CaltechAUTHORS
  A Caltech Library Service

Bureaucratic compliance as a game on the unit square

Miller, Gary J. (1977) Bureaucratic compliance as a game on the unit square. Public Choice, 29 (1). pp. 37-51. ISSN 0048-5829. http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171027-160922103

[img] PDF (sswp 141 - published) - Published Version
Restricted to Caltech community only
See Usage Policy.

875Kb

Use this Persistent URL to link to this item: http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171027-160922103

Abstract

The most rigorous extensive theory of bureaucratic behavior yet developed is contained in William Niskanen's Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Niskanen's theory has numerous and important derivations explaining significant aspects of bureaucratic behavior, but even more importantly, it demonstrates the basic advantages of deductive methodology. By clearly and precisely stating its assumptions, Niskanen's theory invites falsification and correction in a way that can hopefully lead to a cumulative body of knowledge about bureaucratic organizations.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01718561DOIArticle
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF01718561PublisherArticle
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171026-142726993Related ItemWorking Paper
Additional Information:© 1977 Center for Study of Public Choice Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. The author, an assistant professor at California Institute of Technology, wishes to express his appreciation to Joe Oppenheimer and Norman Frohlieh for their helpful advice and encouragement during work on early drafts of this paper, and to William Niskanen for his thoughtful critique and suggestions.
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171027-160922103
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171027-160922103
Official Citation:Miller, G.J. Public Choice (1977) 29: 37. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01718561
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:82757
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:30 Oct 2017 21:09
Last Modified:27 Nov 2017 21:47

Repository Staff Only: item control page