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Allocation rules for network games

Jackson, Matthew O. (2005) Allocation rules for network games. Games and Economic Behavior, 51 . pp. 128-154. ISSN 0899-8256. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2004.04.009.

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Previous allocation rules for network games, such as the Myerson value, implicitly or explicitly take the network structure as fixed. In many situations, however, the network structure can be altered by players. This means that the value of alternative network structures (not just sub-networks) can and should influence the allocation of value among players on any given network structure. I present a family of allocation rules that incorporate information about alternative network structures when allocating value.

Item Type:Article
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URLURL TypeDescription ItemWorking Paper
Jackson, Matthew O.0000-0001-9846-4249
Additional Information:© 2004 Elsevier Inc. Received 4 June 2003; Available online 12 October 2004. I thank Jernej Copic, Sergio Currarini, Gabrielle Demange, Bhaskar Dutta, Cheng-Zhong Qin, Sudipta Sarangi, Anne van de Nouweland, and Eyal Winter for helpful discussions and comments on earlier drafts. I am also grateful to two anonymous referees whose detailed suggestions have improved the exposition, and for Financial support from the Lee Center for Advanced Networking. Formerly SSWP 1160.
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Caltech Lee Center for Advanced NetworkingUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:Networks; Network games; Allocation rules; Cooperative games
Classification Code:JEL: A14; C71; C72; D85
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171103-162601118
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:82965
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:06 Nov 2017 21:17
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 19:54

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