An axiomated family of power indices for simple n-person games

Packel, Edward W. and Deegan, John (1980) An axiomated family of power indices for simple n-person games. Public Choice, 35 (2). pp. 229-239. ISSN 0048-5829. doi:10.1007/BF00140846. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171025-160146170

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Abstract

In this probabilistic generalization of the Deegan-Packel power index, a new family of power indices based on the notions of minimal winning coalitions and equal division of pay offs is developed. The family of indices is parameterized by allowing minimal winning coalitions to form in accordance with varying probability functions. These indices are axiomatically characterized and compared to other similarly characterized indices. Additionally, a dual family of minimal blocking coalition indices and their characterization axioms is presented.

Item Type:

Article

Related URLs:

URL	URL Type	Description
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00140846	DOI	Article
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF00140846	Publisher	Article
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171025-160146170	Related Item	Working Paper

Additional Information:

Issue or Number:

DOI:

10.1007/BF00140846

Record Number:

CaltechAUTHORS:20171025-160146170

Persistent URL:

https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171025-160146170

Official Citation:

Packel, E.W. & Deegan, J. Public Choice (1980) 35: 229. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00140846

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No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.

ID Code:

82686

Collection:

CaltechAUTHORS

Deposited By:

Tony Diaz

Deposited On:

25 Oct 2017 23:07

Last Modified:

15 Nov 2021 19:52

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