Packel, Edward W. and Deegan, John (1980) An axiomated family of power indices for simple n-person games. Public Choice, 35 (2). pp. 229-239. ISSN 0048-5829. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171025-160146170
![[img]](https://authors.library.caltech.edu/style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png) |
PDF (sswp 197 - published)
- Published Version
Restricted to Caltech community only See Usage Policy. 440Kb |
Use this Persistent URL to link to this item: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171025-160146170
Abstract
In this probabilistic generalization of the Deegan-Packel power index, a new family of power indices based on the notions of minimal winning coalitions and equal division of pay offs is developed. The family of indices is parameterized by allowing minimal winning coalitions to form in accordance with varying probability functions. These indices are axiomatically characterized and compared to other similarly characterized indices. Additionally, a dual family of minimal blocking coalition indices and their characterization axioms is presented.
| Item Type: | Article | ||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Related URLs: |
| ||||||||||||
| Additional Information: | © 1980 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers bv. | ||||||||||||
| Issue or Number: | 2 | ||||||||||||
| Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20171025-160146170 | ||||||||||||
| Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171025-160146170 | ||||||||||||
| Official Citation: | Packel, E.W. & Deegan, J. Public Choice (1980) 35: 229. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00140846 | ||||||||||||
| Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | ||||||||||||
| ID Code: | 82686 | ||||||||||||
| Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | ||||||||||||
| Deposited By: | Tony Diaz | ||||||||||||
| Deposited On: | 25 Oct 2017 23:07 | ||||||||||||
| Last Modified: | 03 Oct 2019 18:57 |
Repository Staff Only: item control page
