Matthews, Steven A. (1978) Pairwise Symmetry Conditions for Voting Equilibria. Social Science Working Paper, 209. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171020-161257825
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Abstract
Necessary conditions are established for a point contained in the interior or boundary of a convex feasible subset of Euclidean space to be quasi-undominated in an anonymous simple game. Most of the conditions are behaviorally intuitive and imply pariwise symmetries among utility gradients.
| Item Type: | Report or Paper (Working Paper) | ||||||
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| Additional Information: | This paper supplants its initial draft, which was circulated to a limited extent as "The Possibility of Voting Equilibria." Published as Matthews, Steven A. "Pairwise symmetry conditions for voting equilibria." International Journal of Game Theory 9.3 (1980): 141-156. | ||||||
| Group: | Social Science Working Papers | ||||||
| Series Name: | Social Science Working Paper | ||||||
| Issue or Number: | 209 | ||||||
| Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20171020-161257825 | ||||||
| Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171020-161257825 | ||||||
| Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | ||||||
| ID Code: | 82558 | ||||||
| Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | ||||||
| Deposited By: | Jacquelyn Bussone | ||||||
| Deposited On: | 20 Oct 2017 23:26 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 03 Oct 2019 18:55 |
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