CaltechAUTHORS
  A Caltech Library Service

An Impossibility Theorem for Spatial Models

Border, Kim C. (1982) An Impossibility Theorem for Spatial Models. Social Science Working Paper, 437. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171002-150117835

[img] PDF (sswp 437 - Aug. 1982) - Submitted Version
See Usage Policy.

203Kb

Use this Persistent URL to link to this item: http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171002-150117835

Abstract

This paper examines the implications for social welfare functions of restricting the domain of individual preferences lo type-one preferences. Type-one preferences assume that each person has a most preferred alternative in a euclidean space and that alternatives are ranked according to their euclidean distance from this point. The result is that if we impose Arrow's conditions of collective rationality, IIA, and the Pareto principle on the social welfare function, then it must be dictatorial. This result may not seem surprising, but it stands in marked contrast to the problem considered by Gibbard and Saiterthwaite of finding a social-choice function. With unrestricted domain, under the Gibbard-Satterthwaite hypotheses, choices must be dictatorial. With type-one preferences this result has been previously shown not to be true. This finding identifies a significant difference between the Arrow and the Gibbard-Satterwaite hypothesis.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171004-145251315Related ItemPublished Version
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Border, Kim C.0000-0003-4437-0524
Additional Information:Published as Border, Kim C. "An impossibility theorem for spatial models." Public Choice 43.3 (1984): 293-305.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:Economic theory, Social welfare, Pareto principle, Spatial models, Mathematical functions, Dictatorship, Majority rule, Welfare economics, Voting, Majority voting
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171002-150117835
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171002-150117835
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81968
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:04 Oct 2017 19:33
Last Modified:05 Oct 2017 22:09

Repository Staff Only: item control page