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SOME CONVENTIONAL ORTHODOXIES IN THE STUDY OF AGRARIAN CHANGE

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This is an early version of a paper which will appear in an overly edited form in World Politics in early 1984. I wish to thank Eleanor Searle and Philip Hoffman for their contributions to this manuscript.



**SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 458**

December 1982

Revised December 1983

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is critically to review two major approaches to the analysis of agrarian societies and to do so in light of evidence taken from Africa.

The first approach posits the existence of "natural" societies; the second, "peasant" societies. Both approaches attribute psychological and institutional characteristics to these societies. When subject to the exogenous shocks of intrusive political and economic forces, these attributes then generate characteristic patterns of change. The existence of such "pre-capitalist" societies is thus often invoked to account for patterns of change in contemporary rural societies.

On the basis of African materials, the paper argues that these approaches are overly cultural. They are overly economist, undervaluing the importance of the state. Many of the so-called pre-capitalist features of these societies are themselves arguably products of their encounter with agents of capitalism. Moreover, many result from the efforts of states to secure domination and control over rural populations.

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Sweet smiling village, loveliest of the lawn,  
Thy sports are fled, and all thy charms withdrawn;  
Amidst thy bowers the tyrant's hand is seen,  
And desolation saddens all thy green:  
One only master grabs the whole domain,  
And half a village stints thy smiling plain.

\* \* \*

Far, far away thy children leave the land.  
Ill fares the land, to hastening ill a prey,  
Where wealth accumulates, and men decay:  
Princes and lords may flourish, or may fade;  
A breath can make them, as a breath has made:  
But a bold peasantry, their country's pride,  
When once destroyed, can never be supplied.

\* \* \*

But now the sounds of population fail.  
No cheerful murmurs fluctuate in the gale,  
No busy steps the grass-grown foot-way tread,  
For all the bloomy flush of life is fled.  
All but yon widowed, solitary thing,  
That feebly bends beside the plashy spring. \*

- \* Oliver Goldsmith, "The Deserted Village" in Selected Works of Oliver Goldsmith (London: MacMillan and Co., 1920), pp. 358-360

Permit me to inscribe this Poem to you.

How far you may be pleased with the versification and mere mechanical parts of this attempt, I do not pretend to inquire; but I know you will object (and indeed several of our best and wisest friends concur in this opinion) that the depopulation it deplores is no where to be seen, and the disorders it laments are only to be found in the poet's own imagination. To this I can scarcely make any other answer than that I sincerely believe what I have written. \*\*

- \*\* Oliver Goldsmith, "To Sir Joshua Reynolds," letter transmitting "The Deserted Village" to Sir Joshua Reynolds, in Selected Works of Oliver Goldsmith, p. 355.

## INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is critically to review two major approaches to the analysis of agrarian societies and to do so in light of evidence taken from Africa. The African data provoke considerable skepticism concerning the validity of these contemporary orthodoxies and support three major counter arguments:

1. The reigning orthodoxies posit the existence of two forms of agrarian societies. In some cases, these societies are classified as "natural" societies; in others, they are classified as "peasant". In both cases, they are held to be pre-capitalist. A major thesis of this essay is that this last contention is false. For the very traits that lead these societies to be classified as pre-capitalist - e.g. the existence of common land rights; the avoidance of market exchanges; the turning to subsistence production, reciprocity and such social institutions as the family system for economic support - are themselves arguably products of the encounter of agrarian societies with agents of capitalism.<sup>1</sup>

2. A second argument is that the current orthodoxies are overly cultural. The orthodox positions tend to account for agrarian institutions in terms of the values of rural dwellers, e.g. their desire to secure subsistence or to gain social standing. This essay instead argues that key agrarian institutions represent compromises and adaptations; equally as often, they represent impositions from above by more powerful external agents. In either case, agrarian institutions cannot represent institutionalized expressions of agrarian values and

subjectivist, value-based accounts of these institutions are therefore false.

3. A third criticism is that the prevailing theories are overly economist. In particular, they tend to under-value the importance of the state. Many of the distinctive institutions of agrarian societies, I argue, result from the efforts of the state to secure domination and control over rural populations; and many of the behaviors attributed to the preferences of rural dwellers result from strategic interactions with public agencies which seek to extract goods and services from them. Insofar as the institutions and behaviors exhibited by agrarian societies define a peasantry, in short, states create peasants.

### INTRODUCING THE DOMINANT ORTHODOXIES

Among the most prominent of the current approaches, two stand out: the "natural" and "peasant" economy models of rural society. These models contain both static and dynamic elements. The first provide the initial conditions and the defining institutional and behavioral characteristics; when linked, these static elements generate characteristic patterns of change and significant implications for public policy.

The Myth of the Natural Economy

The critical elements of the model of the natural economy are presented in table 1. In this section, I elaborate upon this schematic summarization.

The origins of this model lie widely scattered. The model derives as much from Polanyi as from Marx and Engels;<sup>2</sup> its roots stem as well from Tonnies notion of societies based upon the principles of gemeinschaft, and from Maine's notion of societies based upon status.<sup>3</sup> In more recent times, the model has been advanced by Dalton, Wolf, Migdal, and Scott, writers whose works have been grouped by their principal critic, Samuel Popkin, into the "moral economy" school of social analysis.<sup>4</sup>

Initial Conditions: According to the model of the natural economy, "primitive" agrarian societies produce not for exchange but for use; as a consequence

market exchanges are usually peripheral, in the sense that most sellers do not acquire the bulk of their livelihood, and buyers the bulk of their daily used goods and services, via . . . market-place sales and purchases. . . . labor and land do not enter the market and basic livelihood is acquired in non-market spheres . . . all important output and factor flows are carried on via reciprocity and redistribution.<sup>5</sup>

TABLE 1

Schematic Presentation of the Model of a Natural Economy

Initial Conditions:

- i. Agrarian economy.
- ii. Production for use rather than exchange.
- iii. Insignificance of markets.

Institutional Characteristics:

- i. "Communal" land rights;
  - a. Use rights accorded to producers if and only if producer a member of the community.
  - b. Rights to land revert to community when use rights no longer exercised.
- ii. Importance of the primary community and, in particular, the village.

Behavioral Characteristics:

- i. The desire for self-sufficiency.
- ii. The importance of status.
- iii. The importance of equality.

Patterns of Change:

- i. Initial opposition to "commoditization."
- ii. Social disintegration in the face of markets.
- iii. Radicalization under the impact of capitalism.

Corollaries:

The preference of agrarian societies for communal forms of economic organization.

In the absence of markets, resources are not allocated in accord with their value in exchange; rather, the patterns of allocation are determined by social relationships. As Dalton states,

Specifically, these primitive social economies are so organized that the allocation of labour and land, work organization within productive processes, and the disposition of goods and services - in short, production and distribution - are expressions of underlying kinship obligation, tribal affiliation, and religious and moral duty. There is no separate economic system to be analyzed independently of social organization.<sup>6</sup>

Institutional Characteristics: Nowhere is the determining influence of social organization over the allocation of economic resources more clearly seen than in the area of property rights. In pre-capitalist societies, according to Marx,

in all these forms, . . . landed property and agriculture are the basis of the economic order and . . . the economic objective is . . . the production of use-values, i.e. the reproduction of the individual<sup>7</sup>

Under such circumstances, "an isolated individual could no more own land than he could speak."<sup>8</sup> The acquisition of property is thus a social act; it requires membership in a community. As Marx concludes

in his discussion of the Germanic form of pre-capitalist society - a discussion which is far more applicable to the analysis of African societies than is his more widely cited discussion of the Asiatic form - "property therefore means belonging to a tribe..."<sup>9</sup>

Critical too is the importance of face-to-face communities, and, in particular, the village. Along with kin-based organizations, villages are viewed as the central social institution of agrarian societies. The importance of the village is perhaps best suggested by Scott:

In almost every case [in Southeast Asia] the village has constituted something more than merely a physical aggregation of households. Ritually, it has been set apart by local guardian spirits and religious shrines; economically, it has represented the unit of labor exchange; socially, it has formed the unit of status, of reciprocity, and of social insurance; politically, it has generally been a unit of dispute settlement, as well as of administration and taxation.<sup>10</sup>

The village is central to all aspects of rural life.

Communal restrictions on landed property and the pervasive significance of villages: both underscore the impact of social relations on economic life. In the literature on the natural economy - and in the literature on the peasant economy as well - the two themes are often fused; they combine in the discussion of the corporate

village. In the words of Wolf, such villages

maintain a measure of communal jurisdiction over land . . .  
 restrict their membership, maintain a religious system, enforce  
 mechanisms which insure the redistribution or destruction of  
 surplus wealth, and uphold barriers against the . . . outside  
 . . . .<sup>11</sup>

And while the initial writings of Wolf make it clear that the corporate village is but one of many forms of rural settlement, the analysis of these villages dominates much of the subsequent literature on agrarian society.<sup>12</sup>

Social Values: The social institutions of rural society, this literature contends, facilitate the attainment of key cultural values. One such value is a sense of membership. As Dalton states, "In primitive communities, the individual as an economic factor is personalized, not anonymous. He tends to hold his economic position in virtue of his social position."<sup>13</sup> Another is a stress on equality. A third is an outgrowth of the first two: the value placed on guarantees of subsistence. Each member of society possesses an equal right to sufficient income to guarantee their survival. Thus Scott, in his discussion of agrarian institutions, cites Polanyi and states:

Polanyi claims on the basis of historical and anthropological evidence that . . . practices . . . in traditional society . . . served to mark it off from the modern economy. He concluded, "It is the absence of threat of individual starvation which makes primitive society, in a sense, more humane than market economy, and at the same time less economic."<sup>14</sup>

Transition Arguments: The model of the natural economy thus posits distinctive institutional and subjective features for agrarian societies. It posits as well a notion of change. The initial condition of the natural economy is the absence of markets. But, according to this model, markets inevitably penetrate into even the most isolated communities; and this alteration in the initial conditions generates characteristic patterns of change.

