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Oligopoly Extraction of a Nonrenewable Common Property Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games

Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1981) Oligopoly Extraction of a Nonrenewable Common Property Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games. Social Science Working Paper, 377. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171005-160021410

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Abstract

This paper is concerned with oligopolistic extraction of a deposit of a nonrenewable resource which is common property. A simple model of a resource market is presented and Nash equilibria are computed. The model is one which has been of particular interest in the early literature on competitive versus monopolistic exploitation. This paper extends the analysis of this model to intermediate market structures. Any analysis of a noncooperative dynamic game must involve specification of the appropriate strategy space. Thus this paper is also concerned with the question: what are appropriate strategies for the analysis of noncooperative resource extraction?


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171116-164654448Related ItemPublished Version
Alternate Title:Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games
Additional Information:Published as Reinganum, Jennifer F. and Stokey, Nancy L. "Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games," International Economic Review 26 (Feb. 1985):161-174.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:Nash equilibrium, Dynamic games, Economic models, Nonrenewable resources, Joint ownership, Oligopolies, Resource ownership, Economic commitments, Financial investments, Economic externalities
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:377
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171005-160021410
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171005-160021410
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:82137
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:06 Oct 2017 17:46
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:51

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