions out of 62 and 14 (or 23%) MCW. One change however is that there are 18 (or 30%) unsupported minority single party or coalition governments.

In the post war period until the present, the class of minimal winning coalitions is the most numerous of our categories. Although the MCW predictor is a more parsimonious theory, in the sense of giving a smaller predictor set in general, in another sense it is a less parsimonious theory in that assumptions about the nature of the policy making process are implicit within the theory. The basis for the minimal winning theory on the other hand is that political actors seek rewards from office, and these are essentially private goods, namely cabinet posts or their equivalents.

2. The Duration of Coalitions

Rather than comparing these coalition events alone, it is useful to analyse the duration of the different kinds of coalition governments. Warwick (1979) has summed up the results of this third research programme (see Table 3). It is possible to relate these results to table 4 of the Appendix, where average duration in each of the nine coalition groups is presented. As noted above, there is a correlation of .299 between the majority status of the coalition and duration. From Table 4 of the Appendix, the average duration of minority (non majority coalitions) is 19 months, compared with 30 months for the majoritarian cases (when we exclude those cases with single majority parties).

Warwick reports correlation coefficients of 0.643 and 0.560 respectively between MW or MCW status and duration. Again from Table 4 of the Appendix it can be seen that the average duration of MW coalitions up to 1971 was 35 months, while for MCW coalitions it was 33 months. However for MCW coalitions which were not MW, the average duration was only 20 months.

As Warwick says, the regression

"Produces no significant role for MCW in accounting for durability once MW is entered in the equation. On the evidence, there is no room for the ideological criterion posited by Axelrod".

Laver (1974) had previously compared the stability of MW and MCW coalitions with that of the least diverse (DW) coalitions. He defined stability to be the ratio of the average coalition duration to the maximum possible duration as defined by country specific rules on elections. He found that DW had a statistically significant mean stability of 0.52

compared with 0.53 for MW and 0.48 for MCW.

Warwick pursued Laver's notion further and obtained a correlation coefficient of -.352 between diversity and duration. However, as Table 3 shows when duration is regressed on diversity, minimal winning status and number of parties, the diversity variable becomes insignificant. These results indicate that the minimal winning criterion is the most effective explicator for coalition durability, and add force to Taylor and Herman's contention that

"ideology does not play a very important role in (explaining) government stability".

However these analyses do not provide a reason why minimal winning coalitions tend to be more stable than other forms of coalitions, or why minimal winning coalitions tend to form in some countries and not in others.

In an ambitious piece of work Dodd (1974, 1976) has attempted to explain both coalitional status (i.e. minimal winning or minority) and durability in terms of structural features of the parliamentary system. His most important explanatory variable is conflict cleavage. On a particular ideological continuum he estimates the position x_i of each party i . Let \bar{x} be the mean position and let

$$\text{Conflict Cleavage} = \sum p_i (x_i - \bar{x})^2$$

where p_i is the proportion of seats controlled by party i .

Tables 4 to 8 present representative examples of party strength and estimates of party position on the economic policy dimension. In a situation such as the Austrian party structure in 1953 with two large centrally

located parties, conflict cleavage is only moderately high. In Ireland, on the contrary, with a dominant party (Finna Fail) the distribution of strength around this party is relatively low and thus conflict cleavage is low. In Finland on the other hand party strength is more uniformly distributed over the policy continuum and conflict cleavage is high.

Dodd defines coalitional status in terms of the absolute value of the difference in size between the coalition and the simple majority. He obtains a negative correlation between status and durability, thus indicating that MW coalitions tend to be most long lived, and that as a coalition becomes larger or smaller than MW then its durability decreases.

His explanation is in terms of two variables: uncertainty and the constraints on bargaining. Essentially Dodd views fragmentation and cabinet turnover as indicative of uncertainty in the political system, and argues that this will be associated with short lived governments. In a situation of high uncertainty and high conflict, or polarized fractionalism, then short lived minority coalitions will tend to form. On the other hand, with high uncertainty and low conflict, or depolarized fractionalism, then short lived surplus coalitions will form.

While Dodd's theory is extremely interesting there are a number of difficulties which become obvious when individual countries are examined.

If we contrast the Netherlands and Italy in the period up to 1971 (see Tables 8 and 7) we see that the Netherlands has a concentration index of .22 and conflict cleavage of 7.38 while Italy has .28 and 7.62 respectively. (I am grateful to Larry Dodd for supplying me with his estimates of the party positions on the economic policy dimension to enable me to compute

conflict cleavage). Since conflict cleavage is high in both countries, and the fragmentation is higher in the Netherlands, Dodd's model would suggest that the coalition government in Italy would be longer lived than the corresponding one in the Netherlands. In fact in Italy the Christian Democrats formed a minority government which lasted eight months until February 1954, after which they formed a centre minimal winning coalition which persisted until mid 1957. In the Netherlands, Labour and the Catholic Peoples Party formed a minimal winning coalition which persisted over two years to the next election in 1948. More importantly minority coalitions almost never occurred in the Netherlands, while they occur regularly in Italy. Of course one of the components of uncertainty in Dodd's model is cabinet turnover, and this is much higher in Italy than in the Netherlands. However a model that explains current coalition instability in terms of past cabinet instability is not entirely adequate.

A second difficulty with Dodd's model is made apparent by considering Finland and Italy. In both countries conflict cleavage and fragmentation are quite high, and on the basis of the model one would expect short lived minority governments. Although these have occurred, they have alternated with short lived surplus coalitions (see Tables 1 and 5 of the Appendix).

Notwithstanding these comments, Dodd's analysis is important because it indicates that the character and durability of coalition government is determined by the distribution of party strengths along the principle dimension of socio-economic policy. The next section of the paper will attempt to discuss in a qualitative way how this distribution affects the bargaining game between parties, and thus the coalitions that come into being.

