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Multiple-Object, Discriminatory Auctions with Bidding Constraints: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

Palfrey, Thomas R. (1979) Multiple-Object, Discriminatory Auctions with Bidding Constraints: A Game-Theoretic Analysis. Social Science Working Paper, 290. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171013-170452235

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Abstract

This paper examines the existence and characterization of pure strategy Nash equilibria in multiple-object auction games in which buyers face a binding constraint on exposure. There are five major results. First, symmetric Nash equilibria exist if and only if there are two or less buyers and two or less items. Second, a Nash equilibrium may not exist if the seller sets a positive reservation bid. Third, asymmetric solutions to symmetrically parameterized games typically involve "high-low" strategies: buyers submit positive bids only on some restricted subset of the items. Fourth, Nash equilibria typically generate zero "profits" to the buyers. Fifth, when asymmetric solutions exist and the buyers are identical, these solutions are never unique.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-094626115Related ItemLater version published in Management Science
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Palfrey, Thomas R.0000-0003-0769-8109
Additional Information:The author gratefully acknowledges comments on earlier drafts by Kim Border, Ronald Braeutigam, Robert Forsythe, and Roger Noll. Published as Palfrey, Thomas R. (1980) Multiple-Object, Discriminatory Auctions with Bidding Constraints: A Game-Theoretic Analysis. Management Science, 26 (9). pp. 935-946.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:290
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171013-170452235
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171013-170452235
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:82357
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:16 Oct 2017 19:18
Last Modified:22 Nov 2019 09:58

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