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Toward a Theory of Legislative Decision

Ferejohn, John A. and Fiorina, Morris P. and Weisberg, Herbert F. (1978) Toward a Theory of Legislative Decision. Social Science Working Paper, 206. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171020-163236278

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Abstract

Recent developments in formal political analysis have spawned two seemingly related theories of democratic political processes. The more familiar of the two is the theory of electoral competition based on Downs' (1957) heuristics and greatly elaborated by Davis, Hinich and Ordeshook (1970), Kramer (1975), McKelvey (1976), and others. Somewhat less familiar (perhaps because the intellectual movement is less well integrated) is the theory of legislative decision which has grown from roots in game theory and the theory of social choice. Black (1958), Riker (1962), Plott (1967), Wilson (1969), Schwartz (1970), Kadane (1972), and several others have nurtured the rudimentary models which compose this theory.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171121-140049018Related ItemPublished chapter
Additional Information:Published in "Game Theory and Political Science" ed. by Peter Ordeshook & Richard McKelvey, New York University press, 1978
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171020-163236278
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171020-163236278
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:82560
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:24 Oct 2017 22:05
Last Modified:21 Nov 2017 22:19

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