Klein, Burton H. (1978) A Dynamic Theory of Regulation. Social Science Working Paper, 199. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171023-100308939
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Abstract
According to the theory presented in this paper, economic regulation does not ordinarily result from market failure; nor does it ordinarily result from an attempt to divide monopoly profits among a smaller, rather than larger, number of firms. It results from a difference in utility functions with respect to both individuals and firms: for example, when older firms in an industry lose their taste for rivalry and are able to obtain government assistance to impose “order” on the industry.
| Item Type: | Report or Paper (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Group: | Social Science Working Papers |
| Series Name: | Social Science Working Paper |
| Issue or Number: | 199 |
| Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20171023-100308939 |
| Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171023-100308939 |
| Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. |
| ID Code: | 82573 |
| Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS |
| Deposited By: | Jacquelyn Bussone |
| Deposited On: | 24 Oct 2017 21:46 |
| Last Modified: | 03 Oct 2019 18:56 |
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