3. Party System and Coalition Stability

The comparative party systems research of the 1960's by Blondel, Sartori, Rokkan and others attempted to classify multiparty systems in terms of criteria of size and relationship between the parties, and clearly this research formed the background to the research on coalition stability discussed in the previous sections. Blondel's (1968) discussion of two or two and half party systems and multiparty systems with and without a dominant party lead to the analysis of the relationship between fragmentation and durability, while Sartori's (1966) distinction between pluralism and hyperpluralism was a significant influence on Dodd's model.

The analyses by Sartori and Rokkan (1970) also inform the three-fold classification of European parliamentary systems by Daalder (1971) into unipolar, bipolar and multipolar systems. Here we shall follow Daalder in attempting to account for coalition formation and duration in terms of the kind of bargaining that can occur in these different systems.

Group 1. Bipolar Systems (Two and a Half parties) in Austria and Germany.

Both Austria and West Germany currently exhibit a level of political concentration of between 0.4 and 0.45 and thus have an effective number of parties of 2.2 and 2.5 respectively (see Table 6 of the Appendix).

Austria: Dreijmanis (1982) describes how the two main parties, the Sozialistische Partei Osterreichs (SPO) and Osterreichische Volkspartei (OVP) resulted from the post war merger of prewar Christian Social parties and Social Democrat parties. These two parties generally gain about 85% of the electoral vote and 90% of the parliamentary seats. In the four elections from 1945 to 1956 the Kommunistische Partei Osterreichs (KPO) gained about

5% of the vote and 4 seats (or 2%). Since 1959 the KPO vote has declined steadily from 3% to 1% and it has no parliamentary representation. In 1949 the right wing Verband der Unabhangigen (VdU) obtained about 12% of the vote and 16 seats (10%). In 1955 the Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs (FPO) became the successor of the VdU. It currently has 11 seats in Parliament.

After the one year KPO-SPO-OVP coalition of national unity between December 1945 and November 1946, minimal winning coalitions were the rule until 1966, when the OVP obtained a majority. Dreijmanis has attributed the minimal winning but large SPO-OVP (or Black-Red) coalition to the fear by the SPO of a permanent Black-Blue coalition of OVP and FPO.

After the election of March 1970, the SPO almost obtained a majority, but formed a minority government with the support of the FPO. On the assumption that the parties are located in the order SPO-OVP-FPO, this implicit coalition violates the MCW and diversity notions of Axelrod and Leiserson. However on the clerical-anticlerical dimension this coalition could be regarded as connected.

With two large parties centrally located in the policy dimension, the level of conflict cleavage is not very high, and fragmentation low. Consequently the durable minimal winning coalitions that formed are consistent with Dodd's theory.

Germany: Since 1961 the situation in Germany has been similar to that of Austria in that two large parties the Social Democrats (SDP) and Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), with between 40 to 50% of the seats, face the Free Democrats (FDP) with about 10%. After the election of 1949 more than seven parties were represented in the Bundestag: these included the

Communist Party (KPD), the Centre Party (Z), the Bavarian Party (BP), the German Party (DP) and the National Democratic Party (DKP). From 1949 to 1953 the largest party, the CDU/CSU, formed a MW coalition with the FDP and right wing parties. In 1953 this coalition became surplus with the inclusion of the All German Block (GB) with 27 seats. Even after the 1957 election when the CDU/CSU had a majority of the seats, it formed a surplus coalition with the DP.

In evaluating the coalitions since 1961 there is some difficulty in locating the Free Democrats in relation to the SDP and CDU. On the economic dimension the FDP are usually regarded as being to the right of the CDU, while in terms of foreign policy they belong between the SDP and CDU. Under the first assumption the CDU-FDP coalition from 1961 to 1967 is connected, while the SPD-FDP coalition from 1969 is disconnected. In preparing the tables of the Appendix I have assumed that the FDP lies in between the two largest parties, and viewed the SPD-CDU coalition of 1967-1969 as disconnected.

As table One (Appendix) makes clear, the MW predictor works very well for Germany. Even the surplus coalition of 1953-1957 can be accounted for, by the need to pass constitutional amendments in the Bundestag which required a two thirds majority (Norpoth, 1982). The surplus coalition of 1957-1961 may also be regarded as a strategic device of the CDU to absorb the DP. In such a two and a half party system, coalition government is extremely stable. The only major inter election coalition collapses occurred in 1957 when the FDP-CDU coalition broke up, and in October 1982 when the FDP left the SDP for the CDU.

Of some interest is the process of concentration that occurred up till 1961 during which small parties like the BP, DP, GB and Z with approximately 5% each of the electoral vote were eliminated. We shall address some theoretical remarks on this at the end of the paper.

Group II. Multipolar systems (with two and two half parties).

Initially the pattern of party strength in Belgium and Luxembourg was roughly the same, with two large parties in the centre of the ideological spectrum, flanked by small parties on the left and right.

In Luxembourg, aside from a brief grand coalition after the war, every coalition until 1974 has been both minimal winning and minimal connected winning. These all involved the Christian Social Party forming a coalition with either the Socialists or the Liberals. A Socialist-Liberal coalition lasted five years from 1974 to 1979, and then gave way to a Christian Social-Liberal coalition after the Christian Social Party increased its seats in the 1979 election. Since the communist party has not been involved in any coalition (except for the post war one) the situation in Luxembourg closely resembles the German-Austrian examples. Although fragmentation and the formal measure of conflict cleavage is higher in Luxembourg than in Germany or Austria, this is not reflected in lower average coalition durability.

