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Pairwise Symmetry Conditions for Voting Equilibria

Matthews, Steven A. (1978) Pairwise Symmetry Conditions for Voting Equilibria. Social Science Working Paper, 209. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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Necessary conditions are established for a point contained in the interior or boundary of a convex feasible subset of Euclidean space to be quasi-undominated in an anonymous simple game. Most of the conditions are behaviorally intuitive and imply pariwise symmetries among utility gradients.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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Additional Information:This paper supplants its initial draft, which was circulated to a limited extent as "The Possibility of Voting Equilibria." Published as Matthews, Steven A. "Pairwise symmetry conditions for voting equilibria." International Journal of Game Theory 9.3 (1980): 141-156.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:209
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171020-161257825
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:82558
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:20 Oct 2017 23:26
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:55

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