A Caltech Library Service

Group play in games and the role of consent in network formation

Charness, Gary and Jackson, Matthew O. (2007) Group play in games and the role of consent in network formation. Journal of Economic Theory, 136 (1). pp. 417-445. ISSN 0022-0531. doi:10.1016/j.jet.2006.09.006.

Full text is not posted in this repository. Consult Related URLs below.

Use this Persistent URL to link to this item:


We study games played between groups of players, where a given group decides which strategy it will play through a vote by its members. When groups consist of two voting players, our games can also be interpreted as network-formation games. In experiments on Stag Hunt games, we find a stark contrast between how groups and individuals play, with payoffs playing a primary role in equilibrium selection when individuals play, but the structure of the voting rule playing the primary role when groups play. We develop a new solution concept, robust-belief equilibrium, which explains the data that we observe. We provide results showing that this solution concept has application beyond the particular games in our experiments. © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription ItemEarlier version published as Social Science Working Paper 1193
Jackson, Matthew O.0000-0001-9846-4249
Additional Information:© 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Received 20 March 2006; final version received 7 September 2006; Available online 11 December 2006. Formerly SSWP 1193.
Subject Keywords:Groups; Networks; Game theory; Equilibrium selection; Equilibrium refinement; Majority voting; Group play; Robust-belief equilibrium
Issue or Number:1
Classification Code:JEL: D85; A14; C72; C91; D71; D72
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171103-151032635
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:82950
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:07 Nov 2017 18:19
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 19:54

Repository Staff Only: item control page