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Tradable Air Pollution Permits in the Overall Regulatory System: Problems of Regulatory Interactions

Hahn, Robert W. and Noll, Roger G. (1982) Tradable Air Pollution Permits in the Overall Regulatory System: Problems of Regulatory Interactions. Social Science Working Paper, 440. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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Because many environmental problems are associated with the production and use of energy, it is not surprising that the effects of policies in the two areas are often interdependent. This paper explores the interactions between the feasibility of an efficient market for emissions permits for sulfur oxides and the current state of air pollution, public utility and natural gas regulation. It shows how some of the opposition to tradable emissions permits can be traced to proposals to implement the reforms that redistribute wealth and the burden of regulatory uncertainty in ways that have greater economic impact than the potential efficiency gains of a market approach. It also examines how a tradable permits market and other regulatory reforms can be designed so as to avoid most of these problems.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Additional Information:The research reported here was undertaken under the auspices of the Caltech Environmental Quality Laboratory. Financial support was provided by the California Air Resources Board and the Caltech Energy Policy Studies Program. The authors are solely responsible for the contents of this paper.
Group:Social Science Working Papers, Environmental Quality Laboratory
Funding AgencyGrant Number
California Air Resources BoardUNSPECIFIED
Caltech Energy Policy Studies ProgramUNSPECIFIED
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:440
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171002-143641204
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81965
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:04 Oct 2017 19:53
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:49

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