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Experiments on the Core: Some Disconcerting Results for Majority Rule Voting Games

McKelvey, Richard D. and Ordeshook, Peter C. (1979) Experiments on the Core: Some Disconcerting Results for Majority Rule Voting Games. Social Science Working Paper, 260. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA.

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In the context of spatial majority voting games, considerable experimental support exists for the core as a solution hypothesis when it exists (c.f. Berl, et al, 1976; Fiorina and Plott, 1978). Some recent experimentation, however, hints at possible problems in a finite alternative setting. Isaac and Plott (1978) report several such experiments in which subjects fail to adopt a core, although their experimental design uses a particular procedure of chairman control that might account for these results. Elsewhere (1979b) we report a series of vote trading experiments in which the core's success rate is less than fifty percent. In this essay we present some additional experimental evidence to suggest that committee choice in simple majority rule games is not dictated solely by whether or not a Condorcet (core) point exists. We conclude that, in the experimental context of open and free discussion, the performance of the core is affected by the structure of alternative space, and also by the structure of the perceived dominance relation beneath the core in the social ordering.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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URLURL TypeDescription ItemLater version published in Journal of Conflict Resolution
Additional Information:Prepared for delivery at the Public Choice Convention, March 17-19, 1979 Charleston, South Carolina. Published as McKelvey, Richard D., and Peter C. Ordeshook. "Experiments on the core: Some disconcerting results for majority rule voting games." Journal of Conflict Resolution (1981): 709-724.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:Game theory, Majority voting, Conflict resolution, Experimentation, Majority rule, Experiment design, Political science, Endowments, Fairness, Voting paradox
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:260
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171017-144159043
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:82430
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:18 Oct 2017 22:35
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:54

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