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Power Structure and Cardinality Restrictions for Paretian Social Choice Rules

Packel, Edward W. (1980) Power Structure and Cardinality Restrictions for Paretian Social Choice Rules. Social Science Working Paper, 310. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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Let f be a multiple-valued Paretian social choice rule for n voters and an outcome set X. The preventing sets for f are shown to form an acyclic majority when |X|<n, a prefilter when |X| > ̅n, and a filter when f also satisfies a binary independence condition. These results are then shown to yield inequalities relating |X|, n, and certain preventing sets. In particular, if every coalition of q voters constitutes a preventing set, then |X|≤[(n-1)/(n-q)]. Other n-q inequalities are obtained if strong equilibria are present for every preference profile.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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URLURL TypeDescription ItemLater version published in Social Choice and Welfare
Additional Information:Support from National Science Foundation Grant SOC790-7366 is gratefully acknowledged. Published as Packel, Edward W. "Power structure and cardinality restrictions for Paretian social choice rules." Social Choice and Welfare 1.2 (1984): 105-111.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
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Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:310
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171012-135230875
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:82320
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:16 Oct 2017 18:00
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:53

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