One response is to resist the market; in the words of Redfield, these societies attempt to keep the market "at arm's length."<sup>15</sup> With the inevitable triumph of the market, however, there arises a second response: social disintegration. In the words of Wolf, "capitalism cut through the integument of custom, severing people from their accustomed social matrix in order to transform them into economic actors, independent of prior social commitments to kin and neighbors."<sup>16</sup> "This liberation from accustomed social ties and the separation which it entailed constituted the historical experience which Karl Marx would describe in terms of 'alienation'.<sup>17</sup> The third response is rural radicalism. Agrarian protest is radical, it is held, in the sense that

it asserts the entitlement of all people to subsistence, the validity of communal property as a means of securing this entitlement, and the rejection of the private market. As Wolf states in his analysis of rural revolutions,

In a sense all our . . . cases can be seen as the outcome of . . . defensive reactions, coupled with a search for a new and more humane social order.<sup>18</sup>

And as Scott states,

As the growth of commerce and markets . . . broke the hold of local custom, the utopian vision of the peasantry increasingly anticipated a society in which, as in earlier times, "buying and selling" would disappear.<sup>19</sup>

The result is rural radicalism:

it is precisely the fact that peasants and artisans have one foot in the pre-capitalist economy that explains why they have provided the mass impetus for so many "forward looking" movements. Their opposition to capitalism, based as it is on a utopian image of an earlier era, is as tenacious, if not more so, as the opposition of a proletariat which has both feet in the new society.<sup>20</sup>

Policy Correlates: The ethical properties of the natural economy, it is held, render rural dwellers revolutionary not only in their political but also in their economic behavior. An important corollary of this theory is that rural dwellers will subscribe to collective forms of economic organization, ones which reject private property and thereby forestall the emergence of economic inequality and exploitation. As noted by Hyden, the promotion of cooperative societies in Africa derives in part from the conviction that African rural society is by preference communitarian:

Like Russian populists in the nineteenth century African leaders have idealized the "pure" features of peasant society. "Africa is essentially 'communaucratic', writes Sekou Touré 'We had already realized socialism before the coming of the Europeans,' says Leopold Senghor.<sup>21</sup>

In response to these convictions, political leaders such as Touré, Senghor, Kaunda, Nyerere and others proceeded to form cooperative societies and channeled their programs of agricultural development through the cooperative movement.<sup>22</sup>

The Peasant Economy:

A second model of agrarian society is frequently applied to rural Africa: the model of the peasant society. Its distinctive features are summarized in table 2.

TABLE 2

## Schematic Presentation of the Model of a Peasant Society

Initial Conditions:

- i. Post-agrarian economy; the importance of urban industry and manufacturing.
- ii. Fully elaborated markets both for products and factors of production.
- iii. Production for exchange as well as use.

Institutional Characteristics:

- i. Private rights in land.
- ii. Prevalence of inequality:
  - a. The importance of state coercion.
  - b. The importance of class formation.
- iii. Limited participation in the markets for products and labor.

Behavioral Assumptions:

- i. Subsistence ethic.
- ii. Rejection of pure profit maximization.

Patterns of Change:

- i. The creation of the peasant mode: the impact of capitalism on the natural economy.
- ii. Conflicts between peasant mode and capitalism.

Initial Conditions: Peasant societies are held to be pre-capitalist in the sense that in peasant societies labor is not separated from the means of production. Nonetheless, it is contended, peasant societies represent a more "advanced" form of agrarian society than do natural economies. Peasant societies do not stand isolated and self-sufficient; rather, they reside within state systems and within economies which contain cities, industry and manufacturing. And they are linked to these other social sectors through relations of political domination and economic exchange.

Institutional Characteristics: Nearly all discussions of peasant societies thus emphasize that peasant societies are "part-societies." As Kroeber's classic definition states,

Peasants are definitely rural - yet live in relation to market towns; they form a class segment of a larger population which usually contains urban centers, sometimes metropolitan capitals. They constitute part-societies with part-cultures.<sup>23</sup>

In the cultural sphere, peasants are bearers of the "little" tradition; they define their rituals in response to the "great" tradition of the ritual centers of the larger society.<sup>24</sup> In the political sphere, they are part of but not governors of the political system; as Shanin states,



Peasants, as a rule, have been kept at arm's length from the . . . sources of power. Their political subjection interlinks with cultural subordination and with their exploitation. . . .<sup>25</sup>

Not only are peasants politically subordinate to the state, but also they are politically dominated by other classes; often these are rural classes, for in the context of a market economy and with the help of state power certain fragments of the rural society are able to accumulate large-scale private landholdings. So important is the pattern of inequality that Welch is driven to ask: "Without landlords, could there be peasants?"<sup>26</sup>

In the economic sphere, peasants are "part-" societies in the sense that they participate in markets and are reliant upon them to fulfill their subsistence needs, but they are only partially so. As Wolf states, "We may . . . draw a line between the peasant and another agricultural type whom we call the 'farmer.' The farmer views agriculture as a business enterprise. . . . The aim of the peasant is subsistence."<sup>27</sup> And as Fallers comments, "In economic terms, a peasant is . . . a man who produces . . . mainly for his own household's consumption, but who also produces something to exchange in a market for other goods and services. This is the economic aspect of the peasant community's semi-autonomy."<sup>28</sup> The limited participation in the market is seen both in the tendency to consume large proportions of one's own production and also to rely primarily upon family, as opposed to hired, labor.

Behavioral Characteristics: Further defining peasant society are behavioral and psychological characteristics. Chayanov, for example argues that the economics of the peasant household differ from that of a profit maximizing firm, for peasants are driven by the need to secure sufficient subsistence to guarantee their survival and their reproduction. Peasants will therefore incur costs up to the point where the consumption needs of the domestic economy are satisfied. As a consequence, peasants will, if necessary, engage in "internal exploitation" of family labor to cover the requirements of domestic consumption. Driven by the imperative of supporting the domestic unit, peasants will work longer hours, cultivate more intensively the lands they hold or surrender greater revenues for lands they wish to buy than purely commercial considerations would justify.<sup>29</sup>

Because their households are more than a pure production unit, then, peasants are motivated by principles other than those of profit maximization. Joining Chayanov in this argument are others who extend the range of relevant motivations to include social goals. According to this position, the peasant expends the fruits of production to build close and supportive ties with his fellow rural dwellers. This is wise, it is argued, because the market is risky and uncertain; the support of others is required as a form of social insurance. As Wolf states, "To insure continuity upon the land and sustenance form his household, the peasant most often keeps the market at arm's length, for unlimited involvement in the market threatens his hold on his source of livelihood. He thus cleaves to traditional arrangements which

guarantee his access to land and to the labor of kin and neighbors."<sup>30</sup> Moreover, expenditures upon social involvements are inherently enjoyable and rewarding; for the culture of the peasantry simply places a higher priority on social status than on material wealth. These themes are captured by Routh, who is quoted with approval by Goran Hyden; according to Routh, the peasant

eats well, he has a bed to sleep on, a chair to sit on. For recreation, he has his evenings of conversation round the pombe (beer) pot. There is no figure in the economic textbooks which is more misunderstood than he. . . . To suggest that he is "underemployed" and imagine that one is bestowing a favour on him by providing more work, is ludicrous. It is his aim to be as underemployed as possible, and to allow himself to be disturbed from this aim only by the need to meet his austere objectives.<sup>31</sup>

The static components of the model of a peasant economy thus contain a set of initial conditions (an advanced market economy), institutional traits (rural class formation, political subordination, and partial involvement in markets), and behavioral characteristics (an overriding concern with subsistence and with the primary community). The dynamic components consist of patterns of change, patterns which include both the origins and the destruction of the peasant economy.

Patterns of Change: The origins of peasant society, it is held, lie in the impact of market forces upon the natural economy. Under the stimulation of the market, property rights become individualistic; households no longer are self-sufficient but become dependent on the market; and "self-sufficient communities founded largely upon kinship ties are 'turned outwards,' as it were, and made dependent . . . upon external structures and forces."<sup>32</sup> In the third world, the primary agency for this expansion of the market is the imperial state; as Post contends

The colonial powers . . . greatly extended the market principle, to the point where the impersonal forces of the world market dominated the lives of millions, and imposed a State where none had been before, or to supersede indigenous ones. . . . It would appear, then, that many of the conditions for the existence of a peasantry were suddenly created, but from the outside.<sup>33</sup>

The intrusion of capitalist society, championed by the powers of imperial expansion, thus lead to the alterations of the conditions supportive of the natural economy and promoted the formation of a peasant society, in which pre-capitalist forms (workers in control of their own means of production) continued to operate, but within a fully capitalist exchange economy.

The dynamic elements of the model posit as well the existence of a second set of changes: patterns of tension and conflict between the peasant mode of production and capitalism.