In Belgium on the other hand there has been increasing political fragmentation and governmental instability. In 1946, as Table 5 shows, the Socialists (Belgische Socialistische Partij, BSP) and Christian Peoples Party (Christelijke Volkspartij, CVP) were flanked by the Communists (KPB) on the left and the Liberals (PVV). A Communist-Socialist-Liberal unconnected coalition lasted for a year or so from February 1946 and then gave way to a

minimal connected winning BSP-CVP coalition in 1947. From then until 1961 all coalitions were minimal winning.

In 1961 the Voksunie (VU) with 3.5% of the electoral vote and 5 seats (2.3%) took up position between the BSP and CVP. In 1965 this small party was followed into Parliamentary existence by the Democratic Front of the French Speaking in Brussels (FDF) and the Rassemblement Wallon (RW) with 2 and 3 seats respectively and 1% of the electoral vote. Until 1974 these small centrally located federalist governments were not involved in government. However the RW joined with the CVP and PVV in Tindermans second and third coalition governments of 1974 and 1976, and the VU and FDF in Tindermans fifth coalition government with the CVP and BSP in 1977. The importance of the ethnocultural problem, the development of small parties and even the split of major parties (like the BSP in 1978) have all contributed to increasing fragmentation and coalition instability. Clearly one dimensional coalition models such as those by de Swaan and Axelrod are inadequate in accounting for the pattern of formation and duration in Belgium. In a situation where a number of dimensions (economic, clerical and language) are salient, not only are small parties likely to come into existence, but coalition bargaining is likely to be extremely unstable (Schofield, 1978). In such a situation the extreme government instability in Belgium is hardly surprising.

Unlike Belgium and Luxembourg, where the largest party is a centre Christian Social Party, in Iceland the right wing Independence Party generally gains about 40% of the seats, while the Communists (PA), Social Democratic Party (SDP) and Progressive Party (PP) usually obtain about 15%, 15% and 30% respectively of the seats.

Whereas in Luxembourg almost every coalition is a MW and MCW coalition containing the large Christian Social Party, the nature of coalition formation in Iceland is determined by the isolation of the large Independence Party on the right. From 1946 to 1949 a surplus but connected coalition of SDP, PP and IP governed. After the election of October 1949, the IP formed a caretaker minority government for five months, and then joined in a MW and MCW coalition with the PP until 1956. The left wing PA-SDP-PP coalition lasted until 1959, and this gave way to an SDP-IP coalition that lasted until the election of 1971. On the economic cleavage this latter coalition is clearly unconnected. Grimsson (1982) has suggested that attitudes towards the US base at Keflavik became increasingly important, and that this made the natural IP-PP coalition difficult.

In 1970 the Union of Liberals and Leftists (ULL) formed as a result of a split in the PA, and it was able to pick up nearly 9% of the electoral vote and 5 (or 8%) of the seats. This led to a left wing PA-ULL-SDP coalition which lasted until 1974. In 1974 the ULL only gained 4.6% of the electoral vote and 2 seats (3%) and finally in 1978 its 3.5% of the vote resulted in no seats. From 1974 to 1979 the MW and MCW coalitions, PP-IP and PA-SDP-PP occurred, while in 1980 a surplus unconnected coalition PA-PP-IP was formed.

While it is apparent that a single policy dimension is insufficient in explaining coalition formation in Iceland, Grimsson (1982) has argued that almost all the coalitions that have occurred have been connected in the two dimensional policy space (see Grofman, 1982, for an analysis of coalition formation in such a context). However the recent PA-PP-IP coalition is not connected even in two dimensions. This suggests that policy differences are not of overwhelming importance in Iceland. The considerable stability

in party strength and electoral support in Iceland is clearly related to the durability of coalitions. As in Germany, the electoral system is biased against small parties.² Although the ULL survived for seven years, once its electoral support dropped below 4% it lost its parliamentary existence.

Group III. Unipolar Systems (One and four half parties) in Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Ireland.

Surplus coalitions never occurred in the post war period in these countries, while minority coalitions were a fairly regular phenomena (see Tables 1 and 5 of the Appendix). According to Dodd's model, one would expect high fragmentation and high conflict cleavage in these parliamentary systems. However each of these countries has a single dominant party which typically either obtains or nearly obtains a majority. As a consequence, fragmentation is approximately the same as in Iceland. The distribution of political strength is however quite different, and this is reflected in the relatively low values of the Conflict Cleavage measure.

As Table 6 makes clear, the largest party in these countries is flanked by two small parties, and faces one or two medium sized parties on the right. One would therefore expect the largest party to form either minority or supported minority governments, and on occasion this minority government to be superceded by a right wing coalition.

In Ireland for example, Finna Fail had an absolute majority of the seats from 1957 to 1961, from 1965 to 1973 and from 1977 to 1981, although it was only after the 1977 election that Finna Fail obtained a majority of the electoral vote. From 1951 to 1954, 1961 to 1965 and from February 1982 Finna Fail actually formed a minority government, with support on occasion from a farmer's

faction. Those coalitions that have occurred have been the result of the attempt by Fine Gael to exclude a Finna Fael and gain access to power. Thus, from 1948 to 1951 and 1954 to 1957 Fine Gael formed a coalition with Labour and Clann na Talmhan. By 1965 the electoral support for Clann na Talmhan and Clann na Poblachla had dropped below 1% and they disappeared from Parliament. The Labour-Fine Gael coalition of 1973-1977 was unconnected on the economic policy scale. Cohan (1982) suggests however that aside from the motivation of Labour and Fine Gael to serve in government, the coalition was connected by virtue of the weak nationalism of the two parties. More generally, Cohan argues that conflict cleavage is low in Ireland because of the relative homogeneity of the society. Although Irish governments have been relatively long lived, it is evident that the cleavage between Finna Fael and the other two major parties may lead to a certain instability in the future. In particular electoral fluctuations have been quite pronounced. Although Finna Fail increased its electoral vote from 46% to 51% (and its seats from 69 to 84) between 1973 and 1977, it lost its majority in 1981 gaining only 78 seats. In the two elections in 1982 neither Finna Fael nor Labour-Fine Gael obtained a clear majority. Indeed it would seem that the complexity of the policy space makes it possible for small groups or independent agents to gain representation and block the attainment of parliamentary majorities.

