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Candidate Preference under Uncertainty: An Expanded View of Rational Voting

Weisberg, Herbert F. and Fiorina, Morris P. (1976) Candidate Preference under Uncertainty: An Expanded View of Rational Voting. Social Science Working Paper, 138. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171026-150639896

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Abstract

This paper examines how rational voters might choose between candidates under conditions of uncertainty. We shall emphasize two rational voting approaches--"defensive voting" and "credulous voting "--which have previously escaped notice. Additionally, we shall map out some of the implications of electoral uncertainty for empirical tests of the rational model and for the development of spatial theory. We shall not attempt to prove how citizens decide to vote, but we shall expand considerably the conventional interpretation of rational voting.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171127-140938955Related ItemPublished Chapter
Additional Information:Published in The Electorate Reconsidered, edited by John Pierce and John Sullivan, pp. 237-256. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1980.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171026-150639896
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171026-150639896
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:82713
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:27 Oct 2017 17:41
Last Modified:27 Nov 2017 22:20

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