Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1980) A Class of Differential Games Where the Closed-Loop and Open-Loop Nash Equilibria Coincide. Social Science Working Paper, 333. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171010-133022165
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Abstract
It is well known that, in general, Nash equilibria in open-loop strategies do not coincide with those in closed-loop strategies. This note identifies a class of differential games in which the Nash equilibrium in closed-loop strategies is degenerate in the sense that it depends on time (t) only. Consequently, the closed-loop equilibrium is also an equilibrium in open-loop strategies.
| Item Type: | Report or Paper (Working Paper) | ||||||
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| Additional Information: | Published as Reinganum, Jennifer F. "A class of differential games for which the closed-loop and open-loop Nash equilibria coincide." Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 36.2 (1982): 253-262. | ||||||
| Group: | Social Science Working Papers | ||||||
| Series Name: | Social Science Working Paper | ||||||
| Issue or Number: | 333 | ||||||
| Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20171010-133022165 | ||||||
| Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171010-133022165 | ||||||
| Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | ||||||
| ID Code: | 82258 | ||||||
| Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | ||||||
| Deposited By: | Jacquelyn Bussone | ||||||
| Deposited On: | 10 Oct 2017 20:59 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 03 Oct 2019 18:52 |
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