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Strategic Lobbying Behavior

Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1980) Strategic Lobbying Behavior. Social Science Working Paper, 302. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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This paper analyzes strategic lobbying behavior under the assumption of disorganized opposition using an optimal control approach. Optimal rates of lobbying expenditure are shown to be increasing functions of time. A specific example is computed to determine the influence of various parameters. Next, the case of lobbying against an active counterlobby is considered in a game theoretic framework. The Nash equilibrium is computed for a specific game with symmetric players. The equilibrium rates of expenditure for the lobbyists may be either everywhere increasing, everywhere decreasing, or single peaked. In addition, some comparative statics results are reversed relative to those of the disorganized opposition model.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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URLURL TypeDescription ItemPublished Article
Alternate Title:A Formal Theory of Lobbying Behaviour
Additional Information:Later published as: Reinganum, J. F. (1983), A formal theory of lobbying behaviour. Optimal Control Applications and Methods, 4: 71–84. doi:10.1002/oca.4660040106
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:302
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171013-140612623
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:82346
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:16 Oct 2017 18:17
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:53

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