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Social welfare functions for economic environments with and without the pareto principle

Border, Kim C. (1983) Social welfare functions for economic environments with and without the pareto principle. Journal of Economic Theory, 29 (2). pp. 205-216. ISSN 0022-0531. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(83)90045-5.

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It is shown for the case of private goods economies that every social welfare function satisfying a weak nonimposition condition and the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom is of one of the following forms. It is either null, or the class of decisive coalitions is an ultrafilter, or the class of anti-decisive coalitions is an ultrafilter. In the case of a private goods economy with finitely many traders, the latter conditions imply the existence of either a dictator or anti-dictator. By requiring the Pareto principle as well, it is easily seen that the social welfare function must be dictatorial.

Item Type:Article
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URLURL TypeDescription ItemSocial Science Working Paper 304
Border, Kim C.0000-0003-4437-0524
Additional Information:Copyright 1983 by Academic Press, Inc. Received March 24, 1980; revised September 24, 1981. I would like to thank an anonymous referee for his careful reading and useful comments.
Issue or Number:2
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171016-101933174
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:82367
Deposited By: Katherine Johnson
Deposited On:16 Oct 2017 17:26
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 19:49

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