For some, such as Hyden, the contradictory relations between the capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production is suggested by the apparent conviction that the existence of the peasantry retards the growth of capitalism. For according to Hyden, the peasant's capacity to revert back to subsistence allows the peasantry to prevent the extraction of surplus from an agrarian economy. As Hyden writes:

it is not an exaggeration to claim that the principal structural constraint to development are the barriers raised . . . by the peasant mode of production. . . . In order to appropriate the surplus product from the peasant more effectively there is no other way available but to raise peasant productivity and make him produce more than for his own domestic needs.<sup>34</sup>

For others, such as Williams, the tension between the peasantry and capitalism also exists, but will nonetheless inevitably be resolved; for the peasants are viewed as an inherently "transitional class, which will inevitably be displaced by the technical superiority of capitalist production. They are able to sustain their existences in the face of . . . competition only by overworking and impoverishing themselves. In this way, they serve the interests of capital by selling commodities cheaply."<sup>35</sup> The very capacity for internal exploitation inherent in

peasant societies thus leads to the transfer of resources to the non-agrarian sector of society and to the self-destruction of the peasantry as a class. Driven by their own impoverishment, they become workers in cities or on the holdings of more efficient, large-scale farms. For others, such as Wolf and Migdal, the struggle is short-lived; for accompanying the dynamics posited by Williams are the pressures of accelerated population growth and ecological stress - pressures which lead to the immiseration and defeat of the rural society.<sup>36</sup>

#### THE MODELS CRITIQUED IN LIGHT OF THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE

In outline form, then, these are two of the dominant models of rural society. What is devastating is how poorly these models perform when applied to the African data.

#### The Initial Conditions:

To an Africanist, one of the most striking deficiencies in these theories is their initial conditions: a world of subsistence production in which there are no markets, no buying, no trading. This assumption, it should be stressed, is not benign; it cannot be dismissed as a mere romantic overtone in the argument. Rather, it provides an essential underpinning. The initial conditions motivate the dynamics of both the models. Movements away from these conditions precipitate a change from a subsistence oriented, egalitarian, and isolated agrarian society to a market dependent, class driven, peasant society, inextricably tied to centers of wealth and power. And the

further intensification of relations with capitalism yields a sustained pattern of conflict between the capitalist and peasant economies. The initial conditions also help to account for the growth and behavior of revolutionary forces: outrage at the loss of a "state of virtue" provides the demand for revolution and the moral values which are threatened through the spread of capitalism provide its ideology. Without the assumptions concerning the initial conditions, then several major predictions - concerning the rise of class based, peasant societies from subsistence economies; the intensification of struggle between peasants and the advanced capitalist sectors of society; and the outbreak and nature of peasant revolts - simply would not follow.

The initial conditions of the model of the natural economy are therefore critical to the prevailing orthodoxies concerning the dynamics of agrarian change. Were these conditions to hold anywhere, one would expect them to hold in Africa. And yet, time and time again, historical research reaffirms that in pre-colonial Africa there was trade, there was commerce, and there was the widespread use of money in exchange economies. It is Jack Goody who best summarizes these findings, and he is worth quoting at length:

The concept of non-monetary economics is hardly applicable to pre-colonial Africa, except possibly for certain hunting groups of minimal importance. Africa was involved in a vast network of wide-ranging trade long before the Portuguese came on the scene. For East Africa we have a late first century sailor's guide, the

Periplus of the Erythrean Sea, to the trade along the coast. Long before the Europeans arrived there were trade routes from Madagascar up to the East African coast, through the Red Sea and into the Mediterranean, along the Persian Gulf to India, Southeast Asia, and Indonesia. By the time the Portuguese had reached East Africa, the Chinese had already been active there; before the development of the gun-carrying sailing ship on the Atlantic seaboard, the maritime commerce of the Indian Ocean made western Europe seem an underdeveloped area. Indeed, the trade between Ethiopia, the Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean had much to do with the developments in the Arabian peninsula, including the rise of Muhammed.

In West Africa the medieval empires of the Niger bend were built up on the trade which brought salt, cloth, and beads south from the Sahara across to West Africa and took gold and ivory and slaves back to the Barbary coast and from there into medieval Europe.<sup>37</sup>

From the point of view of the mercantile economy, parts of Africa were similar to Western Europe of the same period. Metal coinage was in use on the East African coast. In the west, currencies consisted of gold, brass, and salt, but more especially cowrie shells, which, coming as they did from the Maldive Islands off the south of Ceylon, filled most of the necessary attributes of money.<sup>38</sup>

Isolation, subsistence, lack of involvement in an exchange economy: these are not to be found in the "primitive" economies of Africa. Alternatively, these traits characterize so small and insignificant a group of African societies that it would be nonsensical to base a general theory of social change upon them. Given the validity of these criticisms on the basis of African materials, the implications for the use of these models elsewhere is far more damaging. For elsewhere the pervasiveness of the money economy has surely been greater and of even longer duration.

#### Transition Arguments

The reigning orthodoxies in the study of agrarian economies are defined not only in terms of their initial conditions; they are also defined in terms of their dynamics, i.e. their assertions concerning characteristic patterns of change.

For the first of these models, the dynamics derive from the pre-capitalist nature of rural society. Agrarian societies are portrayed as locked in conflict with a powerful alternative economy: the capitalist economy, where there exists private property, where everything can be bought and sold, and where people are driven to maximize profits by the imperative of market competition. In the face of the encroachment of the money economy, rural dwellers are held to attempt to "keep the market at arm's length" and to "resist commoditization."

In light of the expectations generated by these arguments, it is therefore disconcerting to find that in Africa the roles of the supposed combatants are sometimes the reverse of what this model would expect. It is sometimes the agencies of capitalism - the colonial state - who take the lead in resisting commoditization and in promoting communal institutions. The advocates for the rapid expansion of the market and of private property, on the other hand, are sometimes drawn from the members of the indigenous agrarian society.

"Buying and Selling": Despite myths to the contrary, throughout much of Africa, indigenous peoples turned quickly, vigorously, and skillfully to production for colonial markets. The rapid and astonishing growth of the cocoa industry in West Africa has been told by Hill and Barry; within a generation, Ghana became the world's leading producer of cocoa and did so on the initiative of indigenous agrarian interests.<sup>39</sup> Hogendorn has shown how in Northern Nigeria indigenous entrepreneurs organized the large-scale production of groundnuts for export to colonial market.<sup>40</sup> Similar histories exist for palm oil production in Nigeria and groundnut production in Senegal.<sup>41</sup> Similarly, Arrighi wrote for the Rhodesias:

It is possible that in the 1890s the African peoples showed some "unfamiliarity" with [market] opportunities, but by the turn of the century this was no longer the case. Prior to 1904 European farming in Rhodesia was insignificant and the African peasantry supplied the bulk of the foodstuffs required by the mines. In

1903, for example, it was estimated that the annual amount received by Africans for sale of grains, other produce, and stock was on the order of £350,000, and there is much evidence that trade with the African population was at the time the most, if not the only, profitable activity carried out by the Europeans. Further, when the development of European mixed farming and ranching created a demand for African-owned cattle, Africans were ready to sell them in large numbers. Though mainly limited to the sale of what may be called "traditional" produce (grain, cattle, and beer), African participation in the produce market also took other forms: the production for the market of green vegetables, potatoes, wheat, groundnuts, and tobacco, for example, was either introduced or expanded, and the practice developed in the mining areas of drawing a regular income from hiring out bullocks to the mines for purposes of transport.<sup>42</sup>

Arrighi goes on to note that change was not limited to the sphere of exchange but also was introduced in the methods of production:

"Africans were equally prompt in investing and innovating in response to market opportunities."<sup>43</sup> They acquired wagons, carts, maize mills, pumps, ox-drawn ploughs and other equipment, and they invested in higher grade cattle and the fencing and dips required for their survival.<sup>44</sup>

Property Rights: In fact, change went even deeper: it extended as well to the definition of property rights. In light of the expectations formed by the orthodox treatment of agrarian change, the stunning irony of the matter is that it was often the governments of the colonial powers - the primary agents of capitalism - who advocated "communal" property rights whereas the members of the indigenous agrarian societies often championed the cause of private ownership.

As no subject engenders greater confusion than that of property rights, let me quickly recall the definition outlined in table 1. By communal land rights, I mean a system wherein

1. Use rights are accorded a producer if and only if that producer is a member of a community. In other words,
  - a) Community membership is a sufficient condition for rights to land; no member of the community can go without land. And
  - b) Community membership is a necessary condition for rights to land; land cannot be alienated outside of the community.
2. The community holds revisionary rights in land. That is, when use is no longer being made of land, rights to the land revert to the community. The land can then be re-allocated for use.

Under a system of private property rights, condition 1 does not hold. Membership of the community is no longer sufficient to guarantee access to land; nor is it a necessary condition, and land can be alienated to

persons outside the community. Moreover, land which is not in use does not revert to the community; it can be held for purposes of speculation, transferred to other private individuals, or bequeathed to persons of the owner's own choosing. A clear implication of this system, of course, is that even in the presence of abundant land, people can starve for want of access to it; a primary attraction of the communal system is that under similar circumstances such deaths would not occur.

Conflicts between capitalist governments, committed to communal rights, and spokesmen for agrarian societies, committed to private land rights, broke out in both West and East Africa. In 1912, the British colonial government appointed the West African Lands Committee to investigate land laws in British West Africa. The Committee's report called for the reinforcement of "pure native tenure." It stressed that "legislation should have as its aim the checking of the progress of individual tenure and the strengthening of native custom," which, it held, "did not recognize the concept of individual tenure and forbade the . . . sale of . . . community land."<sup>45</sup> In these recommendations, the Committee was vigorously opposed by local interests. One expert on local practices, Sir Brandford Griffith, noted that in opposing private ownership and a free market in land, the government was in fact flying in the face of "local custom"; as Grier comments,

So definite and so common a practice was the sale of land . . . by the end of the nineteenth century that Griffith (whose association with the Colony dated back to his father, Sir William Brandford Griffith, Governor 1886-1895) could say that he "never had occasion to consider the question."<sup>46</sup>

And, as noted in an 1895 petition from "chiefs, natives and other inhabitants of the Cape Coast," the government's policy was unjust, for "now, when private enterprise had proved the value of their lands, [the Government] was to deprive them of their property."<sup>47</sup> The organizers of this petition formed the first indigenous political party in West Africa - a party organized in large part in opposition to the government's restrictions on private rights to land.