In Norway the situation is somewhat similar. The largest party (Labour or DNA) has been in office from 1945 to 1965 and 1973 to 1981. Until 1961 it had a majority of the seats, and when in 1961 it lost its majority it formed a supported minority government with the Socialist Peoples Party (SF). When the SF withdrew its support in August 1963, a minority coalition of the four right wing parties formed and lasted about three weeks, and was again

replaced by the SF-DNA coalition. By 1965 the SF-DNA strength had dropped to 70 seats (47%), and the right wing MW and MCW coalition took office for the next seven years. This collapsed to a centre right minority coalition of three parties for a year. From 1973 to 1981 Labour formed a minority government. However in September 1981 Labour only obtained 65 seats (43%) while the Conservatives increased their strength to 54 seats (36%) and formed a minority government. Clearly Norway has been moving away from a unipolar, majoritarian situation, to one where a large left wing Labour party faces a large Conservative party, and the two are separated by a number of small centre parties which seem to be losing support to the right. It is possible that this polarization will result in government instability.

In Sweden the large Social Democratic Labour Party (SSA) faces a small Communist party and three medium sized right wing parties. Until 1976 the SSA was in the government, either in a minority capacity (1948-1951, 1957-1958, 1973-1976), with the support of the Communist party (1958-1968, 1970-1973) or in a MW and MCW coalition with the Agrarian party (1951-1957).

Between 1968 and 1970 the Labour party actually had a majority. From 1976 to September 1982 the three right wing parties formed a majoritarian government coalition, but the Labour party is now the minority government.

Until 1973, the Danish parliamentary system seemed to be a stable unipolar system like Norway. The Social Democrats (SD) were in office in a minority capacity (1971-1973) or with the support of the Radical Liberals (1947-1950, 1960-1964) or Justice Party (1953-1960, 1964-1968). The Liberal Agrarians (Venstre) and Conservatives (DKF) formed a minority coalition with the Radical Liberals in 1968-1971. As Table 4 of the Appendix shows, the average duration was about 2½ years.

Between 1971 and 1973 however the effective number of parties jumped from 4.0 to 7.0 when four new parties appeared. One faction, the Communist Party (DKP), split away from the Socialist Peoples Party and obtained 7.8% of the electoral vote and fourteen seats; the Christian Peoples Party (KrF) took 4.0% of the vote and seven seats; and finally the Progress Party obtained twenty eight seats and 16% of the vote.

The move away from the established parties was perhaps presaged by the drop in electoral support for the SD from 42% in 1964 to 34% in 1968. Paldam and Schneider (1980) in an analysis of relationship between government popularity and macro-economic variables, have indicated that increases of unemployment and the tax burden were correlated with the drop in the electoral popularity of the Social Democrats in the period 1958-1968.

In examining the periods 1971 to 1973 and 1975 to 1978 when the SD formed a minority government, Paldam and Schneider (1980) found an interesting pattern. They argue that the voters tended to regard the Social Democrats as the only party capable of dealing with unemployment. Thus while the SD were in office, increases of unemployment did not reduce the SD electoral popularity, but rather enhanced it, but did reduce the electoral popularity of the right wing parties. Increases in inflation did hurt the SD. Of greatest interest perhaps was the observation that increases of taxes while hurting the SD, greatly benefitted the Progress Party, a party which entered parliament in 1973 on an anti tax platform.

It is perhaps clear that in Denmark, voters see the policy space to be high dimensional. Small parties may readily come into existence; for example the Christian People Union obtained 2.6% of the electoral vote and five seats

in 1979. This has created a degree of electoral volatility and increasing political fragmentation. Whereas in 1957 the SD obtained 70 seats (42%) and the three right wing parties 89 seats (54%), the party strengths had dropped by 1981 to 59 seats (33%) and 55 (31%) respectively. Thus the system has moved away from the earlier unipolar pattern to one characterized by greater fragmentation and more complex political bargaining. The fact that the SD is flanked by small left wing or centre left parties (the left socialists, socialist peoples party, democratic centre) means that it can form a minority government with support. However policy differences between SD and its partners in the context of high political fragmentation is surely related to the relatively low average duration of government.

Group IV: Fragmented Multipolar Systems (Netherlands, Finland, Italy)

Although the dutch parliamentary system is similar to that of Finland in terms of fragmentation, and to Italy in terms of conflict cleavage, it is clear from Tables 9 and 12 of the Appendix that coalition types and duration are quite different in the Netherlands compared with Finland and Italy.

According to Dodd's model, Netherlands must be an example of depolarized hyperpluralism where political bargaining may proceed even in the highly fragmented system in a relatively amicable fashion. Lijphart (1976) has called this the "politics of accommodation".

The largest party is the Catholic Peoples Party (KVP) which has been in every government since 1946. Indeed the KVP together with its two flanking "confessional" parties (de Swaan 1982), the Anti Revolutionary Party (ARP) and Christian Historical Union (CHU) have been at the heart of

almost every coalition. In December 1976 these three parties allied themselves together with the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) and in 1978 formed a single party. As Table 8 shows these three parties had a majority of the seats and votes in 1946. By 1972, electoral losses by all three parties had forced down their strength to 31%. De Swaan (1982) has argued that the pivotal party, the KVP, has tended to form surplus coalitions to balance the parties to its left and right. This is the essential idea behind de Swaans policy distance theory (PW).

