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Equilibrium, Disequilibrium, and the General Possibility of a Science of Politics

Fiorina, Morris P. and Shepsle, Kenneth A. (1982) Equilibrium, Disequilibrium, and the General Possibility of a Science of Politics. In: Political Equilibrium. Studies in Public Choice. No.4. Springer , Dordrecht, pp. 49-64. ISBN 978-94-009-7382-4.

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Perhaps it overstates matters to say that there is a crisis in formal political theory, but it is apparent that much mischief has been caused by a series of theorems that depict the chaotic features of majority-rule voting systems. These theorems, proved elegantly in recent papers by Cohen (1979), McKelvey (1976, 1979) and Schofield (1978), establish that the cyclicity of the majority preference relation is both generic and pervasive. To paraphrase the title of a recent paper by Bell (1978), when majority rule breaks down, it breaks down completely; and it “almost always” breaks down.

Item Type:Book Section
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Additional Information:© 1982 Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing. The authors acknowledge comments on an earlier draft, ranging from constructive hostility to benign neglect, from Randall Calvert, John Ferejohn, Robert Parks, Charles Plott, Robert Salisbury, and Barry Weingast.
Series Name:Studies in Public Choice
Issue or Number:4
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171009-154915736
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:82236
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:09 Oct 2017 22:55
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 19:49

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