In West Africa, then, we face an ironic situation in which the putative agency of capitalist expansion - the government of the colonial power - actively promoted communal rights, whilst members of the agrarian societies demanded the unrestricted right to purchase and to alienate land. In East Africa we face a similar "reversal." Speaking in opposition to the penetration of private market forces into the rural sector, for example, was the post-war governor of Kenya, Sir Philip Mitchell. Mitchell argued that soil degradation, environmental spoilage, and avaricious exploitation of land inevitably followed the creation of private property. What was needed, then, was "the proper control of the community. Each Native Land Unit, or a portion of a unit, was to be regarded as an estate of the community"; each occupier

of land was to be a 'tenant of the tribe'.<sup>49</sup>

The government of Kenya was opposed in its land policy by the indigenous people, and in particular, by the Kikuyu. As long ago as 1912 a Kenya District Officer had investigated local tenurial practices and had found that land was held by families who occupied it unconditionally, that is, not at the pleasure of any higher authority. He had also found that many of these family estates had been purchased. Land was in fact bought and sold both within and between tribes.<sup>49</sup> It is therefore unsurprising that the Kikuyu opposed government policy and demanded individual registration of land holdings and the enforcement of private rights to land. The urgency with which they pressed their demands was of course intensified by the insecurity they felt in the face of the uncompensated seizure of lands by the colonialists.

Characteristic of the transition arguments of the orthodox models of agrarian change is the assumption that rural dwellers are assaulted by capitalism. The communal attributes of these societies are counterpoised against the forces of capitalism that promote private interests. Allowance is made for some members of rural society to demand private property rights: rural elites, for example, would seek a regime of private property rights in order to defend their economic privileges. But it could never be the case under these theories that agents of capitalism would seek communal rights while the members of agrarian society seek private ones. And yet, as we have seen, there exists in the African literature at least two cases in which this occurs.

I am not prepared to argue that it was everywhere the case that Africans advanced demands for private property, nor that the colonial governments always advanced the case of communal property. Yet the fact that this pattern occurred at all serves to deflect our attention from the economist orthodoxies in this field and to factors other than the level of capitalist development as a determinant of agrarian change. In particular, I would argue, this discordant set of facts suggests that governments may act in ways that differ from what one would expect, given their societies' "stage of development"; that governments may confront an independent set of political imperatives; and that the imperatives shaping political action may lead governments to lay in place characteristic institutions of agrarian society.

Ideology: The African data suggest that at least three major imperatives helped to shape the government's role in agrarian change. One was ideology. In the case of the British, there existed a genuine conviction that pre-capitalist societies were communitarian; that Western man, in the personage of the imperialist, was introducing forces that promoted self-interested behavior; and that because indigenous institutions were scarce and inherently valuable, they should therefore be protected by government. As noted by Sorrenson in his discussion of Norman Humphrey, an influential figure in the post-war development of Kenyan land policy:



Humphrey - and indeed a good many other officials - doubted the moral right of Europeans to impose . . . a system [of economic individualism] on Africans, thus destroying the supposed communal spirit of tribal tradition. Humphrey wanted to establish a series of locational, divisional, and district councils to manage land along communal lines . . . and he hoped this would lead to a re-awakening of [the individual's] sense of duty to his fellows and his land and the instilling of of a desire to abandon those false values that have been a major product of his sudden contact with our civilization.<sup>50</sup>

In registering these sentiments, Humphrey was, of course, echoing the sentiments of far more powerful figures in the British colonial regime: Lugard, Cameron, Perham and Hailey, to mention but a few.<sup>51</sup>

Empowerment: More important than the ideological motivations of government, however, were strategic calculations made in the course of securing political domination in Africa. The colonial governments sought, and needed, political allies through whom to secure control over Africa's largely agrarian population. A key reason for insisting on communal land rights, it would appear, was that a systems of communal rights empowered locally based confederates: it gave control over the allocation of the key resources in an agrarian economy to those who would govern the agrarian population on behalf of the colonialist powers - the tribal chiefs.

In the British case, the policy of governing through "traditional rulers" was known as "indirect rule." C. K. Meek clearly articulates the link between indirect rule and the formation of property rights; as he states at the beginning of his semi-official treatise, Land Law and Custom in the Colonies:

The authority of chiefs, sub-chiefs and heads of clans and families is bound up with the land. The grant, therefore, to individuals of absolute rights of ownership would tend to disrupt the native policy, and so, too, would the indiscriminate sale of tribal lands by chiefs. The control of alienation of land has in consequence been one of the main planks of the British system of 'Indirect Rule'.<sup>52</sup>

So compelling is this thesis that Meek returns to it toward the end of his work, contending that "there is a political danger in allowing individuals to become owners of 'freeholds' without owing any allegiance to the local Native Authorities."<sup>53</sup> "If 'indirect rule' is to continue to be a cardinal principal of British policy," he concludes, then "it would appear to be essential that the local Native Authorities should remain the ultimate 'owners' of as much land as possible. . . ."<sup>54</sup>

The best system, from Meek's point of view, was one in which political loyalty to an agent of the colonial power served as a prerequisite for access to land. Tignor, among others, examined the

operation of this system and found it to operate roughly as one would expect. Friends and relatives of the chief secured land; indeed, the chiefly families became the richest land owners in the districts studied by Tignor. Political enemies of the chiefs lost rights to land. And as adjudicators of land cases, chiefs became rich: "they were among the first to build European-style homes. They had large property in land, wives and stock - all traditional signs of wealth, much of which was acquired through illegal uses of their power."<sup>55</sup> And even more interesting, Tignor found that the more valuable the control over land - i.e. the scarcer the land in relation to the population - the greater the power which the British policy of customary land rights conferred to the chiefs. The Ibo and Kikuyu chiefs, for example, who ruled in densely populated agricultural areas, proved far more effective as "modernizing agents" of the British than did the chiefs of the Kamba or Masai, who lived in areas where population was far less dense and land therefore relatively more abundant.

Counter-factual observations - ones in which rural dwellers favor private property rights while capitalist governments favor communal property - has thus driven us to depart from orthodox theories of rural change. We have moved instead to an approach in which key rural institutions - in this case, property law - are interpreted as political outcomes. In the case at hand, the adoption of common property represents an effort to augment the power of the administrative agents of the state, and thereby secure its more certain domination of an agrarian population.

As a corollary to this approach, we should expect that the institutions which were adopted in any particular situation would represent the outcome of political bargaining. Viewed from this light, there is no particular reason to expect one or another form of agrarian institution to emerge as a consequence of social change. The outcome would depend on the configuration of power.

This inference is supported by the African materials. In some areas in Africa both the colonial powers and the native chiefs were notably weak. This was true in Zambia, where the occupying forces were small and chiefly powers had been based largely upon warfare and slave raiding, both of which were abandoned following the imperial occupation. It was also true in places like Kenya; not only were the British small in number but also acephalous societies were the rule and the institution of chieftancy nonexistent. From the point of view of the colonial administration, the result in both places was a need for power. In the case of Kenya, the response was the virtual creation of chiefs and tribal authorities by the British and the assignment to these native authorities of the power to regulate the allocation of "native" lands. In the case of Zambia, the British forbade any registering of individual titles of land ownership and created tribal rights in land, with land allocation becoming the responsibility of the chiefs. As Gluckman states, "the government policy was virtually the promotion of tribalism: 'tribalism' [is] a whole system of political and domestic relations. Government policy has supported the chiefs . . . [M]embership of the tribe and allegiance to the chief give a man

a right in land. . . . land is held in [this] system through subordinate political groups, and ultimately through a place in kinship relations."<sup>56</sup>

Where there was a need to create rural power, then, the colonial state promoted the creation of communal property rights as part of its effort to elaborate systems of rural political control over an agrarian population. Where the colonial authority possessed decisive power and was not reliant upon the creation of rural elites, then of course the situation was different. In essence, the situation was no longer purely political; commercial considerations could be decisive. Where a labor force was needed, for example, the agrarian society could be "proletarianized", as in some regions of Southern Africa. Or, where food crops or export crops were needed, the rural population could be left in place as a free peasantry and agrarian society left to run as a collection of small holder, working virtually within a regime of private property.

In other regions, however, rural elites did exist; and the outcome of the bargaining between the colonial power and the indigenous agrarian society reflected their composition and preferences. In some cases, such as in Ghana, indigenous commercial elites profited from the use of land. Exports of rubber, timber, and palm oil had long flourished in the territory, and the political leaders were themselves deeply involved in commerce and trade. In securing the terms of the political settlement by which to govern the territory, then, the colonial power had perforce to concede the rights of these rural elites

to exercise uninhibited control over their property. In Uganda, by contrast, the rural elite was not commercialized; land was not exploited to secure pecuniary profits from agriculture. Rather, the elite was almost purely political and consisted of the chiefs and their administrators. In securing allies within the rural sector, then, the imperialists had, perforce, to accommodate to this structure of power. The result was yet another form of property settlement: the virtual "Junkerization" of landed relations. In return for their collaboration with the British occupying powers, the chiefs were given freehold rights on the best lands in Uganda and the peasants virtually rendered serfs. Cash crop production was then begun with the chiefs reaping vast economic benefits through the appropriation of labor dues and other "feudal" services.<sup>57</sup>

It is wrong, then, to argue that African indigenous societies embodied collective property rights and that it was the influence of the West that led to the formation of private rights in land. In some cases, rather, the agents of the West sought to create communal rights and members of the indigenous community struggled for legal recognition of private property. In any case, the form of property law adopted was shaped by the desire of the colonial state for political domination of an agrarian population and by the nature of the political accommodations it had to make in order to secure its hegemony.

