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An Axiomatized Family of Power Indices for Simple n-Person Games

Deegan, John, Jr. and Packel, Edward W. (1978) An Axiomatized Family of Power Indices for Simple n-Person Games. Social Science Working Paper, 197. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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In this probabilistic generalization of the Deegan-Packel power index, a new family of power indices based on the notions of minimal winning coalitions and equal division of payoffs is developed. These indices are axiomatically characterized and compared to other similarly characterized indices. Additionally, a dual family of minimal blocking coalition indices and their characterization axioms is presented.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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Additional Information:Published as Packel, Edward W., and John Deegan. "An axiomated family of power indices for simple n-person games." Public Choice 35.2 (1980): 229-239.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:197
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171023-102413458
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:82575
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:24 Oct 2017 21:42
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:56

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