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Artificial Markets and the Theory of Games

Montgomery, W. David (1973) Artificial Markets and the Theory of Games. Social Science Working Paper, 8. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171101-165803522

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Abstract

The theory of games has provided notable insights into the nature of bargaining processes. In this article I will apply co-operative game theory to a specific problem of air pollution control, as a device for designing and evaluating a set of institutions intended to eliminate certain transaction costs which appear to prevent profitable bargains from being consummated.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171106-125213907Related ItemPublished Version
Additional Information:Revised. This article draws on material included in my doctoral dissertation, "Market Systems for the Control of Air Pollution," submitted to the Department of Economics at Harvard University. A lengthier version was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society in May 1972. I am indebted to Kenneth Arrow, Walter Isard, James Krier and Charles Plott for suggestions and criticisms, and to the Environmental Quality Laboratory of the California Institute of Technology for research support. Published as Montgomery, W. David. "Artificial markets and the theory of games." Public Choice 18.1 (1974): 25-40.
Group:Social Science Working Papers, Environmental Quality Laboratory
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Environmental Quality LaboratoryUNSPECIFIED
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171101-165803522
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171101-165803522
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:82870
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:02 Nov 2017 17:42
Last Modified:20 Mar 2018 18:38

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