Without attempting to overstate the case, it may be useful to note that in other places and in other eras rural land law was recast as part of a political strategy of empowering sub-elites in an effort

to build structures of political domination. I refer to Marx and Engels' discussion of the emergence of feudalism among the Franks. Their analysis is political, not economist; it places at its center the attempts by the crown to organize capabilities for warfare and its efforts to secure a reliable network of subordinates and allies. As Engels clearly argues in his work, the technique adopted by the crown was one of rural empowerment: the divestiture to political allies of control over land rights and the creation thereby of subordinates with the capacity to dominate and govern an agrarian population and to extract needed resources from them.<sup>58</sup>

Finances: States are thus driven by the need for domination and they develop land rights in efforts to create rural centers of power. Their behavior is also influenced by the need for finances. The African materials clearly show the significance of financial imperatives in shaping governments' policies toward rural property; and they do so once again in a way that casts suspicion on any belief in the unilinear development of agrarian institutions - in particular, land rights - in the face of capitalism. One of the best illustrations of the influence of fiscal considerations comes from Zambia.

As is well known, Zambia depends on the production of copper. First located early in the twentieth century, the copper deposits of Zambia gave birth to one of the world's leading copper industries; by 1930, the mines of Zambia employed 30,000 people. By far the largest industry in this small territory, and by a vast measure the most profitable, the copper industry constituted the major element in the

government's tax base.

As copper prices rose, both the government and the mining companies prospered. As copper prices fell, both suffered. But the costs imposed by lower prices were borne unequally; for while both the government and the firms experienced decreasing revenues, the efforts of the firms to lower their costs in the face of declining revenues imposed increased costs upon the government.

The mines were capitalist enterprises. In the face of lower product prices, they maximized their profits (or, equivalently, minimized their losses) by curtailing their use of the variable factor of production: labor. While it was cost minimizing on the part of companies to release labor at times of lower prices, unemployed labor threatened to add to the costs of government. These costs could take the form of the state provision of food and shelter; or they could take the form of higher costs of police protection in the face of threats posed by masses of unemployed. While both the government and the mining companies derived their revenues from mining, then, the government's need for revenues increased just when these revenues became most scarce.

This fiscal dilemma was, in a sense, created by capitalism. The state did not own the means of production; these were in private hands and production decisions were made solely with a view to their private, as opposed to social, consequences. Moreover, the state's revenues were subject to cyclical shocks originating from the capitalist economies. As stated by its Chief Secretary at the time of

the most cataclysmic of such shocks - the depression of the 1930s - the dilemma was clear:

The wealth of the country is in the minerals which it does not own . . . and direct revenue from this source is at present negligible. . . . The fact . . . that the companies are not earning taxable profits does not diminish the services which the Government is compelled to supply to the mining areas.<sup>59</sup>

In fact, as we have seen, the result was likely to be the opposite; at times of shortfalls in revenues, the demand for services increased. In the fact of this dilemma, the state advocated an ironic solution: the development of communal forms of rights to landed property.

The government created a characteristic form of citizenship: one in which rights were constrained not only by national membership but also by membership in a subnationality, a "tribe." And it made access to land a function of social and political affiliation. Land could be acquired in a rural community by affiliating with its political officials and by establishing membership in a kin group which belonged to that political community.<sup>60</sup> To retain rural land rights, then, urban dwellers had to remain "tribalized."<sup>61</sup> The government promoted both political and familial forms of affiliation. Urban authorities issued documents establishing the tribal political affiliation of the urban labor force; for some purposes, such as the trying of court cases, they also extended the political authority of

rural governments into the urban areas.<sup>62</sup> And the government facilitated as well the maintenance of social ties with rural kin by restricting the length of urban labor contracts and by helping to pay the costs of transport back to the rural areas.<sup>63</sup> In these and other ways, the state sought to retard the "detrribalization" of the African labor force.

The reasons for this behavior were clear: at times of fiscal stress, the government wanted to be able to avoid the costs of large-scale unemployment.<sup>64</sup> It wanted the disbanded urban labor force to be able to quickly and peacefully reincorporate itself into the rural economy. The costs of guaranteeing subsistence were thus to be borne by the rural community.

In a society whose economic fortunes were now tied to the most fluctuating of capitalist enterprises, the copper industry, the government sought to insure that the risks to subsistence were borne by the rural community. And it did so by promoting communal entitlements to rights in land. The origins of communal land rights thus lay at least as much in capitalism and in the fiscal problems it created for the state as they did in the inherent cultural properties of the rural population.<sup>65</sup>

#### Another Institution: The Village

Thus far I have employed the African data to criticise several major components of the currently orthodox theories of agrarian change: their statement of initial conditions, their specification of

characteristic trajectories of change, and their analysis of one key agrarian institution: that of property rights.

The African experience provokes a skeptical reappraisal of arguments pertaining to a second major rural institution: the village. As noted above, the fate of this institution is central to both theories. The prevalence of village dwelling is taken to illustrate the importance of values other than those stressed by capitalist societies: social affiliation, status, and community membership, for example. Village institutions are held to prevent exploitation and to provide a pre-capitalist defense against the market's threat to subsistence. Moreover, they are held to promote equality. So central are villages to the orthodox conception of agrarian change that the fate of rural societies are often portrayed in terms of the patterns of change exhibited by village communities.<sup>66</sup>

The African material casts doubt upon these arguments. In Africa, village dwelling simply was often not the basic form of rural settlement. Where rural preferences could be acted upon, persons often preferred to live in isolated homesteads. Where village were formed, it was often at the behest of states. Moreover, many of these states were profoundly capitalist.<sup>67</sup>

With the establishment of the "Pax Britannica" in north-eastern Zambia, for example, most societies were characterized by residence in family homesteads. In the late nineteenth century, however, the British South African Company [B.S.A.C.] --the creation of that most dedicated proponent of capitalist expansion, Cecil John Rhodes --

determined that the region's rural population properly belonged in villages. As noted by Kay, "throughout the whole of north-eastern Zambia ruthless regrouping for administrative convenience was systematically carried out."<sup>68</sup> And as Kay quotes from the B.S.A.C.'s own records, "many . . . resisted and were sent to prison before the order was finally obeyed."<sup>69</sup> In this area, then, village-dwelling was not the form of residence preferred by rural Africans. Rather, it was the administrators who sought to form villages. That the proponents of villagization were the agents of one of the most dedicated embodiments of capitalism adds a disquieting note to our reappraisal of the orthodox position.<sup>70</sup>

Even today it would appear that states prefer village dwelling to a greater degree than do rural people. A notable case in point is Tanzania. It was not the need to collect taxes that led to villagization in Tanzania. Nor was it the need to affirm law and order among a recently conquered and therefore restless population. Rather, the desire on the part of state officials to provide public services and thereby "transform" Tanzania's rural society appears to have led to a conviction that the tendency toward dispersed settlement must be overborn and the people concentrated into villages. In the name of "development," the government of Tanzania sought to group rural dwellers into groups large enough that the government could provide dispensaries, clinics, schools, water supplies, agricultural inputs, marketing facilities, and other services, and so secure an unleashing of the productive forces of Tanzania's agrarian society.<sup>71</sup> It is

notable that the state legitimated its reconstruction of rural society by propounding a theory of African agrarian history in which "colonialism [had]`encouraged individualistic social attitudes,"<sup>72</sup> whereas prior to colonialism, Africans had lived cooperatively in socially integrated, mutually supportive, "village communities." Tanzanian scholars have not hesitated to criticize the validity of these claims.<sup>73</sup>

In evaluating the presumption of village-living as the natural form of agrarian settlement, then, the African literature encourages us toward caution. In some areas, villages appear not to have been the preferred mode of habitation. In other cases, where they were preferred, they were preferred by states. As in the case of Tanzania, some of these states were socialist; as in the case of the late British South Africa Company, however, some were rampantly capitalist.

We can look outside Africa and to other cases. Important among these is pre-industrial Europe. There, once again, we find a large variety of "ancient" forms of settlement; the village simply was not a preferred mode of settlement. Moreover, when settlement took the form of village dwelling, "the exercise or maintenance of authority over land and peasant seems often to have been important in the creation of compact settlement."<sup>74</sup> People were grouped the more easily to be administered. The need for domination thus provides one reason for the concentration of population.

Moreover, villages were sometimes created to facilitate the extraction of manpower and taxes. This consideration is perhaps best illustrated in Russia, where the fiscal needs of the central administration, linked with its lack of administrative capabilities, made the establishment of collective liability a useful means of collecting taxes. Rural jurisdictions were assigned "fiscal quotas" and held collectively liable for them; it was left up to these jurisdictions to organize their own collection procedures. A common response was the formation of corporate institutions which assumed the collective liability and attached communal rights to key resources, such as land, as a means of facilitating the extraction of resources. The extreme form of this response was the formation of the repartitional commune.