For example in 1952 the ARP-KVP-CHU group has a majority (51 seats) but included the Labour Party (PvdA) in the coalition. When the PvdA left the coalition in 1958, the remaining MW and MCW coalition only lasted three months. After the election of 1959 the "confessional" party strength rose to 75 seats (out of 150); they formed a surplus coalition with the Liberals (VVD), which lasted until 1965.

In 1972 the confessional coalition (now 48 seats) brought in the Labour party (with 43 seats) but also the small democratic socialists. In 1977 the group switched to the right with the Liberals, back to the left in 1981, and now after the last election, back to the right.

Clearly the pivotal nature of the central CDA has until 1981 endowed the political system with considerable stability (see Table 12 of the Appendix). However the system has evolved towards a three party structure (PvdA, CDA and VVD) together with the smaller but important democratic socialists. In this sense the Netherlands and Belgium have become somewhat similar. The break up of the PvdA and CDA coalition in October 1981 and again in May 1982 indicates that coalition stability - the politics of accommodation - may be a thing of the past.

In Italy a large Christian Democratic Party (DC) with about 40% of the electoral vote and seats faces a large communist party (PCI) with about 30% of the vote and two medium sized socialist parties with 15%. Until 1971, MCW centre coalitions involving the DC were common. Indeed such coalitions formed even when the DC had a majority between 1948 and 1953. In this period the party system may be regarded as almost unipolar. Just as in Group III minority government by the largest party was not uncommon. However Marradi (1982) sees the evolution as one from DC dominated "centrism" to that of a Socialist-Social Democrat- Christian Democrat coalition. These recent centre-left surplus connected coalitions have not been stable, and reflect the deep conflicts between factions in the socialist parties and the Christian Democrats.³

Finland is different again. The largest party is the Social Democrat Party, flanked by a large Popular Democrat Party and a Centre Party. On the right is a large Conservative party. With high fragmentation and conflict cleavage, one expects from Dodd's model short lived minority coalitions. While minority coalitions have occurred regularly, so have surplus coalitions. With four important parties, almost every possible coalition has formed at some time. As a result one would expect that the ideological coalition theories of Axelrod and Leiserson would not be relevant. However, neither does the "distributional" minimal winning theory of Riker provide an explanation for coalition formation in Finland. On the assumption that the political game in Finland is essentially one of bargaining over portfolios, I have argued elsewhere (Schofield 1982) that there are theoretical reasons why surplus coalitions might alternate with minority party governments.

Conclusion

Every one of the parliamentary systems in the twelve countries that we have examined is unique in some way. The various theories that have been developed to explain coalition formation and duration in general work in one or two countries but not in others. For example linking fragmentation to political instability seems appropriate in Finland but not in the Netherlands, while the notion of connected coalitions works well in Netherlands but not in Finland.

I have tried to suggest here that the pattern of party strength along the most important policy dimension does condition the nature of party bargaining and coalition formation. However Dodd's attempt to formalize this relationship seems to have a number of difficulties. The most important one is that small changes in the distribution of party strength, resulting in small changes in fragmentation and conflict cleavage, can actually bring about considerable changes in the qualitative features of the parliamentary situation.

It is clear that patterns of electoral and political strength tend to be stable over long periods, but that sudden quite dramatic changes do occur, and these also have considerable impact on the nature of political bargaining.

In essence there appears to be two kinds of electoral change. Examples of the first "slow" kind of change we have seen in the Netherlands and Italy, where a dominant central political party or group lost support, and these changes eventually brought about changes in the qualitative aspects of the political game. The second "fast" change we have seen in Belgium or Denmark.

In the latter case, new parties came into existence quite abruptly to some extent because of the saliency of new issues. The nature of the electoral system is of course crucial in that it determines whether such fast electoral change finds parliamentary expression.

As we have seen here, the two relatively unstable countries (Italy and Finland) have been joined by two other countries (Belgium and Denmark) where fast change has increased political instability. In Ireland and the Netherlands, slow electoral change in party support has increased the difficulties of government or coalition formation. It is also reasonable to expect, on the basis of recent events, that government formation in Austria, Sweden and Iceland may become more difficult because of slow electoral change, and in Germany because of both slow and fast political change.

At a more abstract level, it is debateable whether middle range theories (whether game theoretical or policy oriented in inspiration of the kind discussed here) can account for the complex variety of parliamentary behaviour. Formal work in social choice tends to the conclusion that political phenomena are, in quite a deep sense, non predictable. In particular, with only moderate constraints on the formation of new parties, electoral shifts might be expected to be quite dramatic, especially in a context of increasing economic difficulty.

Notes

1. Norway (September 1981), Belgium (November 1981), Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden (September 1982), Ireland (February and December, 1982), Germany (March 1983), Austria and Iceland (April 1983), Italy (June 1983).
2. As we mentioned in the introduction however, in Iceland a new feminist party with three seats (and more than 5% of the vote) came into parliamentary existence after the election in April 1983. In West Germany the new Green party took 27 seats (just over 5%).
3. The problem for the Christian Democrats is that there is no medium sized party on the right that the Christian Democrats can use as a "threat" against the medium sized Socialist party (PSI). The Socialists, together with the three other small parties (Social Democrats, Republicans and Liberals) in the coalition with the Christian Democrats, increased their share of the vote from about 17% in the 1979 election to about 24% in June 1983. The drop in the Christian Democrat share of the vote to 33% has increased the bargaining powers of the Socialists, and, in effect, allowed Craxi, of the Socialists, to become prime minister. Although the Communists lost some votes in this election, a coalition of the five parties of the centre left, including the Communists and Socialists, but excluding the Christian Democrats, is now conceivable.

