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Patent Policy, Technological Innovation, and Government Contracts: A Selective Critique

Collins, Wayne D. and Ferejohn, John A. and Kevles, Daniel J. (1974) Patent Policy, Technological Innovation, and Government Contracts: A Selective Critique. Social Science Working Paper, 56. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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In traditional economics, the patent system has rested on a twofold justification: 1) The award of a temporary monopoly to the creator of an invention will induce investment in inventive activity; 2) Given such a temporary monopoly, the inventor will make his invention public knowledge. Numerous writers have treated the first assertion, and a few have considered the second. But there is also a general welfare question to be considered: Is society better off with a patent system than without one?

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Additional Information:Published in Government Policies and Technological Innovatio, National Technical Information Service. National Science Foundation, Washington, D.C. 20550. Vol. II, p. 23-51, State-of-the-Art Surveys, PB244572/AS, 1974.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:56
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171101-144643147
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:82850
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:02 Nov 2017 19:43
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:59

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