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Some new impossibility theorems

Ferejohn, John A. and Grether, David M. (1977) Some new impossibility theorems. Public Choice, 30 (1). pp. 35-42. ISSN 0048-5829. doi:10.1007/BF01718816.

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Mas-Colell and Sonnenschein [1972] have proved a well-known impossibility theorem for acyclic social preference. They showed that if social preference is acyclic for each configuration of individual preferences, and if the mapping between individual and social preferences satisfies the Pareto axiom, the independence of irrelevant alternatives, and May’s positive responsiveness axiom, then there must be an individual i such that for any x and y, xP_iy ⇒ xRy. This individual might be considered a “vetoer.”

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Additional Information:© 1977 Center for Study of Public Choice Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.
Issue or Number:1
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171101-145356732
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Official Citation:Ferejohn, J.A. & Grether, D.M. Public Choice (1977) 30: 35.
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:82853
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:01 Nov 2017 23:06
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 19:53

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