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Table 1

	Average Duration of Govt. (months).		Effective Number	
	until 1971	after 1971	until 1971	after 1971
Austria	37	52	2.2	2.2
Germany	40	42	3.2	2.5
Belgium	28	12	2.9	5.8
Iceland	33	35	3.6	4.0
Luxembourg	41	48	3.1	3.8
Norway	36	32	3.0	3.3
Ireland	43	30	2.8	2.5
Sweden	30	22	3.1	3.4
Denmark	31	19	3.8	5.7
Netherlands	29	30	4.8	4.5
Finland	13	17	5.0	5.4
Italy	13	11	3.4	3.4
Total	27	23	3.4	3.9

Table 2

MAJORITY PARTY	Group 1	A single party holds a majority of the seats and forms the government.
	Group 2	A single party holds a majority of the seats but forms a coalition with other parties, which obtain cabinet posts
SURPLUS COALITION	Group 3	The coalition is unconnected (in the sense that not all parties in the coalition are adjacent to one another on the policy dimension) as well as being <u>surplus</u> (in the sense of containing a party which is unnecessary for a simple majority).
	Group 4	The coalition is connected but not minimal connected winning, and therefore not minimal winning.
	Group 5	The coalition is minimal connected winning but not minimal winning.
MINIMAL WINNING COALITION	Group 6	The coalition is both minimal connected winning and minimal winning
	Group 7	The coalition is minimal winning but not minimal connected winning
MINORITY COALITION	Group 8	A minority coalition or non majority party has support from other parties which do not have cabinet posts, to the extent that a majority is obtained.
	Group 9	A minority coalition or non majority party forms a government without any implicit support.

Table 3

The Relationship between Coalition Duration and Structural
Features of the Parliamentary System*

Explanatory Variable		Dependent Variable: Duration	
		Correlation Coefficient	Multiple Regression Coeff.
Majority Status	Blondel	.299	.145
MW	Laver	.643	.477
Number Parties	Taylor & Herman	-.418	-.351
Fractionalism	Taylor & Herman	-.407	
Diversity	Laver	-.352	.036
MCW	Axelrod	.560	
Coalition Status	Dodd	-.271	

* Taken from Warwick (1979)

Table 4: Bipolar Systems

Austria after February 1953

<u>Symbol</u>	<u>Party Name</u>	<u>Electoral Vote %</u>	<u>Seats %</u>	<u>Conflict Score</u>
A	Communists (KPO)	5.3	2	-5
B	Socialists (SPO)	42.1	44	-3
C	People's Party (OVP)	41.3	45	1
D	Independents (VDU)	10.9	8	2
	Others	.4		

Concentration = 0.40

Effective number = 2.5

Conflict Cleavage = 4.45

W.Germany after the election of September 1965

<u>Symbol</u>	<u>Party Name</u>	<u>Electoral Vote %</u>	<u>Seats %</u>	<u>Conflict</u>
B	Social Democrats (SDP)	39.3	41	-3
E	Free Democrats (FDP)	9.5	10	2
D	Christian Democratic Party	47.6	49	0
	DFU and NPD	3.6		

Concentration = 0.42

Effective Number = 2.4

Conflict Cleavage = 2.77

Table 5

Moderate Conflict Cleavage and Moderate Fragmentation

Belgium after February 1946

<u>Symbol</u>	<u>Party Name</u>	<u>Electoral Vote %</u>	<u>Seats %</u>	<u>Conflict</u>
A	Communists	12.7	11	-6
B	Socialists	32.4	34	-3
G	Christian Social Party	42.5	45	1
H	Liberals	9.7	8	2
	Others	2.7		
Concentration = .34				
Effective Number = 2.9				
Conflict Cleavage = 6.77				

Luxembourg after October 1946

<u>Symbol</u>	<u>Party Name</u>		<u>Seats %</u>	<u>Conflict</u>
A	Communists		10	-5
B	Socialists		20	-3
C	Christian Social Party		50	0
D	Liberals		20	2
Concentration = .34				
Effective Number = 2.9				
Conflict = 5.24				

Iceland after June 1946

<u>Symbol</u>	<u>Party Name</u>	<u>Electoral Vote %</u>	<u>Seat %</u>	<u>Conflict</u>
A	Communists	19.5	10	-5
B	Social Democrats	17.8	17	-3
C	Progressives	23.1	27	0
D	Independence Party	39.4	36	2
Concentration = .270				
Effective Number = 3.70				
Conflict Cleavage = 7.71				

Table 6

Unipolar Systems

Norway after September 1961

<u>Symbol</u>	<u>Party Name</u>	<u>Electoral Vote %</u>	<u>Seats %</u>	<u>Conflict</u>
A	Socialist Peoples Party	2.49	1	-4
B	Labour Party	46.8	49	-3
C	Liberals	8.9	9	0
D	Christian Peoples Party	9.6	10	0
E	Agrarian Party	9.3	11	1
F	Conservatives	20.00	19	3

Concentration = 3.3

Effective Number = 3.0

Conflict Cleavage = 5.62

Sweden after September 1956

<u>Symbol</u>	<u>Party Name</u>	<u>Electoral Vote %</u>	<u>Seats %</u>	<u>Conflict</u>
A	Communist	5.0	2	-5
B	Soc. Dem. Labour	44.6	46	-3
C	Agrarian	9.4	8	-1
D	Liberal Peoples Party	23.8	25	0
E	Conservatives	17.1	18	2

Concentration = .31

Effective Number = 3.2

Conflict Cleavage = 3.74

Denmark after November 1960

<u>Symbol</u>	<u>Party Name</u>	<u>Electoral Vote %</u>	<u>Seats %</u>	<u>Conflict</u>
B	Socialists	6.1	6	-1
C	Social Democrats	42.1	43	-2
D	Radical Liberals	5.8	6	-1
E	Agrarians	21.1	22	1
F	Conservatives	17.9	18	2
	Others	7.0	4	2

Concentration = .26

Effective Number = 3.8

Conflict Cleavage = 2.73

Table 6 (contd.)