As discussed by Blum, "the land-equalizing commune was not of ancient origin."<sup>75</sup> Rather, it appears to have arisen in response to the need for paying of the sole tax, first introduced in the eighteenth century. As Blum indicates:

fiscal considerations played a large part in its introduction and spread. The state wanted to make sure that the individual peasant had enough land to meet the obligations it demanded of him. The peasant, for his part, was equally interested in getting enough land to pay his taxes and obrok and support his family. In addition, . . . those in high places perhaps feared that the discontent of those . . . peasants who had little or no land, if

allowed to go unappeased, might break out into violence.<sup>76</sup>

The result was the creation of the repartitional commune. It is worth quoting Blum at greater length on this matter:

The serf owners, saddled with the responsibility for collecting the tax, realized that it was in their own interest to see to it that each of their peasants had the economic capacity to pay the levy.

The method many proprietors adopted to reach the goal was the use of a new kind of assessment unit that bore an old name, the tiaglo. . . it meant the peasant labor unit, . . . and the obligation the unit had to pay its seignior.<sup>77</sup>

\* \* \*

Each tiaglo normally had to pay the same amount of dues and services. But the number of assessment units varied from one homestead to another according to the number of workers in the homestead, or its overall potential. Thus, the total sum of obligations each homestead paid varied. In this way the amount the serfowner demanded of each peasant family was adjusted to its capacity to pay.<sup>78</sup>

\* \* \*

This in turn led to the equalization and redistribution of holdings. Since each tiaglo had the same amount to pay, and since it usually derived all or most of its income from the land, the

proprietor . . . furnish[ed] each tiaglo with that amount of land that would provide each of them with equal quantities of produce.<sup>79</sup>

In the instance of the repartitional commune, then, village dwelling and common rights over property are joined. According to the reigning orthodoxies, these are two of the key institutions characteristic of pre-capitalist societies. But here we find that rather than being expressive of cultural preference, they are institutional responses to the imperatives of political domination and resource extraction. They are contrivances elaborated to solve the problem of political control and taxation in agrarian societies.<sup>80</sup>

Informed by the skepticism engendered thus far, one may take one further step: a re-reading of the literature on corporated villages. The locus classicus is Wolf's 1957 article in which he analyzes the corporate communities of Mesoamerica and Java.<sup>81</sup> In this article we do in fact find cultural accounts of corporate villages: the creation of ritual centers, little traditions, redistributive communes and festivals, and so forth. We also find stress on characteristic values: equality, community, and the preservation of communal rights in land. But what we also find is that these communities were created as acts of political domination; as Wolf states, "Historically, the closed corporate configuration in Mesoamerica is a creature of the Spanish Conquest"<sup>82</sup> and "In Java, similarly, corporate peasant community did not take shape until after



the coming of the Dutch, when for the first time the village as a territorial unit became a moral organism with its own government and its own land at the disposal of its inhabitants."<sup>83</sup>

In the subsequent literature, as we have indicated, it is the culture of the corporate village that gets discussed; indeed, the cultural correlates of village settlement are promoted into causes, and the corporate village is treated as an embodiment and defender of pre-capitalist values. Yet, in Wolf's original treatment of this institution, we can see that it was imposed by the state. A further reading of Wolf indicates the reasons for this imposition. One was to extract resources - corvée labor and taxes - from the rural population while "avoiding the huge costs of direct administration."<sup>84</sup> The communities were assigned collective liability for the supply of these resources; by being given communal rights over land, they were also given the resources by which to compel and to facilitate such levies. Another reason was the state's fear of landlessness; the administration sought to protect itself against the burden of a landless population and created communal rights to land to prevent the seizure of land by wealthy interests. Corporate villages provide a low cost means of increasing the revenues extracted from rural communities while obviating as well the costs to the fisc which can be imposed by a landless peasantry.

A Behavioral Characteristic: The Preference for Subsistence

Initial conditions, institutional traits, and characteristic patterns of transition: these three elements help to define the orthodox models of agrarian society. So too does a fourth element: the psychological traits of rural dwellers. None of these traits is more central to the conventional models than the preference for subsistence production.

In the natural economy model, the preference for subsistence stands as a corollary to the model's initial conditions: the lack of markets and thus the absence of exchange. And it provides a motivational underpinning to the characteristic response to the penetration of market forces: the initial resistance to commoditization and to "buying and selling." In the model of the peasant economy, peasants are held to participate in markets by necessity, not preference; they do so mainly because it is the only way to secure subsistence. Indeed, the preference for subsistence modes of living stands as a "pre-capitalist" artifact - one that helps to account for the tension between the peasantry and other classes in the transition to capitalism.

It is Hyden who perhaps best captures the flavor of these arguments:

The argument is . . . that . . . where the peasant mode is very much alive, there is an economy other than the market economy. Moreover, this economy of affection is being maintained and

defended against the intrusions of the market economy. The resistance of the African peasant economies to capitalism . . . is still a phenomenon not to be ignored.<sup>85</sup>

With respect to Africa, Hyden concludes:

So common is this situation . . . that it is not an exaggeration to claim that the principal structural constraint to development are the barriers raised . . . by the peasant mode of production . . . [Policy makers must] get the peasant involved in the cash nexus. . . . In order to appropriate the surplus product from the peasant more effectively there is no other way available but to raise peasant productivity and make him produce more that for his own domestic needs.<sup>86</sup>

Hyden and others thus posit the existence of a pre-capitalist agrarian society characterized by a preference for subsistence which in turn frustrates the growth of capitalism. The correct argument, I would argue, in fact runs in the opposite direction. On the basis of African materials, I would argue that the operation of market forces induces subsistence production on the part of peasants; that a key reason for this is that the state is employed to control the market to expropriate resources from rural populations; and that in the face of such adverse market conditions, peasants are of course reluctant to "buy and to sell." What is taken as a "pre-capitalist" form of

behavior, then, is in fact endogenous to the configuration of capitalist forces as presently structured in the developing areas.

The most direct illustration of these arguments can be taken from the export markets of Africa. Many export crops are "cash crops," pure and simple; they have no direct use in consumption and are grown purely for the market. Recently the volume of agricultural exports from Africa has declined, creating shortages of foreign exchange; this decline has been taken by Hyden and others as evidence of the disruptive power of a pre-capitalist peasantry. But, I would argue, it should be viewed in a different light.

In Africa, over 80 percent of the population and over 50 percent of the gross domestic product commonly reside in agriculture. The governments are therefore reliant on the industry for financial resources. One way in which governments tax agriculture is by regulating the market for export crops. In many cases, the government is the sole legal buyer of these crops. It purchases them at an administratively set price in the domestic market and sells them at prices prevailing in the world market. The government accumulates revenue generated by the difference between the domestic and world market prices. Table 1 presents the ratio of the domestic and world prices, adjusted for the costs of transport, marketing and processing. In most cases, it suggests, producers of cash crops are heavily taxed.

Table 1: Nominal Protection Coefficients for Selected Export Crops

<u>Crop</u>	1971-75	1976-80
Cocoa		
Cameroon	.37	.45
Ghana	.47	.40
Ivory Coast	.56	.38
Togo	.50	.25
Coffee		
Cameroon (Arabica)	.72	.60
Cameroon (Robusta)	...	.36
Ivory Coast	.68	.36
Kenya	.94	...
Tanzania	.80	.59
Togo	.42	.23
Cotton		
Cameroon	...	.79
Ivory Coast	.79	1.05
Kenya	1.07	...
Malawi	.68	.75
Mali	.55	.44
Senegal	.65	...
Sudan	.78	.60
Togo	.62	.79
Upper Volta	...	.79

Source: IBRD, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action, Washington D.C.: IBRD, 1981, p.56.

One implication of government fiscal policy is that the returns to participating in the market place are lowered for many farmers. In any case, they certainly are lowered by comparison with the returns to producing crops which can be consumed on the farm or sold outside of official marketing channels. This phenomenon is illustrated in table 2, which compares the net return of five major export crops in Uganda (cotton, robusta coffee, tea, cocoa, and tobacco) with the net return to five commodities for which government controls did not exist (maize, millet, beans, groundnuts, and plantains).

The government's use of market controls to levy resources from agriculture thus lowers the returns to farmers from production for the market, both in absolute and relative terms. This in and of itself would account for the peasant's turning away from cash crop production. But the analysis can run even deeper. For the manipulation of agricultural markets, I would argue, not only reduces the returns to farming but also places farmers under the economic and political control of persons with political influence.

Table 2: Comparative Net Returns of Major Crops in 1975 and 1977/78<sup>a</sup>  
(Shillings per kilogram, estimate)

	1975	1977/78
1. Seed Cotton	-1.37	-3.40
2. Robusta Coffee	-0.38	+0.74
3. Tea (green leaf)	-0.16	-0.31
4. Cocoa	-0.25	-0.10
5. Fire-cured Tobacco	.....	-12.20
6. Maize	+0.68	+2.07
7. Finger Millet	+1.36	+5.08
8. Beans	+1.90	+5.05
9. Groundnuts	.....	+5.64
10. Plantains	+1.03	+1.90

a. Net returns equals average price less average costs.

Source: Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry, "Pricing Policy & Agricultural Production: Discussion Paper," (Entebbe: Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry, August 1978).

The best way to illustrate these arguments is to return to the market for export crops. Governments are not only interested in securing public revenues from this market; they are also interested in securing foreign exchange. Toward this end they overvalue their currencies (see table 3). The effect of overvaluation is straightforward. By maintaining an artificially strong currency, governments lower the perceived price of foreign products. The policy is therefore popular with industrialists, who seek cheap imports of plant and capital equipment; elites, who seek more cheaply to fulfill their tastes for imported products; and governments themselves, who are starved for foreign currencies with which to purchase vehicles, office equipment, capital goods and other forms of imports.

