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Information transfer and aggregation in an uninformed committee: A model for the selection and use of biased expert advice

Plott, Charles R. and Llewellyn, Morgan (2015) Information transfer and aggregation in an uninformed committee: A model for the selection and use of biased expert advice. Social Science Working Paper, 1394. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171103-132700481

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Abstract

A committee of five uses majority rule for decisions on two public goods. Individual committee member preferences depend on a state of nature that is unknown to the committee members but the state of nature is known to two experts who have preferences about committee decisions. Experts have no vote on the committee but provide a recommendation to the committee at the opening of a meeting. Two experts who have known, opposing biases are selected – a dyadic mechanism. The results reveal that experts do not tell the truth but committee decisions are as if committee members know what the experts know. The information transfer occurs because committee members anticipate the biases and properly infer the information held by the experts.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160204-111040366Related ItemPublished Version
Additional Information:The financial support of the Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science is gratefully acknowledged. The paper benefited from the comments of Rick Harbaugh and Alexander Hirsch and the insights of Meghana Bhatt, who as a student in a Caltech experimental economics class, conducted initial pilot experiments. The research and paper also benefited from the participants attending a conference on behavioral and experimental economics held at the University of California Santa Barbara in February 2006.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
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Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political ScienceUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:Cheap talk; Committee experts; Expert biases; Experiments; Majority rule; Information aggregation
Classification Code:JEL: C90; D71; D81
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171103-132700481
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171103-132700481
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:82939
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:03 Nov 2017 20:33
Last Modified:03 Nov 2017 20:33

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