CaltechAUTHORS
  A Caltech Library Service

The Simultaneous, Ascending Auction: Dynamics of Price Adjustment in Experiments and in the U.K. 3G Spectrum Auction

Plott, Charles R. and Salmon, Timothy C. (2002) The Simultaneous, Ascending Auction: Dynamics of Price Adjustment in Experiments and in the U.K. 3G Spectrum Auction. Social Science Working Paper, 1155. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171103-164629754

[img] PDF (sswp 1155 - Jul. 18, 2002) - Submitted Version
See Usage Policy.

458Kb

Use this Persistent URL to link to this item: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171103-164629754

Abstract

In this paper we develop a model of the behavior of bidders in simultaneous ascending auctions based on two principles: principle of surplus maximization and the principle of bid minimization. These principles lead to models of both price dynamics and equilibration, leading to disequilibrium structural equations that can be used for estimating bidder values. The intention behind the development of this methodology is to provide an auctioneer a method of extracting information during an auction about possible closing prices. We first benchmark the performance of the model with data from experimental auctions and then apply it to the U.K. UMTS or Third Generation Mobile auction.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140303-164524335Related ItemPublished Version
Additional Information:Published as Charles R. Plott, Timothy C. Salmon, The simultaneous, ascending auction: dynamics of price adjustment in experiments and in the UK3G spectrum auction, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 53, Issue 3, March 2004, Pages 353-383,
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:Multiple Unit Auctions, Value Estimation, Spectrum Auctions
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1155
Classification Code:JEL: C7, C9, C5
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20171103-164629754
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171103-164629754
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:82969
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:06 Nov 2017 19:16
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 19:00

Repository Staff Only: item control page