A Caltech Library Service

Implementation of Democratic Social Choice Functions

Ferejohn, John A. and Grether, David M. and McKelvey, Richard D. (1982) Implementation of Democratic Social Choice Functions. Review of Economic Studies, 49 (3). pp. 439-446. ISSN 0034-6527. doi:10.2307/2297367.

[img] PDF (sswp 300 - published) - Published Version
Restricted to Caltech community only
See Usage Policy.


Use this Persistent URL to link to this item:


A social choice function is said to be implementable if and only if there exists a game form such that for all preference profiles an equilibrium strategy n-tuple exists and any equilibrium strategy n-tuples of the game yield outcomes in the social choice set. A social choice function is defined to be minimally democratic if and only if whenever there exists an alternative which is ranked first by n − 1 voters and is no lower than second for the last voter, then the social choice must be uniquely that alternative. No constraints are placed on the social choice function for other preference profiles. Using the classical definitions of equilibria for n-person games—namely Nash and strong equilibria, it is shown here that over unrestricted preference domains, as long as there are at least as many alternatives as individuals, no minimally democratic social choice function is implementable. A similar result holds in certain restricted domains of the type assumed by economists over public goods spaces. We then show that a different notion of equilibrium—namely that of sophisticated equilibrium—allows for implementation of democratic social choice functions also having further appealing properties.

Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription ItemSocial Science Working Paper 300
Additional Information:© 1982 The Society for Economic Analysis Limited. Published: 01 July 1982.
Issue or Number:3
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171016-112548002
Persistent URL:
Official Citation:John A. Ferejohn, David M. Grether, Richard D. McKelvey; Implementation of Democratic Social Choice Functions, The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 49, Issue 3, 1 July 1982, Pages 439–446,
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:82368
Deposited By: Katherine Johnson
Deposited On:16 Oct 2017 18:30
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 19:50

Repository Staff Only: item control page