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A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms

Weingast, Barry R. (1976) A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms. Social Science Working Paper, 142. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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This paper presents a modification of the theory of the legislature which retains the assumption of self-interested maximizing behavior, but yields predictions consistent with empirical observation. In addition, this perspective suggests rationales for other features of Congress that are commonly reported in the empirical literature: the existence of various "norms," "roles," and "expectations."

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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Additional Information:I am grateful to Robert Bates, John Ferejohn, Morris Fiorina, James Quirk, and Roger Noll for helpful comments at the various stages of this paper. Published as Weingast, Barry R. "A rational choice perspective on congressional norms." American Journal of Political Science (1979): 245-262.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:Legislators, Universalism, Pork, Rational choice theory, Majority rule, Constituents, Games, Political parties, Total costs
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:142
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171025-140543064
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:82668
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:27 Oct 2017 17:53
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:57

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