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Representations of Binary Decision Rules by Generalized Decisiveness Structures

Ferejohn, John A. and Fishburn, Peter C. (1977) Representations of Binary Decision Rules by Generalized Decisiveness Structures. Social Science Working Paper, 168. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171025-134446210

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Abstract

This paper is motivated by two apparently dissimilar deficiencies in the theory of social choice and the theory of cooperative games. Both deficiencies stem from what we regard as an inadequate conception of decisiveness or coalitional power. Our main purpose will be to present a more general concept of decisiveness and to show that this notion allows us to characterize broad classes of games and social choice procedures.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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Additional Information:Published as Ferejohn, John A., and Peter C. Fishburn. "Representations of binary decision rules by generalized decisiveness structures." Journal of Economic Theory 21.1 (1979): 28-45.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171025-134446210
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171025-134446210
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:82666
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:25 Oct 2017 21:15
Last Modified:21 Nov 2017 23:57

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