Ireland after May 1951

<u>Symbol</u>	<u>Party Name</u>	<u>Electoral Vote %</u>	<u>Seats %</u>	<u>Conflict</u>
A	Labour	11.4	13	-2
C	Finna Fail	46.3	47	-1
D	Clann na Talmhan	4.0	4	0
E	Fine Gael	25.7	27	1
X	Others	12.6	12	

Concentration = .27

Effective Number = 3.6

Conflict Cleavage = 1.0

Table 7

Multipolar Systems

(Polarized hyperfractionism)

Finland after July 1958

<u>Symbol</u>	<u>Party Name</u>	<u>Electoral Vote %</u>	<u>Seats %</u>	<u>Conflict</u>
A	Popular Democrats	23.2	25	-5
B	Social Dem. League	2.6	1.5	-4
C	Social Dem. Party	23.2	24	-3
E	Centre Party	23.1	24	0
F	Liberals	5.9	4	+1
G	Swedish Peoples Party	6.7	7	2
H	Conservatives	15.3	14.5	2

Concentration = 0.2

Effective Number = 5.0

Conflict Cleavage = 6.5

Italy after June 1953

<u>Symbol</u>	<u>Party Name</u>	<u>Electoral Vote %</u>	<u>Seats %</u>	<u>Conflict</u>
A	Communists	22.6	24	-5
C	Socialists	12.7	13	-3
D	Social Democrats	4.5	3	0
E	Republicans	1.6	1	1
F	Christian Democrats	40.1	45	1
G	Liberals	3.8	2	1
H	Monarchists	6.9	7	2
J	Italian Social	5.8	5	3
	Others	1.3		

Concentration = .28

Effective Number = 3.6

Conflict Cleavage = 7.62

Table 8

Netherlands after May 1946

<u>Symbol</u>	<u>Party Name</u>	<u>Electoral Vote %</u>	<u>Seat %</u>	<u>Conflict</u>
A	Communists	10.6	10	-5
C	Labour	28.3	29	-3
F	Anti-revolutionary	12.9	13	0
G	Catholic People's Party	30.8	32	0
H	Christian Union	7.8	8	0
J	Liberals	6.4	6	3
K	Political Reform Party	2.1	2	3
	Others	1.0		

Concentration = .22

Effective Number = 4.8

Conflict Cleavage = 7.38

Appendix

Type of Coalition Governments in
West European Countries 1945 - 1983

Table 2: Proportional Distribution of European Governments by Type: 1945 - 1971

	AUS	GER	BEL	ICE	LUX	NOR	IRE	SWE	DEN	NET	FIN	ITA	TOTALS
1. Single Party Majority	16		15			59	50	8	0				12
2. Surplus Coalition with majority party	16	35										20	6
3. Unconnected non MW coalition										15	23	5	4
4. Connected (but non MW coalition)				12	2					47	29	2	8
5. MCW but not MW coalition										6		32	3
SURPLUS COALITION	16	35	0	12	2	0	0	0	0	68	52	59	21
6. MW and MCW coalition	67	52	29	31	98	26		24	28	17	20	0	33
7. MW but not MCW coalition		13	54	52			24			14		13	14
MINIMAL COALITION	67	65	83	83	98	26	24	24	28	31	20	13	47
8. Minority coalition with support			2	3		15	12	53	60	0	16	23	16
9. Minority coalition without support				2			14	15	12	1	11	5	4
MINORITY COALITION		0	2	5	0	15	26	68	72	1	27	28	20
Herfindahl Index	.45	.31	.34	.28	.32	.33	.35	.32	.26	.21	.20	.29	.29
Effective # Parties	2.2	3.2	2.9	3.6	3.1	3.0	2.8	3.2	3.8	4.8	5.0	3.4	3.4

Table 4: Average Duration of European Governments by Type: 1945-1971

	AUS	GER	BEL	ICE	LUX	NOR	IRE	SWE	DEN	NET	FIN	ITA	TOTALS
1. Single Party Majority	48		46			48	50	24					46
2. Surplus Coalition with majority party	24	49										16	26
3. Unconnected non MW coalition										47	14	8	17
4. Connected (but non MW coalition)				40	5					38	12	7	21
5. MCW but not MW coalition										20		20	20
SURPLUS COALITION	24	49		40	5					36	13	15	21
6. MW and MCW coalition	39	40	23	35	46	43		24	43	27	15		35
7. MW but not MCW coalition		22	33	44			37			23		39	35
MINIMAL COALITION	39	36	28	40	46	43	37	24	43	25	15	39	35
8. Minority coalition with support			5	10		24	36	53	38		24	9	25
9. Minority coalition without support				5		1	42	15	12	3	6	7	10
MINORITY COALITION	20		5	8		16	39	30	28	3	11	9	19
TOTAL	37	40	28	33	41	36	43	30	31	29	13	13	27

Table 5: Total Duration of European Governments by Type in the 1970's

	AUS	GER	BEL	ICE	LUX	NOR	IRE	SWE	DEN	NET	FIN	ITA	TOTALS
1. Single Party Majority	90						48						138
2. Surplus Coalition with majority party													
3. Unconnected non MW coalition			31	40							69	26	166
4. Connected (but non MW coalition)												32	32
5. MCW but not MW coalition										62		20	82
SURPLUS COALITION			31	40						62	69	78	280
6. MW and MCW coalition		125	51	66	35			45		52			374
7. MW but not MCW coalition			26		61		52				33	12	184
MINIMAL COALITION		125	77	66	96		52	45		52	33	12	558
8. Minority coalition with support	67							16	57			32	172
9. Minority coalition without support			2			128	18	47	75	5	16	14	305
MINORITY COALITION	67		2			128	18	63	132	5	16	46	477
TOTAL	157	125	110	106	96	128	118	108	132	119	118	136	1453

