In the Mood: The Effect of Election Year Considerations Upon the Appropriations Process

Abstract

The analyses undertaken in this study generate evidence supportive of the hypothesis that Congress treats the budgets of agencies which supply particularistic, constituency-oriented benefits more favorably in election years than non-election years. There appears not to be any greater election year generosity on the part of Congress with regard to those agencies which perform primarily universalistic services. The data also show that congressional appropriations decisions regarding the constituency-oriented agencies are also influenced much more strongly by the level of unemployment in the economy and by the balance of party power in the federal government. It must be stressed, though, that the impact of congressional election year appropriations process is quite limited. This is because over all changes in agency appropriations are much more a function of the budget estimates submitted to Congress by OMB than of what Congress does to these estimates. And given that there were no important differences evident in OMB behavior between election years and non-election years, overall trends in actual appropriations were not much affected by election year considerations either.