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Social Welfare Functions for Economic Environments with and without the Pareto Principle

Border, Kim C. (1980) Social Welfare Functions for Economic Environments with and without the Pareto Principle. Social Science Working Paper, 304. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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Social welfare functions for private goods economies with classical preferences are considered. It is shown that every social welfare function satisfying a weak nonimposition condition and the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom is of one of the following forms. It is either null or the class of decisive coalitions is an ultrafilter or the class of anti-decisive coalitions is an ultrafilter.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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URLURL TypeDescription ItemLater version published in Journal of Economic Theory
Border, Kim C.0000-0003-4437-0524
Additional Information:Revised. I would like to thank Professor Ket Richter for many profitable discussions during earlier stages of this research. Published as Border, Kim C. "Social welfare functions for economic environments with and without the Pareto principle." Journal of Economic Theory 29.2 (1983): 205-216.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:304
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171012-170534239
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:82336
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:16 Oct 2017 17:26
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:53

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