Table 6: Proportional Duration of European Governments by type in the 1970's

	AUS	GER	BEL	ICE	LUX	NOR	IRE	SWE	DEN	NET	FIN	ITA	TOTALS
1. Single Party Majority	57						41						9
2. Surplus Coalition with majority party													
3. Unconnected non MW coalition			28	38							58	19	12
4. Connected (but non MW coalition)												24	2
5. MCW but not MW coalition										51		15	6
SURPLUS COALITION			28	38						51	58	58	20
6. MW and MCW coalition		100	46	62	36			49		49			26
7. MW but not MCW coalition			24		64		44				28	9	13
MINIMAL COALITION		100	70	62	100		44	49		49	28	9	39
8. Minority coalition with support	43								51			23	12
9. Minority coalition without support			2			100	15	51	49		14	10	20
MINORITY COALITION	46		2			100	8	51	100		14	33	32
Herfindahl Index	.46	.40	.17	.25	.26	.30	.40	.29	.17	.22	.19	.29	.25
Effective <i>H</i> Parties	2.2	2.5	5.8	4.0	3.8	3.3	2.5	3.4	5.7	4.5	5.4	3.4	3.9

Table 7: Frequency of European Governments by Type in the 1970's

	AUS	GER	BEL	ICE	LUX	NOR	IRE	SWE	DEN	NET	FIN	ITA	TOTALS
1. Single Party Majority	2						1						3
2. Surplus Coalition with majority party													
3. Unconnected non MW coalition			3	1							4	2	10
4. Connected (but non MW coalition)												3	3
5. MCW but not MW coalition										2		1	3
SURPLUS COALITION			3	1						2	4	6	16
6. MW and MCW coalition		3	2	2	1			2		1			11
7. MW but not MCW coalition			3		1		1				1	2	8
MINIMAL COALITION		3	5	2	2		1	2		1	1	2	19
8. Minority coalition with support	1							1	3			1	5
9. Minority coalition without support			1			4	2	2	4	1	2	3	19
MINORITY COALITION	1		1			4	2	3	7	1	2	4	25
TOTAL	3	3	9	3	2	4	4	5	7	4	7	12	63

Table 9: Total Duration of European Governments by Type: 1945 - 1983

	AUS	GER	BEL	ICE	LUX	NOR	IRE	SWE	DEN	NET	FIN	ITA	TOTALS
1. Single Party Majority	138		46			191	197	24					596
2. Surplus Coalition with majority party	48	98										62	207
3. Unconnected non MW coalition			31	40						47	139	42	299
4. Connected (but non MW coalition)				40	5					150	87	39	321
5. MCW but not MW coalition										82		118	200
SURPLUS COALITION	48	98	31	80	5					279	226	261	1027
6. MW and MCW coalition	197	284	143	171	361	85		118	86	105	70		1620
7. MW but not MCW coalition		22	192	176	61		125			45	33	51	705
MINIMAL COALITION	197	306	335	347	422	85	125	118	86	150	103	51	2325
8. Minority coalition with support	67		5	10		47	36	175	246		47	104	737
9. Minority coalition without support			2	5		129	60	91	111	8	48	28	482
MINORITY COALITION	67		7	15		176	96	266	357	8	95	132	1219
TOTAL	450	404	419	442	427	452	418	408	443	437	424	444	5167

Table 11: Frequency of European Governments by Type: 1945 - 1983

	AUS	GER	BEL	ICE	LUX	NOR	IRE	SWE	DEN	NET	FIN	ITA	TOTALS
1. Single Party Majority	3		1			4	4	1					13
2. Surplus Coalition with majority party	2	2										4	8
3. Unconnected non MW coalition			3	1						1	9	4	18
4. Connected (but non MW coalition)				1	1					4	7	4	17
5. MCW but not MW coalition										3		6	9
SURPLUS COALITION	2	2	3	2	1					8	16	18	52
6. MW and MCW coalition	5	7	6	5	8	2		5	2	3	4		47
7. MW but not MCW coalition		1	8	4	1		3			2	1	3	23
MINIMAL COALITION	5	8	14	9	9	2	3	5	2	5	5	3	70
8. Minority coalition with support	1		1	1		2	1	4	8		2	9	29
9. Minority coalition without support			1	1		5	3	5	7	2	7	5	36
MINORITY COALITION	1		2	2		7	4	9	15	2	9	14	65
TOTAL	11	10	20	13	10	13	11	15	17	15	30	35	200

Table 12: Average Duration of European Governments by Type: 1945-1985

	AUS	GER	BEL	ICE	LUX	NOR	IRE	SWE	DEN	NET	FIN	ITA	TOTALS
1. Single Party Majority	46		46			48	49	24					45
2. Surplus Coalition with majority party	24	49										16	26
3. Unconnected non MW coalition			10	29						47	15	11	16
4. Connected (but non MW coalition)				40	5					38	12	10	19
5. MCW but not MW coalition										27		20	24
SURPLUS COALITION	24	49	10	35	5					35	14	15	20
6. MW and MCW coalition	40	40	24	34	45	43		24	43	35	15		34
7. MW but not MCW coalition		22	24	44	61		42			23	33	17	31
MINIMAL COALITION	40	38	24	39	47	43	42	24	43	30	19	17	33
8. Minority coalition with support	67		5	10		24	36	44	31		24	12	25
9. Minority coalition without support			2	5		26	20	18	16	4	7	6	13
MINORITY COALITION	67		7	8		25	24	30	24	4	10	9	19
TOTAL	40	40	21	34	43	35	38	27	26	29	14	13	26