Palfrey, Thomas R. (1979) Multiple-Object, Discriminatory Auctions with Bidding Constraints: A Game-Theoretic Analysis. Social Science Working Paper, 290. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171013-170452235
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Abstract
This paper examines the existence and characterization of pure strategy Nash equilibria in multiple-object auction games in which buyers face a binding constraint on exposure. There are five major results. First, symmetric Nash equilibria exist if and only if there are two or less buyers and two or less items. Second, a Nash equilibrium may not exist if the seller sets a positive reservation bid. Third, asymmetric solutions to symmetrically parameterized games typically involve "high-low" strategies: buyers submit positive bids only on some restricted subset of the items. Fourth, Nash equilibria typically generate zero "profits" to the buyers. Fifth, when asymmetric solutions exist and the buyers are identical, these solutions are never unique.
Item Type: | Report or Paper (Working Paper) | ||||||
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Additional Information: | The author gratefully acknowledges comments on earlier drafts by Kim Border, Ronald Braeutigam, Robert Forsythe, and Roger Noll. Published as Palfrey, Thomas R. (1980) Multiple-Object, Discriminatory Auctions with Bidding Constraints: A Game-Theoretic Analysis. Management Science, 26 (9). pp. 935-946. | ||||||
Group: | Social Science Working Papers | ||||||
Series Name: | Social Science Working Paper | ||||||
Issue or Number: | 290 | ||||||
Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20171013-170452235 | ||||||
Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171013-170452235 | ||||||
Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | ||||||
ID Code: | 82357 | ||||||
Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | ||||||
Deposited By: | Jacquelyn Bussone | ||||||
Deposited On: | 16 Oct 2017 19:18 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 22 Nov 2019 09:58 |
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