Isaac, R. Mark (1980) Cooperative Institutions for Sharing in the Oil Industry. Social Science Working Paper, 308. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171012-162906878
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Abstract
Exploration for oil and natural gas often produces an information externality for other resource owners. In isolation, this arrangement can lead to suboptimal exploration patterns. However, private institutions have evolved in the oil industry to provide markets for the external information. In this paper, the exploration process is modeled in a game theoretic framework in which the existence and performance of the private trading institutions are examined.
Item Type: | Report or Paper (Working Paper) | ||||||
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Additional Information: | This research was written partly while the author was funded by the John Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes Foundation and partly while funded by the Caltech Energy Policy Project. Many helpful comments were received from Professors John Ferejohn, Roger Noll, and James Quirk, and from the Economic Theory Workshop. | ||||||
Group: | Social Science Working Papers | ||||||
Funders: |
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Series Name: | Social Science Working Paper | ||||||
Issue or Number: | 308 | ||||||
Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20171012-162906878 | ||||||
Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171012-162906878 | ||||||
Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | ||||||
ID Code: | 82332 | ||||||
Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | ||||||
Deposited By: | Jacquelyn Bussone | ||||||
Deposited On: | 16 Oct 2017 17:42 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 03 Oct 2019 18:53 |
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