The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in Budget Allocation Problems

Dutta, Bhaskar and Jackson, Matthew O. and Le Breton, Michel (2004) The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in Budget Allocation Problems. Social Science Working Paper, 1195. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171102-145748198

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Abstract

We examine how a society chooses to divide a given budget among various regions, projects or individuals. In particular, we characterize the Banks set and the Uncovered Set in such problems. We show that the two sets can be proper subsets of the set of all alternatives, and at times are very pointed in their predictions. This contrasts with well-known "chaos theorems," which suggest that majority voting does not lead to any meaningful predictions when the policy space is multidimensional.

Item Type:

Report or Paper (Working Paper)

Related URLs:

URL	URL Type	Description
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160317-143414501	Related Item	Later version published in Social Choice and Strategic Behavior: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey Scot Banks (2005)

ORCID:

Author	ORCID
Jackson, Matthew O.	0000-0001-9846-4249

Additional Information:

This paper was written in fond memory of our dear friend and colleague Jeffrey Scot Banks. Financial support under NSF grant SES-0316493 is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Salvador Barbera for helpful conversations that helped spark some of the ideas behind the model we develop here, and David Austen-Smith for detailed comments on an earlier draft.

Group:

Social Science Working Papers

Funders:

Funding Agency	Grant Number
NSF	SES-0316493

Subject Keywords:

Banks Set, allocation problems, uncovered set, majority voting

Series Name:

Social Science Working Paper

Issue or Number:

1195

Classification Code:

JEL: C72, D71, D72

Record Number:

CaltechAUTHORS:20171102-145748198

Persistent URL:

https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171102-145748198

Usage Policy:

No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.

ID Code:

82911

Collection:

CaltechAUTHORS

Deposited By:

Jacquelyn Bussone

Deposited On:

03 Nov 2017 17:31

Last Modified:

03 Oct 2019 19:00

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