Schofield, N. (1984) Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold. Social Choice and Welfare, 1 (3). pp. 187-210. ISSN 0176-1714. doi:10.1007/BF00433516. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171002-111518401
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Abstract
A classification theorem for voting rules on a smooth choice space W of dimension w is presented. It is shown that, for any non-collegial voting rule, σ, there exist integers v*(σ), w*(σ) (with v*(σ)<w*(σ)) such that 1.(i) structurally stable σ-voting cycles may always be constructed when w ⪴ v*(σ) + 1 2.(ii) a structurally stable σ-core (or voting equilibrium) may be constructed when w ⪴ v*(σ) − 1 Finally, it is shown that for an anonymous q-rule, a structurally stable core exists in dimension n−2/n−q, where n is the cardinality of the society.
Item Type: | Article | ||||||||||||
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Additional Information: | © 1984 Springer-Verlag. Received May 30, 1983; Accepted June 27, 1984. | ||||||||||||
Issue or Number: | 3 | ||||||||||||
DOI: | 10.1007/BF00433516 | ||||||||||||
Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20171002-111518401 | ||||||||||||
Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171002-111518401 | ||||||||||||
Official Citation: | Schofield, N. Soc Choice Welfare (1984) 1: 187. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00433516 | ||||||||||||
Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | ||||||||||||
ID Code: | 81950 | ||||||||||||
Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | ||||||||||||
Deposited By: | Tony Diaz | ||||||||||||
Deposited On: | 02 Oct 2017 18:55 | ||||||||||||
Last Modified: | 15 Nov 2021 19:47 |
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