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An axiomated family of power indices for simple n-person games

Packel, Edward W. and Deegan, John (1980) An axiomated family of power indices for simple n-person games. Public Choice, 35 (2). pp. 229-239. ISSN 0048-5829. doi:10.1007/BF00140846.

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In this probabilistic generalization of the Deegan-Packel power index, a new family of power indices based on the notions of minimal winning coalitions and equal division of pay offs is developed. The family of indices is parameterized by allowing minimal winning coalitions to form in accordance with varying probability functions. These indices are axiomatically characterized and compared to other similarly characterized indices. Additionally, a dual family of minimal blocking coalition indices and their characterization axioms is presented.

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Additional Information:© 1980 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers bv.
Issue or Number:2
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171025-160146170
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Official Citation:Packel, E.W. & Deegan, J. Public Choice (1980) 35: 229.
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:82686
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:25 Oct 2017 23:07
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 19:52

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