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Theories of Industrial Organization as Explanations of Experimental Market Behavior

Plott, Charles R. (1981) Theories of Industrial Organization as Explanations of Experimental Market Behavior. Social Science Working Paper, 388. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171005-132456201

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Abstract

The current professional interest in experimental economics seems to stem in part from a recently acquired ability of economists to explore subtle implications of institutional details for market performance. Advances in understanding the role of information in market models suggest the possibility that the contribution of institutions in affecting information patterns and resource allocation can be identified and assessed. Game theory has increasingly focused upon the structure of strategy spaces as dictated by special institutional structures. The discovery of the theoretical existence of decentralized incentive compatible processes for the provision of public goods allows one to speculate about the possibility of many different types of institutions which might solve the public goods and free rider problems. The continued growth and development of the field of law and economics has directed the theory toward the study of the relationship between legal technology and economic principles. Theoretical works on the nature of institutions and possible manifestations of their influence fill the journals.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140303-142008043Related ItemPublished Version
Additional Information:Published as Plott, Charles R. (1981) Theories of Industrial Organization as Explanations of Experimental market Behavior. In: Strategy, Predation, and Antitrust Analysis. Federal Trade Commission , Washington, DC, pp. 523-577.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:388
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171005-132456201
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171005-132456201
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:82121
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:06 Oct 2017 19:57
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:50

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