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Collective Choice Mechanisms for Achieving Efficient Stock Market Allocations

Forsythe, Robert (1979) Collective Choice Mechanisms for Achieving Efficient Stock Market Allocations. Social Science Working Paper, 301. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA.

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This paper examines two collective choice mechanisms for achieving efficient stock market allocations. The first, proposed by Helpman and Razin, is shown to have the property that an equilibrium rarely exists. An alternative mechanism, due to Hurwicz, is examined and it is shown that the resulting equilibria under this mechanism do exist and are efficient.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:301
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171013-142432231
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:82347
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:16 Oct 2017 18:19
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:53

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