But the price of a policy of overvaluation is the lowering (in terms of domestic currency) of the earnings generated in foreign markets by exports. Foreign dollars convert into fewer units of domestic currency, for the value of the domestic currency has been set at an artificially high level. These effects are summarized in diagram 1.




Table 3: Estimates of the Overvaluation of African Currencies, 1979

Cameroons	1.00
Ghana	3.00
Ivory Coast	1.10
Kenya	1.40
Malawi	1.05
Mali	1.10
Nigeria	1.40
Senegal	1.40
Sudan	1.30
Tanzania	1.50
Togo	1.10
Upper Volta	1.10
Zambia	1.50

Source: Doris J. Jansen, "Agricultural Pricing Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1970s," December, 1980, and Franz Pick, Pick's Currency Yearbook, 1976-1977, (New York: Pick Publishing Corporation, 1978).

The horizontal axis indicates the quantity of foreign goods, here indexed in terms of dollars (\$), demanded or supplied; the vertical axis represents their price in terms of domestic currency, here called cedis (¢). The supply curve is the marginal cost curve of the export industry; it shows the amount of exports (or dollars) which will be supplied for any given valuation of the local currency. The demand curve represents the demand for imports (or foreign dollars), given their perceived price in terms of cedis. Overvaluing the cedi (from  $\text{¢}_0$  to  $\text{¢}_1$ ) lowers the cedi price of the dollar (from  $P_0$  to  $P_1$ ). The result is to cheapen imports. But the correlative effect is to weaken the incentives to export, so that the supply of exports declines from  $Q_{S_0}$  to  $Q_{S_1}$ .

The withdrawal from cash crop markets is thus an expected result of the efforts by states to manipulate prices in markets - in this case, currency markets - so as to secure public resources for the fisc. But also important is that overvaluation places farmers in a position of economic and political bondage.

To gain insight into this effect, we may return to Diagram 1. At the overvalued price of the domestic currency ( $P_1$ ), the quantity of foreign exchange demanded ( $Q_{D_1}$ ) is greater than the quantity supplied ( $Q_{S_1}$ ); there is thus an excess demand for foreign exchange at the official price for it (i.e. at the official exchange rate). One result of this induced scarcity is to drive up the market value of foreign exchange; those who can get it can sell it at a price that lies significantly above the official price. As can be seen in diagram 1,

with  $Q_{S_1}$  supplied at the official exchange rate, the market clearing price would in fact be  $P^*$  (i.e., where demand equals supply). Another result is that at the official exchange rate demand can only equal supply through rationing; fixing the price at  $P_1$  maintains a condition of excess demand ( $Q_{D_1} > Q_{S_1}$ ) and those in control of allocating foreign exchange can choose those who will - and who will not - get a chance to import foreign goods.

The consequences are obvious. Those in charge of the foreign exchange "market" stand to reap enormous rewards from it. If they can secure foreign exchange at price  $P_1$ , they can resell it at  $P^*$ ; alternatively, if they can import foreign goods at the artificially lowered price of  $P_1$ , they can resell them at the market clearing price of  $P^*$ . Moreover, the beneficiaries of this system are those in political control. For with fixed prices in the first instance, this "market" is in fact not a market at all; the initial allocation of scarce resources takes place through administrative and political channels, and only in the second instance - when the benefits of the scarcity are reaped in black markets - through the establishment of competitive prices.

In this system, the beneficiaries are those in the Central Bank or those who make appointments to it. They are those who sit on the foreign exchange allocation committees and the committees which allocate import licenses, or those who make the appointments to these committees. They are those who receive import licenses, or who

allocate them. The losers in this system are those who are not located in positions of access to this scarce resource and who nonetheless must purchase imported goods.

Typically there are no peasant farmers in the Central Bank or on the committee that allocates foreign exchange or import licenses. Yet the farmers rely on imports. Hoes, cutlasses, sprayers, pesticides, ox ploughs and implements, sack and bags, milling machines, and so forth: these farm implements are often imported. Moreover, shirts, shoes, blankets, soap, batteries, etc.: these consumer goods are often imported or are manufactured with imported equipment. But given the scarcity of foreign exchange, the value of imports is extremely high ( $P^*$  in diagram 1) these imports will only be provided if they can command at least that value. The consequence is that the farmers must pay a premium to those who have sufficient political power to secure privileged access to foreign exchange or to the imports it can buy.

Overvaluation thus weakens the incentives to operate in markets. It lowers the price of exports, increases costs of farming and raises consumer prices for farmers. And it does so while involving the farmers in a system of regulated foreign exchange markets: one in which they are subject to political and economic domination by persons with influence in the national capital.

Conventional orthodoxies define the peasantry in terms of political subordination and a preference for subsistence. In dynamic terms the peasantry is defined in terms of their reversion to

subsistence; this is seen as a pre-capitalist resistance to the spread of the market economy. My argument is that these characteristics can better be explained in terms of a model of revenue extraction.

The preference for subsistence need not be attributed to pre-capitalist values; rather, it is a preference that any person, and especially any capitalist, would express under highly disadvantageous market conditions. The powerlessness of peasants need not be introduced as a separate defining trait; along with the preference for subsistence, it can be accounted for as the joint consequence of the way in which markets have been manipulated to extract resources from agriculture. Nor need the withdrawal to subsistence be seen as exogenously determined, e.g. as a result of pre-capitalist forces; rather it should be seen as endogenous - a form of behavior totally accountable in terms of the systems of relations that define the contemporary political economy of third world agrarian populations.

Political powerlessness, a preference for subsistence, and tendency to withdraw from markets and to keep them at arm's length: these characteristics are used to define peasants. They appear, however, to be integral features of a process whereby states employ markets to extract resources from agriculture. In this sense, states can be said to create peasants.<sup>87</sup>

#### CONCLUSION

In this paper I have attempted to summarize two of the dominant models of agrarian change. And I have sought to critique them in light

of my knowledge of rural Africa. These approaches require for their truth initial conditions which historically have rarely existed. They are overly subjectivist, attributing institutions to preferences under circumstances in which these institutions have clearly been imposed. And they are overly economist, in that they place too strong an emphasis on the impact of the market on agrarian societies and too little on the impact of states. Time and again throughout this essay, an approach has proved fruitful that relates the characteristics of rural societies to the requirements of the state. What is called for, then, is an approach to the explanation of rural institutions that is state centered -- one that looks at the effect upon rural society of the demand for power and resources on the part of states under conditions in which people and wealth are concentrated in agriculture.

## NOTES

1. By capitalism is meant an economic system in which there exists (1) market exchange of both products and factors of production; (2) in particular, private markets for labor; and (3) economic accumulation, thus securing the reproduction and expansion of the means of production.
2. See, for example, Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957) and Karl Marx and Frederik Engels, Pre-Capitalist Socio-Economic Formations: A Collection (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1979).
3. Ferdinand Tonnies, Community and Society (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963) and Henry Maine, Ancient Law (London: Lardon J. Murray, 1961).

4. George Dalton, ed. Tribal and Peasant Economies (Garden City, New York: Natural History Press, 1967); Eric R. Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1969); Joel S. Migdal, Peasants, Politics and Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974); James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976); Samuel L. Popkin, The Rational Peasant (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979).
5. George Dalton, "Traditional Production in Primitive African Economies" in Tribal and Peasant Economics, ed. George Dalton (Garden City, New York: Natural History Press, 1967), p. 75.
6. George Dalton, "Subsistence and Peasant Economies in Africa," in Ibid, p. 157.
7. Karl Marx, "Precapitalist Economic Formations," in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Pre-Capitalist Socio-Economic Formations, p. 97.
8. Ibid, p. 98.
9. Ibid, p. 106.
10. James C. Scott, "Protest and Profanation: Agrarian Revolt and the Little Tradition," Theory and Society 4(1977), p. 213.



11. Eric Wolf, "Closed Corporate Peasant Communities in Mesoamerica and Central Java," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 13(1957), p. 6.
12. A prime illustration would be Joel S. Migdal, Peasants, Politics, and Revolutions.
13. Dalton, quoting Raymond Firth in "Subsistence and Peasant Economics," p. 159.
14. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant, p. 5.
15. Robert Redfield, Peasant Society and Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 46.
16. Wolf, Peasant Wars, p.279.
17. Ibid, p.280.
18. Ibid, p.282.
19. Scott, "Protest and Profanation," p.231.
20. Ibid.

21. Goran Hyden, Efficiency vs Distribution in East African Co-operatives (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1973), p. 4.
22. See the discussions in William Derman, Serfs, Peasants and Socialists (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973); Dean E. McHenry, Tanzania's Ujaneu Villages (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1979); S. A. Quick, "Bureaucracy and Rural Socialism in Zambia," Journal of Modern African Studies 15(1977): 379-400; and Donal Cruise O'Brien, The Mourides of Senegal (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971).
23. As quoted by L. A. Fallers in "Are African Cultivators to be Called 'Peasants'?" in Economic Development and Social Change, ed. George Dalton (Garden City: The Natural History Press, 1971), p.170.
24. Redfield, Peasant Society and Culture.
25. Teodor Shanin, "Introduction," in Peasants and Peasant Society, ed. Teodor Shanin (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1971), p. 150.
26. Claude Welch, "Peasants as a Focus in African Studies," African Studies Review 20(1977), p.5.

