Collins, Wayne D. and Ferejohn, John A. and Kevles, Daniel J. (1974) Patent Policy, Technological Innovation, and Government Contracts: A Selective Critique. Social Science Working Paper, 56. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171101-144643147
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Abstract
In traditional economics, the patent system has rested on a twofold justification: 1) The award of a temporary monopoly to the creator of an invention will induce investment in inventive activity; 2) Given such a temporary monopoly, the inventor will make his invention public knowledge. Numerous writers have treated the first assertion, and a few have considered the second. But there is also a general welfare question to be considered: Is society better off with a patent system than without one?
| Item Type: | Report or Paper (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | Published in Government Policies and Technological Innovatio, National Technical Information Service. National Science Foundation, Washington, D.C. 20550. Vol. II, p. 23-51, State-of-the-Art Surveys, PB244572/AS, 1974. |
| Group: | Social Science Working Papers |
| Series Name: | Social Science Working Paper |
| Issue or Number: | 56 |
| Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20171101-144643147 |
| Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171101-144643147 |
| Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. |
| ID Code: | 82850 |
| Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS |
| Deposited By: | Jacquelyn Bussone |
| Deposited On: | 02 Nov 2017 19:43 |
| Last Modified: | 03 Oct 2019 18:59 |
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