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Secure Implementation Experiments: Do Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Really Work?

Cason, Timothy N. and Saijo, Tatsuyoshi and Sjöström, Tomas and Yamato, Takehiko (2006) Secure Implementation Experiments: Do Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Really Work? Games and Economic Behavior, 57 . pp. 206-235. ISSN 0899-8256.

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Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a standard concept used in social choice theory. Saijo, Sjöström and Yamato [Saijo, T., Sjöström, T., Yamato, T., 2003. Secure implementation: Strategy-proof mechanisms reconsidered. Working paper 4-03-1. Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University] argue that this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategyproof mechanisms have a continuum of Nash equilibria, including equilibria other than dominant strategy equilibria. For only a subset of strategy-proof mechanisms do the set of Nash equilibria and the set of dominant strategy equilibria coincide. For example, this double coincidence occurs in the Groves mechanism when preferences are single-peaked. We report experiments using two strategy-proof mechanisms. One of them has a large number of Nash equilibria, but the other has a unique Nash equilibrium. We found clear differences in the rate of dominant strategy play between the two.

Item Type:Article
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Cason, Timothy N.0000-0001-9581-5015
Additional Information:© 2006 Elsevier Inc. Received 24 November 2003; Available online 3 February 2006. Research was partially supported by the Grant in Aid for Scientific Research 15310023 of the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture in Japan, a Tokyo Center for Economic Research Grant, a Japan Economic Research Foundation Grant, and a University Faculty Scholar award at Purdue University. We thank anonymous referees and an associate editor for their useful comments. Formerly SSWP 1165.
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT)15310023
Japan Economic Research FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Purdue UniversityUNSPECIFIED
Classification Code:JEL: C92; D71; D78; H41
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171103-161701675
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:82964
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:06 Nov 2017 21:24
Last Modified:09 Mar 2020 13:18

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