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Secure Implementation Experiments: Do Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Really Work?

Cason, Timothy N. and Saijo, Tatsuyoshi and Sjöström, Tomas and Yamato, Takehiko (2006) Secure Implementation Experiments: Do Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Really Work? Games and Economic Behavior, 57 . pp. 206-235. ISSN 0899-8256. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171103-161701675

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Abstract

Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a standard concept used in social choice theory. Saijo, Sjöström and Yamato [Saijo, T., Sjöström, T., Yamato, T., 2003. Secure implementation: Strategy-proof mechanisms reconsidered. Working paper 4-03-1. Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University] argue that this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategyproof mechanisms have a continuum of Nash equilibria, including equilibria other than dominant strategy equilibria. For only a subset of strategy-proof mechanisms do the set of Nash equilibria and the set of dominant strategy equilibria coincide. For example, this double coincidence occurs in the Groves mechanism when preferences are single-peaked. We report experiments using two strategy-proof mechanisms. One of them has a large number of Nash equilibria, but the other has a unique Nash equilibrium. We found clear differences in the rate of dominant strategy play between the two.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.12.007DOIArticle
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825605001612PublisherArticle
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-151328081Related ItemWorking Paper
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Cason, Timothy N.0000-0001-9581-5015
Additional Information:© 2006 Elsevier Inc. Received 24 November 2003; Available online 3 February 2006. Research was partially supported by the Grant in Aid for Scientific Research 15310023 of the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture in Japan, a Tokyo Center for Economic Research Grant, a Japan Economic Research Foundation Grant, and a University Faculty Scholar award at Purdue University. We thank anonymous referees and an associate editor for their useful comments. Formerly SSWP 1165.
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT)15310023
Japan Economic Research FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Purdue UniversityUNSPECIFIED
Classification Code:JEL: C92; D71; D78; H41
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171103-161701675
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171103-161701675
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:82964
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:06 Nov 2017 21:24
Last Modified:09 Mar 2020 13:18

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