27. Eric R. Wolf, "Types of Latin American Peasantry: A Preliminary Discussion," American Anthropologist 57(1955), p. 454.
28. Fallers, "Are African Cultivators . . .," p. 171.
29. A. V. Chayanov, The Theory of Peasant Economy, ed. Daniel Thorner, Basile Kerblay, and R. E. F. Smith (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin for the American Economic Association, 1966).
30. Wolf, Peasant Wars, p. xiv.
31. Quotation from Guy Routh, "Mores and Motivations of Peasant and Proletarian Households in Tanzania," (University of East Africa Social Science Conference, Dar es Salaam, December 1970) by Goran Hyden, "The Resilience of the Peasant Mode of Production: The Case of Tanzania," in Agricultural Development in Africa: Issues of Public Policy ed. Robert H. Bates and Michael F. Lofchie (New York: Praeger, 1980), pp. 224-225.
32. Ken Post, "Peasantization and Rural Political Movements in Western Africa," Archives Européennes de Sociologie 13(1972), pp. 226-227.
33. Ibid, p. 233.

34. Goran Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980), p. 31.
35. Gavin Williams, "The World Bank and the Peasant Problem," in Rural Development in Tropical Africa, ed. Judith Heyer, Pepe Roberts, and Gavin Williams (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. 31.
36. Migdal, Peasants, Politics, and Revolution; Wolf, Peasant Wars.
37. Jack Goody, "Economy and Feudalism in Africa," The Economic History Review 23(December 1969), pp. 394-395.
38. Ibid, p. 395.
39. Polly Hill, Studies in Rural Capitalism in West Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970) and Sara Berry, Cocoa, Custom and Socio-economic Change in Rural Western Nigeria (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975).
40. Jan S. Hogendorn, "Economic Initiative and African Cash Farming," pp. 283-328 in Colonialism in Africa, 1870 - 1960, ed. Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).

41. Cruise O'Brien, The Mourides of Senegal and G. K. Helleiner Peasant Agriculture, Government, and Economic Growth in Nigeria (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1966).
42. Giovanni Arrighi, "Labor Supplies in Historical Perspective: A Study of Proletarianization of the African Peasantry in Rhodesia," in Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul, Essays on the Political Economy of Africa (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1973), p. 185.
43. Ibid.
44. See also the cases described in Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons, eds. The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977).
45. Beverly Grier, "Underdevelopment, Modes of Production, and the State in Colonial Ghana," The African Studies Review 24(1981), p. 35.
46. Ibid, p. 33.
47. David Kimble, A Political History of Ghana (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 345.

48. Quoted in M. P. K. Sorrenson, Land Reform in Kikuyu Country (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1967), p.66.
49. Ibid, p. 20 - 21.
50. Sorrenson, Land Reform, p.58.
51. See, for example, Lord Hailey, An African Survey: Revised, 1956 (London: Oxford University Press, 1957); Frederick D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (London: F. Cass, 1965); and Margery Freda Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria (London: Oxford University Press, 1937).
52. C. K. Meek, Land Law and Custom in the Colonies (London: Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 10.
53. Ibid, p. 193.
54. Ibid.
55. Robert L. Tignor, "Colonial Chiefs in Chiefless Societies," Journal of Modern African Studies 9(1971), p. 350. See also M. Clough, Chiefs and Politicians: Local Politics and Social Change in Kiambu, Kenya, 1918 - 1936, PhD Dissertation, Stanford University, 1978.

56. Max Gluckman, "Foreword" to W. Watson, Tribal Cohesion in a Money Economy (Manchester: Manchester University Press for the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, 1958), pp. x - xi.
57. West, Land Policy in Buganda.
58. Frederick Engels, "The Frankish Period" in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Pre-Capitalist Socio-economic Formations. Historians would no longer agree perhaps with the picture of "emerging feudalism" upon which Marx and Engels based their analysis. What would be in doubt would be the Frankish crown's ability to control the splintering of political power. (n. See Marc Bloch, Feudal Society, trans. L. A. Manyon, London 1961, chap. XXVII, esp. pp. 361-8) But of medieval awareness of the connection between land law and political domination there can be no doubt. Professor S. F. C. Milsom in The Legal Framework of English Feudalism demonstrates land law as essential in the process by which the English crown at the height of its power increased its control at the expense of private courts, at the price of allowing the feudal magnates to maintain and indeed increase their control over the peasantry, by refusing ownership of peasant land to any but his lord. (S. F. C. Milsom, The Legal Framework of English Feudalism, Cambridge, 1976, esp. chap. 1 ("Disciplinary Jurisdiction", and 2 "Proprietary Ideas".) I wish to thank Eleanor Searle for these points and citations.

59. L. H. Gann, A History of Northern Rhodesia, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1964), p. 253.
60. Watson, Tribal Cohesion; also J. van Velsen, "Labour Migration as a Positive Factor in the Continuity of Tonga Tribal Society," in Social Change in Modern Africa, ed. Aiden Southall (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).
61. Excellent discussions are included in Elena L. Berger, Labour, Race and Colonial Rule: The Copperbelt from 1924 to Independence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974) and Charles Perrings, Black Mineworkers in Central Africa (New York: Africana Publishing Company 1979).
62. The best discussion remains A. L. Epstein, Politics in an Urban African Community (Manchester: Manchester University Press for the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, 1958).
63. See Perrings, Black Mineworkers. See also Helmuth Heisler, Urbanization and the Government of Migration (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974).

64. Most obviously, these costs are the costs of providing subsistence and the costs of policing an unruly urban mob. Insofar as unemployment is associated with landlessness, however, a third cost is implied: the cost of administering an "unattached" population. People without property lack claims to resources mediated by a legal system. Propertylessness therefore implies freedom from administration and, from the states' point of view, freedom from control. People without property pose a threat to public administration. In Africa, therefore, the states clearly favored the retention of rights to land. This was apparently true as well in England. For Marx clearly argues that the "king and parliament" resisted enclosure, and did so for many of the reasons we have just discussed (Karl Marx, "The So-Called Primitive Accumulation," Part VIII, Capital (New York: Charles H. Kerr and Co., 1906), pp. 789ff); as Marx states, "legislation was terrified at this revolution" (Ibid., p. 790).
65. For additional arguments see Claude Meillassoux, Maidens, Meal and Money: Capitalism and the Domestic Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Harold Wolpe, "Capitalism and Cheap Labour Power in South Africa," Economy and Society, 1, no. 4 (1972): 425-456; and Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons, eds., Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978). Where I differ from these approaches is in my sensitivity to the divergence of interests

- between the state and private enterprises and in my conviction that the state was set upon solving its own fiscal problem by controlling the formation of land laws. Private enterprises naturally cared less about the problem than did the state; and, when they did care, they often had policy preferences at variance with those of the state's administrators.
66. See, for example, Joel S. Migdal, Peasants, Politics and Revolutions.
67. The arguments in this section echo those first advanced in Samuel L. Popkin, The Rational Peasant (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979). In this, and other matters, Popkin's work is brilliantly prophetic.
68. George Kay, Social Aspects of Village Regrouping in Zambia (Lusaka: Institute for Social Research, University of Zambia, 1967), p. 11.
69. Ibid, p. 10.
70. Note also the Kenya case, where Sorrenson notes: "The Kikuyu did not live in villages, but in dispersed households. . . . During the Mau Mau Emergency the Kikuyu, the Embu and some of the Meru population were concentrated in 732 villages. . . ." Sorrenson, Land Reform, p. 3.

71. The best studies are Michaela Von Freyhold, Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1979); Dean E. McHenry, Jr., Tanzania's Ujamaa Villages (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1979); and Goran Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980).
72. Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa, p. 98.
73. See, for example, Samuel S. Mushi, "Modernization by Traditionalization: Ujamaa Principles Revisited," Taamuli 1, no. 2 (March 1971).
74. C. T. Smith, A Historical Geography of Western Europe Before 1800 (London: Longmans, 1967), p.261. See also J. G. Hurst, "The Changing Medieval Village in England," in Pathways to Medieval Peasants, edited by J. A. Raftis, Papers in Medieval Studies 2 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1981), pp. 27-62.
75. Jerome Blum, Lord and Peasant in Russia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 510.
76. Ibid, p. 514.

77. Ibid, p. 512.
78. Ibid, p. 513.
79. Ibid, p. 514.
80. It is relevant to note that in several societies in Africa, states, in order to secure repayment of agricultural investments, have made village units collectively liable for debts; defaults by any farmer in these villages is sufficient to disqualify all farmers in that village for future loans. Moreover, in many parts of Africa, agricultural goods, once harvested by farmers, are automatically the property of the state; they cannot be bought and sold in the market. The reason is that the harvest stands as collateral. The state has defined property rights over the harvest in such a way as to facilitate the movement of capital into the rural areas. Once again, then, we find corporate institutions and collective rights being created by states. That in these cases the states are explicitly operating so as to promote the movement - and recovery - of capital only adds to the force of our critique of the dominant theories of the origins of agrarian institutions.
81. Eric R. Wolf, "Closed Corporate Peasant Communities in Mesoamerica and Central Java," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, 13(1957): 1-18.

82. Ibid, p. 7.
83. Ibid, p. 8. Wolf is quoting J. S. Furnivall, Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939).
84. Wolf, "Closed Corporated Peasant Communities," p. 10.
85. Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa, p. 19.
86. Ibid, p. 31.
86. Coquery-Vidrovitch, in writing about pre-colonial African societies, defined the African mode of production as one in which states did not directly control producers (e.g. through enserfment of slavery) but rather controlled and manipulated trade to accumulate resources from them. Her analysis is at least as applicable, in my view, to contemporary Africa as it was to the pre-colonial period, and very likely more so. See Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, "Recherches sur un mode de production Africain," La Pensée 144(1969): 61-78.