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Market Power and Transferable Property Rights

Hahn, Robert W. (1982) Market Power and Transferable Property Rights. Social Science Working Paper, 402. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171004-153511320

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Abstract

The appeal of using markets as a means of allocating scarce resources stems in large part from the assumption that a market will approximate the competitive ideal. When competition is not a foregone conclusion, the question naturally arises as to how a firm might manipulate the market to its own advantage. This paper analyzes the issue of market power in the context of markets for transferable property rights. First, a model is developed which explains how a single firm with market power might exercise its influence. This is followed by an examination of the model in the context of a particular policy problem


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171116-150049478Related ItemPublished Version
Additional Information:Revised. I would like to thank Jim Quirk, Roger Noll and Jennifer Reinganum for providing useful input to this effort. Any remaining errors are solely the responsibility of the author. Published as Hahn, Robert W. "Market power and transferable property rights." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 99.4 (1984): 753-765.
Group:Social Science Working Papers, Environmental Quality Laboratory
Subject Keywords:Market power, Property rights, Marginal abatement costs, Market prices, Price takers, Minimization of cost, Particulate emissions, Total costs, Excess demand, Mathematical models
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171004-153511320
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171004-153511320
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:82090
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:04 Oct 2017 23:44
Last Modified:16 Nov 2017 23:37

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