Packel, Edward W. (1980) Power Structure and Cardinality Restrictions for Paretian Social Choice Rules. Social Science Working Paper, 310. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171012-135230875
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Abstract
Let f be a multiple-valued Paretian social choice rule for n voters and an outcome set X. The preventing sets for f are shown to form an acyclic majority when |X|<n, a prefilter when |X| > ̅n, and a filter when f also satisfies a binary independence condition. These results are then shown to yield inequalities relating |X|, n, and certain preventing sets. In particular, if every coalition of q voters constitutes a preventing set, then |X|≤[(n-1)/(n-q)]. Other n-q inequalities are obtained if strong equilibria are present for every preference profile.
Item Type: | Report or Paper (Working Paper) | ||||||
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Additional Information: | Support from National Science Foundation Grant SOC790-7366 is gratefully acknowledged. Published as Packel, Edward W. "Power structure and cardinality restrictions for Paretian social choice rules." Social Choice and Welfare 1.2 (1984): 105-111. | ||||||
Group: | Social Science Working Papers | ||||||
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Series Name: | Social Science Working Paper | ||||||
Issue or Number: | 310 | ||||||
Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20171012-135230875 | ||||||
Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171012-135230875 | ||||||
Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | ||||||
ID Code: | 82320 | ||||||
Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | ||||||
Deposited By: | Jacquelyn Bussone | ||||||
Deposited On: | 16 Oct 2017 18:00 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 03 Oct 2019 18:53 |
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