Fiorina, Morris P. (1982) Group Concentration and the Delegation of Legislative Authority. Social Science Working Paper, 438. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171002-145410029
![[img]](https://authors.library.caltech.edu/style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png) |
PDF (sswp 438 - Aug. 1982)
- Submitted Version
See Usage Policy. 571kB |
Use this Persistent URL to link to this item: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171002-145410029
Abstract
This paper takes an initial stab at the delegation question. What incentives lead legislators to delegate not only the administration but even the formulation of public policy to unelected officials? A variety of considerations are relevant, but my focus will be on political (rather than managerial) incentives to delegate. The next section of the paper develops a simple framework in which the later discussion can be conducted.
| Item Type: | Report or Paper (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | Originally prepared for the Conference on Social Science and Regulatory Policy, Reston, Virginia—January 22-23, 1982. I am grateful to Roger Noll and Peter Aranson for useful comments on an earlier version. |
| Group: | Social Science Working Papers |
| Series Name: | Social Science Working Paper |
| Issue or Number: | 438 |
| Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20171002-145410029 |
| Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171002-145410029 |
| Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. |
| ID Code: | 81967 |
| Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS |
| Deposited By: | Jacquelyn Bussone |
| Deposited On: | 04 Oct 2017 19:21 |
| Last Modified: | 03 Oct 2019 18:49 |
Repository Staff Only: item control page
