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Social Decision Functions and Strongly Decisive Sets

Packel, Edward W. (1980) Social Decision Functions and Strongly Decisive Sets. Social Science Working Paper, 193. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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Properties of the strongly decisive sets (some preference for x over y along with no preference for y over x allows coalitional enforcement of x over y) associated with a social decision function are investigated. The collection of such sets does not have the superset preserving property of filters, but is characterized by properties defining a target. A 1-1 and onto mapping is exhibited between the class of targets and a certain class of social decision functions, showing that such functions are completely characterized by the structure of their strongly decisive sets. The "ring" structure of targets is shown to be closely related to known results on veto hierarchies.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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Additional Information:Revised. Original dated to October 1977. The author wishes to thank Professor John A. Ferejohn for providing motivation and valuable suggestions Published as Packel, Edward W. "Social decision functions and strongly decisive sets." The Review of Economic Studies 48.2 (1981): 343-349.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:Economic theory, Ambivalence, Cultural customs, Mathematical monotonicity, Lexicography, Oligarchy, Decision making
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:193
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171023-103807912
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:82577
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:24 Oct 2017 21:34
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:56

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