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Representations of Binary Decision Rules by Generalized Decisiveness Structures

Ferejohn, John A. and Fishburn, Peter C. (1977) Representations of Binary Decision Rules by Generalized Decisiveness Structures. Social Science Working Paper, 168. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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This paper is motivated by two apparently dissimilar deficiencies in the theory of social choice and the theory of cooperative games. Both deficiencies stem from what we regard as an inadequate conception of decisiveness or coalitional power. Our main purpose will be to present a more general concept of decisiveness and to show that this notion allows us to characterize broad classes of games and social choice procedures.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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Additional Information:Published as Ferejohn, John A., and Peter C. Fishburn. "Representations of binary decision rules by generalized decisiveness structures." Journal of Economic Theory 21.1 (1979): 28-45.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:168
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171025-134446210
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:82666
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:25 Oct 2017 21:15
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:57

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