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Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information

Green, Edward J. and Porter, Robert H. (1982) Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information. Social Science Working Paper, 367. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171006-135046763

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Abstract

Recent work in game theory has shown that, in principle, it may be possible for firms in an industry to form a self-policing cartel to maximize their joints profits. This paper studies the applicability of that work to empirical industrial organization. A model of a noncooperatively supported cartel is presented, and the aspects of industry structure which would make such a cartel viable are discussed.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171117-140712553Related ItemPublished Version
Additional Information:Revised. Original dated to January 1981. We have accepted the generous help of many colleagues in the course of this research. We would particularly like to thank C. Berry, T. Bresnahan, S. Salop, H. Sonnenschein, and R. Willig. Robert Porter’s research received support from the Canada Council and a a Sloan Foundation grant to the University of Minnesota Economics Department. Published as Green, Edward J., and Robert H. Porter. "Noncooperative collusion under imperfect price information." Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society (1984): 87-100.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Canada CouncilUNSPECIFIED
Alfred P. Sloan FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:Collusion, Cartels, Nash equilibrium, Market prices, Industrial market, Shipping industries, Estimators, Ergodic theory, Markov processes, Industrial concentration
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171006-135046763
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171006-135046763
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:82178
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:06 Oct 2017 21:09
Last Modified:18 Nov 2017 01:32

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