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Demand-Revealing Mechanisms for Private Good Auctions

Forsythe, Robert and Isaac, R. Mark (1980) Demand-Revealing Mechanisms for Private Good Auctions. Social Science Working Paper, 351. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA.

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The set of demand revealing mechanisms for allocating private goods is characterized and examples are given. Auctions in which multiple units of either homogenous or nonhomogeneous commodities are studied and, in particular, it is demonstrated that there will generally not exist a demand revealing mechanism with which each bidder will pay the same price for each unit purchased. The experimental literature on these bidding mechanisms is discussed and several additional inquiries are suggested.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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Additional Information:Published as Forsythe, Robert and Isaac, R. Mark. "Demand-Revealing Mechanisms for Private Good Auctions." in Research in Experimental Economics vol. 2, edited by Vernon Smith. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1982.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:351
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171006-163719005
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:82197
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:09 Oct 2017 22:12
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:51

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