A Caltech Library Service

Contracts versus Salaries in Matching

Echenique, Federico (2012) Contracts versus Salaries in Matching. American Economic Review, 102 (1). pp. 594-601. ISSN 0002-8282. doi:10.1257/aer.102.1.594.

[img] PDF - Published Version
See Usage Policy.

[img] PDF - Submitted Version
See Usage Policy.


Use this Persistent URL to link to this item:


Firms and workers may sign complex contracts that govern many aspects of their interactions. I show that when firms regard contracts as substitutes, bargaining over contracts can be understood as bargaining only over wages. Substitutes is the assumption commonly used to guarantee the existence of stable matchings of workers and firms.

Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription ItemEarlier version published as Social Science Working Paper 1322
Echenique, Federico0000-0002-1567-6770
Additional Information:© 2012 American Economic Association. I thank Vince Crawford, Flip Klijn, Scott Kominers, and Michael Ostrovsky for very useful comments. I am also very grateful to three anonymous referees for their thoughtful questions and suggestions.
Issue or Number:1
Classification Code:JEL: C78, D86, J31, J41
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171102-165954225
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:82923
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:03 Nov 2017 17:43
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 19:54

Repository Staff Only: item control page